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Chapter 1. The Rise of Asia:  
What Implications for International Law and Global Governance? 
 
1.1 Asia Rising, Asia Leading 
 Interest in the possible impact of the rise of Asia in world affairs has been 
growing for a number of years.1  Asia’s emergence has become one of the most important 
developments in the post-Cold War international system, and it has drawn attention from 
scholars and practitioners who study the balance of power in international politics, the 
process of economic growth and competition, and the acceleration of globalization.2  
Although definitions of what constitutes “Asia” differ,3 there is little disagreement that 
the epi-center for the rise of Asia sits in eastern and southeastern Asia, with China as the 
most prominent nation in Asia’s on-going political and economic transformations.  
Predictions that the 21st century will be the “Asian century” provide food for thought 
about the implications of Asia’s future role in world affairs.4  Policy debates and 
controversies about Asia’s significance now and in the future have many different facets, 
                                            
1 D. Fidler, The Asian Century: Implications for International Law, 9 Singapore Yearbook of Int’l 
L. 19 (2005) [hereinafter Fidler, Asian Century], p. 19. On the rise of Asia in world affairs, see C. 
Lingle, The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to the Global 
Millennium 3rd rev. ed. (Asia 2000); International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (G. 
Ikenberry & M. Mastanduno, eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2003); Power Shift: China and Asia’s 
New Dynamics (D. Shambaugh, ed., Univ. California Press 2006).  
2 On the impact of globalization on the rise of Asia, see Globalization and Change in Asia (J. 
Heffron, ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2007); M. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From 
Decolonization to Globalization (Routledge 2003).  
3 Experts segment “Asia” in different ways, including East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and 
Western Asia. Of these regional groupings, the dynamism is most prominent in East and 
Southeast Asia, with India and South Asia region frequently being mentioned as important in 
Asia’s rise. Except for India, however, the South Asia (e.g., Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
and Myanmar) and Western Asia (e.g., Iran and Middle East) regions are not exhibiting signs of 
dramatic gains in political and economic power as East and Southeast Asia have experienced.  
4 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 1, pp. 19-20. 
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but they all point to an underlying consensus that, for 21st century international relations, 
Asia will matter more than the region has ever previously done, and will matter in ways 
significantly different from how Asia had political importance in earlier historical eras. 
 This thesis explores one aspect of this larger, vibrant phenomenon of Asia’s rise to 
global prominence—the potential impact of Asia’s political and economic transformation 
in world affairs on international law and global governance.  This thesis argues that the 
outlines of an Asian perspective on international law and global governance can be 
detected through analysis of aspects of the Asian philosophical tradition, the Asian 
historical experience, and Asia’s contemporary importance. More specifically, this Asian 
perspective reflects Asia’s historical exploitation at the hands of Western imperialism, 
insights and values captured by Asian philosophical traditions, especially Confucianism, 
and the potential impact that the growth in Asian political, economic, and military power 
may have on international relations.  In short, philosophy, politics, and power are the 
main drivers of an Asian perspective on international law and global governance.  
 
1.2 From Westphalia to Eastphalia 
 Past and future international systems are frequently described as Westphalian or 
post-Westphalian.5  These terms refer to the structure of the international political system 
created by the Peace of Westphalia concluded in 1648 to end to the bloody Thirty-Years 
War in Europe.6  The attributes established for inter-state relations in the Peace of 
                                            
5 A. Cassese, International Law 2nd ed. (Oxford Univ. Press 2005), pp. 22-25. On the post-
Westphalia, see R. Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. Ethics 311 
(2004). 
6
 On the historical development of international law after the Peace of Westphalia in general, see 
W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (M. Byers trans., Walter de Gruyter 2000), pp. 279-
424. 
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Westphalia, particularly the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other states, became the fundamental working principles for 
international politics for the next 350 years.  The modern system of international law also 
emerged from the Westphalian structure for international politics.7  Changes in 
international relations that have created political conditions or developments that 
challenged the basic tenets of the Westphalian system are often dubbed post-
Westphalian,8 to indicate their divergence from the central structuring principles that had 
long dominated relations among states and peoples. 
 Whether an international system in the past was Westphalian or post-Westphalian, 
the driving forces behind its dynamics were predominantly Western countries and 
Western ideas.  The 19th century was the “European century” because European nations 
dominated international relations and, through imperialism, make the Westphalian model 
universal in its scope and application.9  The 20th century was the “American century” 
because the United States emerged over the course of the century as the most powerful 
political, economic, and military power the world had ever seen.10  The United States 
played the decisive role in the three great wars of the 20th century—World War I, World 
War II, and the Cold War—and brought Western ideas of democracy, human rights, and 
economic interdependence to bear on the international relations in ways that challenged 
key Westphalian assumptions and moved thinking into post-Westphalian realms. 
                                            
7 Cassese, supra note 5, pp. 46-68. See also, A. Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, 
and the Westphalian Myth, 55 Int’l Org. 251 (2001). 
8 See R. Falk, Law in Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective (Transnational 
Publishers 1998).   
9 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 1, pp. 21-22. 
10 Id., pp. 22-25. 
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 The influence of Europe and Untied States in world affairs in the 19th and 20th 
centuries put the “West” in “Westphalian” in ways most sharply felt by nations that 
developed outside the Euro-American traditions of politics, philosophy, governance, and 
law.  Asia was one of the non-Western regions of the world that was brought within the 
Westphalian world through European imperialism and the geopolitical needs of the great 
powers and superpowers of the 19th and 20th centuries.  Compared to the surging power 
of the West, Asian countries were politically fragile, economically vulnerable, and 
militarily weak, and, hence, did not exert independent influence on how international 
relations operated.  The inability of Asian countries to leave their mark on international 
relations extended to international governance mechanisms, facilitated by a system of 
international law designed by Western states to serve their global interests. 
 The rise of Asia over the course of the past 20 years creates a different dynamic 
than the one that dominated the experiences of Asian countries within the Westphalian 
system.  This rise has occurred simultaneously with the emergence of a new phase of 
globalization, dramatically catalyzed by the triumph of the United States and its liberal, 
democratic allies in the Cold War.  This triumph, and efforts made by Western countries 
to promote their ideas and interests in the post-Cold War environment, permeated every 
continent and region of the world.  Only in Asia, however, did the world begin to see 
large-scale political and economic developments that both successfully integrated many 
Western ideas and practices and revealed perspectives and approaches indigenous to the 
experience of a non-Western region.  In the face of the onslaught of Western ideas and 
 5 
interests in the post-Cold war period, many in Asia began to push back and to claim an 
independent foundation for Asian political action in this new world order.11 
 This thesis examines what this independent Asian framework might entail.  What 
are the components of this “Eastphalian” perspective on international relations, and from 
where did these components come?  How do these components shape an Eastphalian 
approach to international law and global governance in the early part of the 21st century?  
Attempting to answer these questions has proved daunting because these questions 
encompass a diverse geopolitical region and a bewildering variety of issues that range 
from the deeply philosophical to the strictly practical.  The analysis in this thesis perhaps 
raises more questions than it answers, but the effort to tackle such big questions has been 
worthwhile because it reveals basic aspects of an Asian perspective on international 
relations and international law and identifies the challenges Asian countries face if they 
wish to see Asia influence the future of world affairs in ways commensurate with the 
power and importance Asia has now and will have in the future.  Whether historians look 
back on the 21st century as the Asian century may well depend on whether Asian 
countries individually and collectively meet the challenges that making Eastphalia a 
beacon for global efforts to improve the human condition entails. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 The thesis analyzes the potential implications of an Asian perspective on 
international law and global governance in two substantive parts.  The first part looks 
backwards at the experiences of Asian countries with Western imperialism and 
                                            
11 This pushback was most famously seen in the “Asian values” debate, which Chapter 5 analyzes 
in detail. 
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international law, while the second part examines the contemporary features of an 
Easthphalian approach to international relations and international law.  This mixture of 
historical and contemporary materials provides a rich and complex collection of 
influences, ideas, and issues to explore. 
 The first chapter in Part I (Chapter 2) analyzes the Asian worldview prior to the 
forcible incorporation of Asia into the Westphalian system.  The impact of Western 
imperialism was so significant that the process of incorporation has obscured non-
Western concepts of international order and international law that existed in Asia.  
Chapter 2 sketches the foundations of a pre-Westphalian perspective in Asia on 
international order, and these foundations involve the influence of Confucianism as a 
political philosophy and the importance of the Sinocentric system that functioned in East 
Asia prior to the arrival of Western imperialism.  The collapse of the Sinocentric system 
occurs when the Western great powers begin to determine the course of events in Asia, 
and this period also sees the importation and application of Western international law in 
Asia.  As a weaker part of an international system with global scope, Asia follows in the 
wake of the great events that shape the course of international law, and the loss of an 
Asian voice in world affairs becomes more profound.  
 Chapter 3 focuses more specifically on the important relationship between 
international law and concepts of civilization.  The Western imperial powers justified 
their discriminatory treatment of Asian governments and peoples under the “standard of 
civilization,” which privileged civilized countries over uncivilized nations.12  Asian 
countries were uncivilized under international law and, therefore, unworthy of enjoying 
                                            
12 See, e.g., G. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Clarendon Press 
1984); Globalization and Civilization (M. Mozaffari, ed., Routledge 2002). 
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the full rights of the Westphalian international legal system until they became civilized 
(i.e., Westernized) states.  Chapter 3 describes the mechanisms through which Western 
countries applied the standard of civilization, namely the system of capitulations and the 
use of unequal treaties.  Although the period of decolonization after World War II is 
believed to have expunged the standard of civilization from international law civilization-
centric features of international law continue to appear in the post-Cold War world.  The 
triumph of the United States and its allies in the Cold War gave globalization a very 
particular ideological edge,13 which powerfully influenced international law and its use.  
What has emerged in the post-Westphalian era is a new standard of civilization, the 
standard of global civilization, which influences international law in many of the same 
ways the old standard of civilization informed the law of nations.  It is this new standard 
of global civilization that the rise of Asia confronts and perhaps may start to shape in the 
early part of the 21st century. 
 Chapter 4 of the thesis reviews attempts to analyze critically the biased and 
discriminatory evolution of modern international law experienced in Asia and other non-
Western regions of the world.  The focus of this analysis is on a school of international 
legal theory called “Third World Approaches to International Law,” or TWAIL.  The 
TWAIL school of thought represents the best-known critical deconstruction of the history 
of international law, which reveals international law to have largely functioned as an 
instrument of imperialism, racism, and oppression against non-Western peoples.  In many 
                                            
13 A prominent example of this ideological edge was the so-called “Washington consensus” that 
influenced how major international economic and financial institutions (e.g., World Trade 
Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund) approached economic reform in 
developing countries. On the Washington consensus, see C. Gore, The Rise and Fall of the 
Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries, 28 World Development 789 
(2000); M. Naim, Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or 
Washington Confusion? 21 Third World Q. 505 (2000).  
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ways, TWAIL provided a theoretical approach for non-Western experts to expose 
injustices not highlighted by standard methodologies for analyzing international law.  
Chapter 4 explores the strengths and weaknesses of TWAIL, especially how these 
strengths and weaknesses relate to the search for an Asian perspective on international 
law and global governance. 
 Part II of the thesis turns its attention toward contemporary times and works to 
elucidate the features of an Eastphalian outlook on present-day international relations and 
international law.  One of the problems with Asian critiques of international law is that, 
like TWAIL, they tend to dwell too heavily on the past and simply recycle the “Asia as 
victim” story.  But Asia’s rise in political power and prominence means that any 
Eastphalian perspective has to reflect not only the past but also a forward-looking, 
constructive worldview.  Asian countries can no longer be satisfied with narrative that 
reflects only complaints about the bad old days of Western imperialism. 
 Thus, Part II begins with Chapter 5’s analysis of the famous “Asian values” 
debate and controversy that emerged in the 1990s, just as the post-Cold War international 
system was taking shape and globalization was accelerating.  Chapter 5 takes a critical 
look at the assertion made by Asian leaders that the ideas and values of the West, being 
pushed aggressively through the processes of globalization, were not superior to or 
adequate substitutes for the values and traditions Asian countries possessed.  This debate 
connected with philosophical issues raised by Confucianism and stimulated questions 
about what “Asia” meant for this method of pushing back against Western influence.  The 
“Asian values” debate also has significant implications for key aspects of post-Cold War 
international relations and international law, such as the promotion of democracy and the 
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protection of human rights, and Chapter 5 spends a significant amount of time exploring 
complex human rights issues the “Asian values” debate raised.  In sum, the “Asian 
values” debate provides an important window into aspects of an Asian perspective on 
international law and global governance. 
 Chapter 6 engages in a detailed case study of the Asian perspective on one of the 
most important and controversial areas of contemporary international law—the 
international legal rules on the use of force by states.  This chapter describes the existing 
rules on the use of force and identifies the controversies with these rules concerning the 
scope of the right to use force in self-defense and whether states have a right to use force 
in humanitarian interventions.  With this background in place, the chapter then explores 
the Asian perspective on the use of force by states.  This exploration involves looking at 
Confucian ideas on the use of force, self-defense, and humanitarian intervention, as well 
as the policy approaches to the use of force generally taken by Asian states in 
contemporary international relations.  Chapter 6 particularly probes how Asian countries 
perceive humanitarian intervention.  This chapter also looks in detail at how the Asian 
perspective on the use of force, self-defense, and humanitarian intervention relates to the 
emerging normative concept in international law and global governance of “human 
security.”  The chapter concludes by analyzing the “China factor”—how the growth of 
Chinese power and influence in Asia and beyond may affect the Asian perspective on 
human security and international law. 
 The last chapter (Chapter 7) provides an overview of the major arguments and 
conclusions of the thesis in order to clarify the emerging outlines of an Eastphalian 
perspective on international law and global governance.  It describes the main influences 
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informing the Eastphalian perspective, and these influences reflect the importance of 
Confucian philosophy, the historical experiences of Asian countries, and the relevance of 
Asian power, especially Chinese power, in the current international system.  The chapter 
considers what the impact of the Eastphalian outlook on international law and global 
governance might entail, which involves looking closely at the strengths and weaknesses 
of this perspective.  The thesis concludes with some critical analysis on the question 
whether the Eastphalian perspective gives Asia the opportunity to be a laboratory for 
policy reforms that can improve human security in Asia and beyond.  Will other countries 
and regions of the world look to Asia and the Eastphalian template for guidance on how 
to meet the pressing challenges of an increasingly globalized world?  Although an 
Eastphalian perspective is discernable, whether it will guide international law and global 
governance in the 21st century remains subject to significant doubt. 
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PART I. ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AND CRITICAL THEORY 
 
 12 
Chapter 2. An Asian Perspective on International Order: 
Rise and Fall of a Philosophical and Political Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Before analyzing how Asian countries may affect the future of international law, 
pausing to consider philosophical and historical aspects concerning international law in 
the Asian region will be helpful for understanding whether and how Asian factor may 
shape international law in early 21st century.   
This chapter examines the philosophical and political framework of international 
relations developed in Asia before the arrival of Western imperialism, with an emphasis 
on Confucian thinking and the operation of a Sinocentric international system.  The 
chapter then describes how Western imperialism destroyed this framework and 
incorporated Asia into the European-dominated Westphalian system of international 
relations and international law.  Opportunity for a distinctive Asian voice did not emerge 
strongly during the Cold War’s bipolar balance of power competition and ideological 
battles between liberalism, communism, and anti-imperialism.  The post-Cold War 
“triumph” of the United States and its version of globalized liberalism moved 
international law into a new post-Westphalian phase that reflected Western interests as 
strongly as the European-dominated system of international law did in the 19th and first 
half of the 20th centuries. 
The background provided by this chapter is important in understanding not only 
the history of Asian countries’ relationship with international law but also the present 
context in which the rise of Asia is occurring.  As later chapters elucidate, the heritage of 
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Confucianism and Western exploitation of Asia discussed in this chapter still factor 
significantly in the Asian perspective on international law and global governance 
emerging in the early 21st century.  
 
2.2 The Westphalian Shadow: Obscuring the Origins of Non-Western Perspectives 
on International Order and International Law 
The history of humankind has involved continuous efforts to create and operate 
mechanisms that maintain societies and help them flourish.  For functional societies, 
authoritative decisions, also known as law, have always played an important role in 
structuring and harmonizing the values and goals of societies.  Law is one of the most 
significant constituent elements of society.  The Latin maxim “Ubi societas ibi jus”—
where there is society, there is law—clearly reflects the paramount importance of law in 
any society.  
With the growth of populations and the material power of societies, and with their 
geographical expansion, humankind confronted the need to have authoritative norms that 
regulated the relationships between independent societies.  This need fuelled the 
development of conceptions and systems of inter-society rules that pre-dated the 
emergence of the European Westphalian system in the 17th century.  The rise of the 
Westphalian international order, and its subsequent universal application through 
European-dominated international law, has obscured important non-Western ideas and 
practices concerning inter-society relations.  Understanding whether the political and 
economic rise of Asia in the early 21st century is contributing to the development of an 
“Eastphalian” perspective on international law and governance requires consideration of 
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the controversial impact of the Westphalian system on non-European regions and ways of 
thinking. 
The Westphalian system is based on a state-centric model of international 
relations and reflects predominantly the European perspective, and has great importance 
in the fields of international law and international relations.  The seminal date for the 
emergence of modern international law and international relations—1648 —is the same.1   
Werner argues that 1648 marked the death of a pre-modern feudal order, an order 
subsequently replaced with the modern system of international law and international 
relations.  This modern system takes as its starting point the principle of sovereignty for 
territorial states.2   
The European origins of the Westphalian system meant, not surprisingly, that 
European countries structured and shaped modern international law in ways that reflected 
their interests and ideas.3  European countries’ tremendous influence on every aspect of 
international law meant that international law developed, generally speaking, as the 
“Public Law of Europe.”4  This historical dynamic has echoes in Asia because, as 
                                            
1 P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 7th rev. ed. (Routledge 
1997), p. 9. On the historical development of international law after the Peace of Westphalia in 
general, see W. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (M. Byers trans., Walter de Gruyter 
2000), pp. 279-424; A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations rev. ed. (Macmillan 
1958), pp. 115-290. For a concise introduction to the Westphalian system, see D. Fidler, Revolt 
Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of 
International Law, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 29 (2003), pp. 34-37. 
2 W. Werner, “The Unnamed Third”: Roberta Kevelson’s Legal Semiotics and the Development of 
International Law, 12 Int’l J Semiotics of L. 309 (1999), p. 319. 
3 R.P. Anand, “Attitude of the Asian-African States Towards Certain Problems of International 
Law,” in Third World Attitudes Towards International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S. 
Sathirathai, eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987), p. 6. 
4 D. Fidler, The Asian Century: Implications for International Law, 9 Singapore Yearbook of Int’l 
L. 19 (2005) [hereinafter, Fidler, Asian Century], p. 21. On the European character of 
international law, see C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth—In the International Law of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum (Telos Press 2003). 
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discussed below in more detail, the Asian understanding of rules governing the relations 
of independent societies reflected the characteristics and cultures of the Asian region. 
The shadow of the Westphalian system extended, however, beyond Europe through the 
global scale of European imperialism.  The European character of international law’s 
substance and spread gave the impression that only European countries were involved in 
the creation of international law.5  Fidler points out that “[T]he European century’s most 
distinctive mark on international law was its universalization as an instrument of 
international governance.  The universalization of international law was a by-product of 
European imperialism and other forms of European projection of superior power in non-
European parts of the world.”6   
The leading role European countries undoubtedly played in the development of 
the modern system of international law seems unchallengeable because non-European 
parts of the world, especially Asia, Africa and Latin America, did not make a substantial 
contribution to the formulation of international law during the period of European 
imperialism.  European supremacy in international law’s evolution also influences the 
study of the history of international law.  Works by Western scholars trace the history of 
international law back to antiquity.7  However, Western scholars’ interest in the history of 
international law generally has a relatively narrow scope of actors, places, and events 
directly connected to the formation and operation of the Westphalian system.   
                                            
5 General work on the relationship between European imperialism and development of 
international law can be found in A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).  
6 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 21.  
7 See Grewe, supra note 1, pp. 37-139; Nussbaum, supra note 1, pp. 1-16. For general works on 
international law in ancient times, see D. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2001). 
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Yasuaki argues, for example that the study of international law tends to regard the 
history of modern European international law as the history of international law itself.8  
Moreover, references to antiquity or the medieval period generally focuses on Greece and 
Rome as the birthplace of European civilization, and refers to the Just War doctrine, 
natural law doctrine, and legal practice of medieval Europe.  This Westphalian bias 
means that the history of non-European regions and peoples with managing inter-society 
relations has been neglected.9 
From the perspective of the Westphalian system, the term “international law” 
cannot be separated from the origins of the modern, territorial state system.  In other 
words, historical practices in pre-Westphalian eras are not, strictly speaking, inter-state or 
international relations as those concepts were understood in Europe and, thus do not 
inform analysis of modern international law.10  Older systems of inter-nation relations, 
such as developed by China, India, and Egypt, are not perceived as relevant to modern 
understandings of international law, even with respect to similarities in principles.11 
Efforts to reach back to these non-European, pre-Westphalian systems of rules 
have been criticized by scholars of the history of international law.  For example, 
Miéville has questioned approaches by scholars who elevate the significance of the pre-
Westphalian and non-Western origins of international law: “[W]e cannot understand pre-
state relations ‘without scrutinizing … the form, substance and nature of their norms 
                                            
8 O. Yasuaki, When was the Law of International Society Born?—An Inquiry of the History of 
International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. History Int’l L. 1 (2000), pp. 54-55. 
9 On the bias in attitudes towards ancient international law and the problems of Eurocentrism in 
history of international law, see O. Butkevych, History of Ancient International Law: Challenges 
and Prospects, 5 J. History Int’l L. 189 (2003), pp. 203-217. 
10 The supremacy of the nation state is the one of the guiding principles of the Westphalian system.  
Grewe points out that the balance of power, maintaining the status quo, and the supremacy of 
nations states are the three pillars of Westphalian system. Grewe, supra note 1, pp. 287-315. 
11 Anand, supra note 3, p. 7. 
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regulating relations among independent groups.’  Labelling them ‘international law’ does 
not do this.  The claim that such law existed in ancient India, or Africa, is sometimes 
adduced without argument, simply by reference to the existence of international 
polities.”12 
Scholars, particularly from the Third World, continue to challenge the exclusively 
European spin on the development of modern international law.13  Even though political 
entities in non-European parts of the world were not often regarded as states by the 
Westphalian system, the fact that different types of states existed in non-European parts 
of the world before and after the Peace of Westphalia is self-evident.  Furthermore, these 
political entities had active relations among themselves before and after the emergence of 
the Westphalian system.14  The Westphalian system was deeply rooted in the relations of 
European countries, and, thus, “international law” arising from the Westphalian system 
did not reflect rules and principles used in non-European parts of the world, making 
modern international law less “international” than it could otherwise have been. 
Yasuaki attacks the European bias informing the history of international law.  
Yasuaki claims that narrow Eurocentric views on international law have considerable 
                                            
12
 C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Brill 2005), p. 166. 
13 See S.P. Sinha, Legal Polycentricity and International Law (Carolina Academic Press 1996); L. 
Zhaojie, Traditional Chinese World Order, 1 Chinese J. Int’l L. 20 (2002), pp. 20-58; A. Altman, 
Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law: The Early Dynastic Period in 
Southern Mesopotamia, 6 J. History Int’l L. 153 (2004), pp. 153-172; A. Altman, Tracing the 
Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law (2): The Old Akkadian and Ur III Periods in 
Mesopotamia, 7 J. History Int’l L. 115 (2005), pp. 115-136; O. Yasuaki, supra note 8, pp. 54-57; 
R.P. Anand, Onuma Yasuaki’s “When was the Law of International Society Born—An Inquiry of 
the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective,” 6 J. History Int’l L. 1 
(2004), pp. 5-11; I. Allain, Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East as the 
Underclass of the International Legal Order, 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 391 (2004), pp. 391-404; J. 
Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing 
Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 263 (2000), pp. 265-267. 
14 On the non-European origins of international law, see A. Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European 
International Law, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 315 (2006), pp. 328-330. 
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trouble facing questions about non-European versions of international relations.15  
Orakhelashvili also criticizes the assumption that non-European were incapable of 
understanding international law as an example of prejudice.  Eurocentric views on 
international law ignored the cultural and intellectual heritage of non-European nations, 
which included the use of ideas closely related, if not identical, to Westphalian concepts 
of international law.16  
The relations of independent nations and societies can be easily found in the pre-
and post-Westphalian historical records of non-European civilizations.17  These records 
contain evidence of rules and principles that are familiar even from the Westphalian 
perspective.  For example, the ruler Eannatum of the city-state of Lagash and the state of 
Umma concluded a boundary treaty in Mesopotamia in about 3100 B.C.  This example is 
just the tip of the iceberg concerning the active relations among independent societies in 
non-European regions.18  Non-European versions of the Westphalian rules concerning the 
sanctity of treaties, inviolability of ambassadors, principle of humanity in conducting 
wars, and rules of the law of the sea can be found in Kautilya’s Arthasastra and the Code 
of Manu.  Ancient India recognized one of the fundamental laws of war—distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants.19  Ideas for inter-state organizations also 
existed, as evidenced by Confucius’ proposal for a Grand Union of Chinese States.20   
                                            
15 Yasuaki asks “[S]hould we say that international law exists if there is treaty between states? 
When we refer to states in this question, what kind of personal and territorial entity with a certain 
power and authority do we assume? … Should we characterize various kinds of agreements 
between the Chinese emperor and other leaders in their neighborhood for the purpose of 
commercial dealings and peace settlements?” Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 2. 
16 Orakhelashvili, supra note 14, p. 328. 
17 Nussbaum, supra note 1, pp. 1-16.      
18 Sinha, supra note 13, pp. 20-21. 
19 Orakhelashvilie, supra note 14, p. 328. 
20 Nussbaum, supra note 1, p. 4. 
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Although the attack against Westcentrism in international law has drawbacks,21 
the critique sheds light on how we might re-conceptualize and re-contextualize 
perspectives of international law and international relations in the age of 21st century 
globalization.  The growing political, economic, and cultural influence of Asia in 
contemporary world politics heightens the need to understand potentially different 
perspectives on international relations and international law connected to Asia’s past and 
present.22  
      
2.3 Foundations of an Asian Perspective on International Order: Confucianism and 
the Sinocentric System in East Asia 
It makes little sense analyzing European international law without considering the 
underlying influence of Christianity.23  The Christian Just War doctrine influenced, for 
example, international law on the use of force and provides a good example to illustrate 
the relationship between Christianity and the European origins of international law.24  
Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are commonly known as three religions in 
the Asian region.  In fact, these religions are more correctly known as the three 
“teachings.”25  According to Chen, Confucianism lacks the essential characteristics of a 
                                            
21 The prevalent criticism on non-European version of international law can be summarized as the 
doctrine of “we do have our international law.” Yasuaki, supra note 8, pp. 58-61. See also 
Miéville, supra note 12, pp. 156-169 
22 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 9. 
23 H. Steiger, From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World 
Citizen—Reflections on the Formation of the Epoch of the History of International Law, 3 J. 
History Int’l L. 180 (2001), pp. 184-187. On the relationship between Christianity and 
international law, see J. Noyes, “Christianity and Late Nineteenth-Century British Theories of 
International Law,” in The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law (M. 
Janis, ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991), pp. 85-106.  
24 Anghie, supra note 5, pp. 23-28, 291-298; G. Reichberg, Preventive War in Classical Just War 
Theory, 9 J. History Int’l L. 5 (2007), pp. 7-8. 
25 F. Chen, “The Confucian View of World Order,” in The Influence of Religion on the 
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religion.  He notes that “[C]onfucianism does not advocate a belief in a deity, nor does it 
have an accepted doctrine of salvation, nor does it use sacred stories to aid propagation.  
While it does employ rituals and have a ‘code of conduct,’ the attendant perspectives are 
non-religious in character.”26  Despite its non-religious character, Confucianism has 
played an important role in shaping Asian perspectives on international order, including 
international law. 
China was the hegemon in the Asian region before its subordination to European 
imperialism in the 19th century.  Before being forced open by European countries, China 
had formulated normative frameworks regulating the relationship between countries in 
Asia and countries in other regions.27  Although Confucianism is not a religion, it guided 
philosophically the direction of China’s domestic and foreign policies.  Given China’s 
status as the historic hegemon in the Asian region, Confucianism has been an important 
philosophical view on governing the relations between countries in the Asian region.  
Thus, Confucianism in the Asian region is the counterpart to Christianity in the European 
region. 
Far reaching studies on the philosophical character of Confucianism are beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  For this chapter’s purpose, understanding the impact of 
Confucianism on normative frameworks for relations between countries in Asian region 
is the objective.  The focus is on how the characteristics of Confucianism produce a 
different perspective on international order and international law than what developed in 
Europe under the Westphalian system.  
                                                                                                                                  
Development of International Law (M. Janis, ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991), p. 31.   
26 Id. 
27 Yasuaki, supra note 8, pp. 11-12. 
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Chen explores the features of Confucianism that are important for understanding 
its impact on international order in Asian region, and he identifies five important 
elements: (1) its postulation of a goal, a world governed by Ping (平)—literally “peace”; 
(2) the Confucian conception of community—the world as Tian-Xia; (3) the Confucian 
conception of order, especially the non-differentiation of legal and moral orders; (4) 
minimum order, which includes three core ideas—the absence of unauthorized coercion 
or violence, disappearance of litigation, and authorized use of force; and (5) maximum 
order, which means the greatest production and widest distribution of human values.28   
These five elements of a Confucian perspective on international order have 
similarity with aspects of the European perspective on international order.  For example, 
under the minimum order perspective, the unauthorized use of force is strictly prohibited 
and humanitarian intervention is justified on the condition that certain requirements (e.g., 
necessity and proportionality in the force used) be clearly satisfied.29  
The Confucian perspective on international order differs from the Westphalian 
approach because Confucianism supported the existence of a hegemonic power in the 
Asian region embued with a strong sense of superiority over other countries and 
nations.30  The Westphalian system largely operated under a balance of power dynamic 
involving a number of great powers considered civilizational and cultural equals, rather 
than under the influence of a morally superior hegemonic power. 
In general, under Confucian thinking, the ideal international order in the Asian 
region should be governed by a sole hegemon, which was historically China, which had 
                                            
28 Chen, supra note 25, p. 31.    
29 Id., pp. 38-40. See also Chapter 6 of this thesis for further analysis of the Asian perspective on 
international security and the use of force. 
30 Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 12. 
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responsibility for putting into practice lessons from Tian (天)—literally “Heaven.”  
Confucians see the world as Tian-Xia (天下)—literally “all under Heaven.”  Tian-Xia can 
be narrowly or broadly interpreted.  In a narrow sense, Tian-Xia refers to the kingdom of 
ancient China, known as Eastern Chou, which is regarded as the ideal kingdom in 
Chinese history.  In a broad sense, Tian-Xia is extensive enough to comprehend the entire 
world.31  In addition, Tian-Xia is understood as a harmonious political order without state 
boundaries and governed by a sage through virtue, without any coercive power at all.32  
Because Tian is understood as the perfect source rules and guidance, the judgments of 
Tian should be respected by everyone in Tian-Xia under all circumstances.33  With 
China’s vast territory, massive population, huge economic capabilities, sophisticated 
culture, and highly developed legal rules and institutions, Chinese emperors thought of 
themselves as Tian-Zi (天子)—literally “the Son of Heaven.”34  The sacred role of Tian-
Zi was to implement the requirements of Tian in Tian-Xia. 
Although Tian-Xia could have an expansive scope, the Confucian perspective on 
international order in application was a closed system of international relations based in 
Asia and centered on China as the politically and culturally superior nation.  This 
perspective clashes with the development, at least within Europe, of the Westphalian 
norms of sovereign equality and the opposition to the presence of any hegemonic 
                                            
31 Chen, supra note 25, p. 33. 
32 J. Chan, “Territorial Boundaries and Confucianism,” in Boundaries, Ownership, and Autonomy 
(D. Miller & S. Hashmi, eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2001), p. 96. 
33 Id. On the concept of “Heaven” in Confucianism, see J. Levenson, Confucian and Taiping 
“Heaven”: The Political Implications of Clashing Religious Concepts, 4 Comp. Stud. Soc. & 
History 436 (1962), pp. 436-453. 
34 Yasuaki, supra note 8, p.12.  On the right and duty of “the Son of Heaven,” see S. Chen, Son of 
Heaven and Son of God: Interactions among Ancient Asiatic Cultures regarding Sacral Kingship 
and Theophoric Names, 12 J. Royal Asiatic Soc. 289 (2002), pp. 289-325. 
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power.35  The strong sense of the superiority of China in Confucian thinking results in 
Sinocentrism.  Because Tian-Zi is the sole messenger of Tian, there is no relationship 
based on the equality between Tian-Zi, the Chinese emperor, and other rulers in Tian-
Xia.36   
Tian-Zi did not have to consider the cultural perspectives of other rulers because 
these other rulers were, in general, regarded as representatives of barbarian political 
entities.37  Thus, the relationship between ancient China and other countries was carried 
out through a sophisticated culture of highly educated officials schooled in Chinese 
poetry and classical knowledge.38  Tian-Zi did not have any sense that the relationship 
between China and other countries was regulated by a separate legal order.  In terms of 
relations between China and other nations, Tian-Zi emphasized protocols, or ritual 
customs, when engaging in relations with other (barbarian) countries.  These protocols 
were, without question, governed by the domestic law of China39 not by a separate body 
of law between nations.  
The fundamental philosophy underlying the Sinocentric system was rule by virtue 
through Tian.  The virtue-oriented Sinocentric system did not leave room for tolerance of 
“uncivilized countries.”  This aspect of the Confucian perspective plays a critical role in 
                                            
35 A. Acharya, Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future? 28 Int’l Security 149 (2003-2004), p. 156. 
36 Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 12. See also G. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International 
Society (Clarendon Press 1984), pp. 130-133. 
37 For example, Chinese emperors regarded kings of the Korean dynasty as representatives of 
‘Tong-I’ (東夷) – literally “Eastern barbarians” or “Eastern Bowmen.” See J. Best, A History of the 
Early Korean Kingdom of Paekche together with an annotated translation of the Paekche Annals 
of the Samguk sagi (Harvard Univ. Press 2006), p. 26; N. Swanström & M. Weissmann, Can 
China Unite the Gordian Knot in North Korea? 31 Korean J. Int’l Stud. 51 (2004), available at 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2004/KJIS_Gordian_Knot.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
38 Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 13. 
39 Id., p. 14. 
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making the Sinocentirc system a closed system of international relations, particularly 
compared to the more open and expansive European system of international relations.   
In Confucian thought, Tian-Zi has a sacred duty to enlighten uncivilized people so 
that they understand the virtue of Tian and send a tributary mission to barbarians to share 
in Tian-Zi’s virtuous rule.  When barbarians turned a deaf year to the virtue of Tian-Zi, 
Tian-Zi just excluded ignorant barbarians from the realm of ideal Tian-Xia as the natural 
sanction.  From the view of Tian-Zi, the worst sanction for uncooperative barbarians is to 
let them continue in an uncivilized state.  Tian-Zi would then isolate the uncooperative 
country politically and economically.  In this way, the Sinocentric system functioned on 
the basis of the system’s recognition of the superior position of Tian-Zi in the greater 
political order.40   
The various aspects of Confucianism significantly influenced a Sinocentric Asian 
perspective on international order.  However, by applying Confucianism’s teachings too 
rigidly, paying too much emphasis to the superiority of China, and disregarding the 
existence of other cultures and civilizations, Sinocentrism became a closed, uninformed 
and vulnerable system of international relations.  When the “Western barbarians with 
yellow hair and blue eyes” appeared, the Sinocentric system collapsed in the face of 
European imperialism.  
      
                                            
40 Id., p. 17. 
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2.4 Collapse of the Sinocentric System: Western Imperialism and the Process of 
Universalization of International Law 
The processes of imperialism provided for the universalization of the Westphalian 
system and its system of European-derived international law.  The law of nations as 
developed in Europe recognized its universal potential through, for example, the use of 
natural law as a source of law,41 but, in practice, international law remained largely the 
public law of Europe through the 18th century.42  The European character of international 
law came into sharper relief in the 19th century as European powers began to expand their 
commercial and imperial interests across the globe.  The spread of European power and 
influence ensured that the 19th century would be the “European century” for purposes of 
international law.43  In the period of international law’s universalization, perspectives 
from non-European countries and regions did not factor into this development.44 
Expanding the geographical reach of the public law of Europe was not the sole 
goal of Europe’s universalization of international law.  The European project to 
universalize international law included the “standard of civilization” through which 
European countries sought to transform non-European countries into states that could 
operate within the Westphalian system.45  Almost identical to the Sinocentric cultural and 
civilizational superiority, the arrogant sense of superiority of European civilization over 
non-European civilizations can be explicitly extracted from writings of European scholars.  
                                            
41 Nussbaum, supra note 1, pp. 80-81. 
42 Orakhelashvili, supra note 14, p. 317. 
43 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 21. 
44 C. Alexandrowicz, The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations: (Historical Aspects)123 
Recueil des Cours (1968-1) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1969), pp. 123-125. 
45 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 21.  See also B. Bowden, The Colonial Origins of 
International Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilization, 7 J. History 
Int’l L. 1 (2005), pp. 13-20. 
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These views are seemingly rooted in cultural and racial prejudices.46  Similar to the 
cultural and civilizational superiority in the Sinocentric system, the European standard of 
civilization devalued non-European civilizations through cultural and racial prejudices.47  
Lorimer’s argument provides a good example of the attitude contained within the sense of 
European civilizational superiority.  He argued in the heyday of 19th century European 
imperialism that “[E]ven now the same rights and duties do not belong to savage and 
civilized man.”48   
Unlike the Sinocentric system, the European powers transformed the public law 
of Europe into a body of international law that justified the global scope of European 
imperial endeavors.  In the 19th century, European states used international law to give 
legitimacy to outright conquest of non-European nations and to the system of 
capitulations, which gave European powers the rights to operate in non-European 
countries on the basis of European laws.49  Through these mechanisms, non-European 
political, economic, social, and cultural systems were overthrown, destroyed, or 
marginalized to make way for the European standard of civilization and the 
universalization of the Westphalian image of international law and relations.50 
When confronted by the demands of the European countries to enter into political 
and economic relations, China was not prepared for this clash of civilizations.  The 
Chinese did not understand the ways of Westphalia and looked down on the European 
                                            
46 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 22. 
47 Id. 
48 J. Lorimer, The Institutes of Law (Adamant Media Corporation 2000), pp. 12-13.  
49 D. Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment 
Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization, 35 Tex. Int’l L. J. 387 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fidler, A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations], pp. 390-398. On the concept of 
civilization and international order, see also E. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, 
Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002), pp. 109-117. 
50 Anghie, supra note 5, pp. 32-114. 
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barbarians for failing to observe and appreciate the highly ritualistic rules Tian-Zi 
expected barbarians in Tian-Xia to obey.51  The 1842 Treaty of Nanking between Great 
Britain and the Ch’ing dynasty was the prelude to the total collapse of the Sinocentric 
system and world view.  The Ch’ing dynasty’s Sinocentrism prevented it from 
understanding the contents of treaties with Europeans.  For example, in accepting the 
system of capitulations in treaties with European powers, China viewed these privileges 
as Tian-Zi’s benevolence towards Western barbarians in Tian-Xia.  The length of time it 
took for China to understand what was happening reveals how deeply Sinocentrism was 
rooted.52  The use of force by European countries, as in the Opium Wars, shattered the 
traditional world view of the Chinese and demonstrated that China was part of an entirely 
different system of rules, prejudices, and power.53 
Ironically, the transformation of Japan into a European-like state in the decades 
after the Meiji Restoration helped bring the Sinocentric system to an end.  Unlike China, 
Japan made vigorous efforts to learn how the Westphalian system worked and changed 
itself into a member of this system.54  Japan’s ability to break free from the Sinocentric 
mindset and adapt to the new European-made world order made the rigidity and 
incomprehension of China’s reactions all the more telling. 
In sum, the European conquest of Asian and the destruction of the Sinocentric 
system should not be understood in the narrow scope of the disappearance of the Ch’ing 
dynasty.  European imperialism and the universalization of the Westphalian system of 
international law also represented the loss of an indigenous Asian perspective on 
                                            
51 Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 29. 
52 Id., p. 53. 
53 Id., pp. 30-32. On the Chinese transition from the Heaven Empire to a state incorporated into 
European civilization, see Gong, supra note 36, pp. 130-163. 
54 Yasuaki, supra note 8, p. 52.  
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international order.  Having no counterpart system to the European international system 
and no material means to resist European power, non-European regions of the world were 
forced to accept the European system.  These changes allowed the myth of the superiority 
of European civilization, and the inferiority of non-European cultures, to be perpetuated 
on a global scale.  
 
2.5 Loss of an Asian Voice in International Law: The Rise of Ideology in 
International Law 
Unlike the 19th century, which was dominated by grand narratives of European 
superiority, the 20th century can be regarded as a competition among different ideologies 
promoted by rival great powers.  This competition largely pitted Europeans against 
Europeans and saw the rise of new countries to the status of great powers, countries built 
on ideological rather than dynastic premises—the United States and the Soviet Union.  
The ability of the United States to compete and eventually prevail in the 20th century’s 
ideological struggles marks this century as the “American century.” 
Fidler’s analysis of the American century helps conceptualize how this century 
brought about a radical paradigm shift in the science of international law and how this 
change affected Asian voice in international law.55  
Fidler highlights that “[T]he end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s left the United States as the dominant country politically, 
economically, militarily, technologically and culturally.  From the vantage point of the 
                                            
55 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, pp. 22-25. 
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United States’ victory in the Cold War and its resulting hegemony, the 20th century 
certainly takes on an American sheen.” 56   
The image of European superiority from the 19th century was dismantled by the 
rise of American power and eventually hegemony in the 20th century.  This process was 
marked, however, by fierce ideological competition among various ideologies, such as 
liberalism, communism, fascism, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism.  These 
competing ideologies each promulgated a blueprint for desirable model of international 
governance.57  
This issuance of President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points in 1918 
was one of the first indications that ideology would play a greater role in thinking about 
international law and international relations in the 20th century.58  The Fourteen Points 
laid the cornerstone for the American liberal philosophical perspective on international 
relations.59     
The Fourteen Points communicated that it was a duty of the United States to 
enhance and spread liberalism through the world.  This imperative of American liberalism 
posed a dramatic challenge to traditional Westphalian understandings of international law 
and its legitimacy,60 especially the principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs 
of other states.  The ideological view of American liberalism makes protection and 
                                            
56 Id., p. 22. 
57 Id., p. 23. 
58 See President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Jan. 8, 1918, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
59 Fidler points out the Fourteen Point’s emphasis on the principles of the self-determination of 
peoples, transparent governance and diplomacy, free trade among nations, and the building of 
international institutions for security of all states. Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, pp. 22-23. 
60 H. Cohen, The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate, 
28 Yale. J. Int’l L. 551 (2003), pp. 559-567. 
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promotion of the rights of life, liberty, and property inalienable and universal rights 
available to everyone in every country.61   
 The American liberal ideology did not, however, occupy the field unchallenged.  
Liberalism was only one of many ideologies that competed for the hearts and minds of 
peoples around the world, and these ideologies included communism, fascism, and anti-
imperialism.  This ideological competition stood in stark contrast to smug assumptions of 
European superiority that fuelled the universalization of the Westphalian system and its 
set of international legal rules.  The heart of the ideological struggle was in Europe, but 
the ideologies, particularly liberalism and communism, claimed universal application, 
making the struggle global in scope.  
The ideological ferment and turmoil in the 20th century left its marks on 
international law.  Fidler terms this phenomenon as the “triumph of ideology” in 
international law in 20th century.  He argues that various ideologies provided international 
law with new concepts and rules of international law, which renovated or sometimes 
discarded the conventional assumptions and practices in international law.62  However, 
the “triumph of ideology” in international law in 20th century should not be understood to 
mean that the United States monopolized the ideological competition that affected 
international law.  Rather, until its victory in the Cold War near the end of the 20th century, 
the United States was only one of the main players in making international law reflect a 
new kind of ideepolitik in international relations.63 
                                            
61 Id., p. 561. 
62 Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, p. 24. 
63 Id. 
 31 
The ideepolitik of the American century had significant impact on Asian countries.  
In general, the 20th century can be regarded as an open-market competition among 
various ideologies.  However, the ideologies that came from the Third World, including 
Asia, did not have much market share.  Power politics still played a role in forcing 
weaker states to accept a certain type of ideology.64  Although Asian-African countries 
comprise a majority of the globe, they did not construct their own views and use them to 
challenge or even change international law.  Ideological ferment in the Third World 
tended to follow in the wake of the American/European ideological movements, such as 
seen in Asian and African adaptations of anti-imperial perspectives seen in liberalism 
(e.g., India’s leadership in the non-aligned movement) and of socialist views taken from 
communism (e.g., communism in Mao’s China).  
Many reasons explain why ideepolitik in international law and international 
relations affected Asian countries as it did in the 20th century.  The absence of a distinct 
Asian voice in the ideepolitik of the 20th century can be explained by analyzing the 
process of decolonization, the inflexible bipolar superpower system of the Cold War, and 
the post-Cold War “End of History” phenomenon. 
The decolonization process in Asia and the inflexible bipolar system that 
prevailed during the Cold War period largely prevented Asian countries from crafting 
their own perspective to compete with other ideologies, such as liberalism and 
communism, and from suggesting an alternative blueprint of international governance in 
the 20th century.  During the decolonization process, Asian and African countries’ fierce 
social resistant movements against former colonial powers directly contributed to anti-
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colonial and anti-imperial perspectives affecting the content and practice of international 
law.  These “revolts against the West” brought new attention to various areas of 
international law, such as the principle of self-determination, non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other states, rules on foreign direct investment, special and differential 
treatment under international trade law, the law of the sea, and the movement to create a 
New International Economic Order.65  Initiatives from Asian and African countries tended, 
however, to be subsumed within the larger bipolar struggle for power between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  
Similarly, newly independent countries in the Asian and African regions needed to 
restore and reconstruct their political institutions and economies.  These two urgent goals 
could not be achieved without the aid of the United States or the Soviet Union and the aid 
came with ideological and political strings attached.  Asian and African countries had 
little choice but to try to work within the power structure controlled by the United States 
and the Soviet Union.66  In this context, there was little room for advocating an 
                                            
65 On the concept of the “revolt against the West”, see D. Armstrong, Revolution and World 
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(M. Ssekandi, rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publisers 1992), pp. 29-43; S.P. Sihna, “Perspective of 
the Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International law,” in Third World 
Attitudes Towards International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai, eds., Martinus 
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Agrawala, “The Emerging International Economic Order,” in id., pp. 379-391; S. Asante, 
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66 From the point of the “triumph of ideology” in international law in the 20th century, the trend of 
ideepolitik could not be made in one country or bloc of states. Fidler, Asian Century, supra note 4, 
p. 24.  However, in reality, Asian countries did not have a full chance to make an independent 
ideological contribution to international law under the heavy stress provided by the competition 
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indigenous Asian ideology of international law and international politics, which could 
exist outside the ideological and power competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  Despite the activities of the Group of 77 on behalf of developing countries, 
which proclaimed the policy of non-alignment, these activities remained subsumed 
within the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.67  
The two regional powers of East Asia, China and Japan, did not make significant 
contributions to heralding Asian voices in international relations.  Although China had a 
conflict with the Soviet Union over Marxism,68 this Sino-Soviet conflict was not a 
conflict between an independent Asian perspective and communism in international 
relations.  In terms of Japan, its defeat and political reconstruction by the United States 
after World War II made this re-emerging regional power a close ally of the United States 
rather than a source of independent Asian thought and practices.69 
The lack of distinct Asian voices in international law is also explained by the 
emergence of the United States as the winner of the Cold War and as the post-Cold War 
hegemon in international politics.  Even though skeptics abound concerning the triumph 
of liberalism and the “end of history,”70 such as Huntington’s pessimistic dystopia of the 
looming “clash of civilizations,”71 the U.S. victory in the Cold War allowed the United 
States to advance its political and ideological agenda globally with essentially no 
                                                                                                                                  
between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
67 On the Group of 77’s foreign policy, see J. Mayall, Reviewed Work(s): The Afro-Asian 
Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World by D. Kimche; Nonalignment: Theory 
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68 See D. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton Univ. Press 1962). 
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70 See F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Harper Perennial 1993). 
71 See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon & 
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competition.  The U.S. version of ideepolitik sets the new “standard of civilization” for 
the era of post-Cold War globalization, and this version of ideepolitik had significant 
influence on the post-Westphalian version of international law emerging in the post-Cold 
War period, influence not much different from the old European standard of civilization 
that characterized international law in the 19th century. 
The first direct challenge to the hegemony of the American version of ideepolitik 
came from radical Islamist groups willing to attack the United States, as happened on 
September 11, 2001.  The nature of the U.S. response to the global terrorist threat placed 
even more pressure on countries to ally themselves with the interests and ideas of the 
United States.  In short, the global war on terrorism divided the world simplistically into 
faithful friends or evil enemies of the United States.72  In the eyes of critics, the United 
States’ unilateralism became a rogue force in international relations, leading to the blatant 
distortion of established rules and principles of international law.73  Thus, in this context, 
the United States may very well be unreceptive to the emergence of new perspectives on 
international relations and international law that do not accord with the paradigms of the 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The absence of a distinctly Asian voice in the ideepolitik that has characterized 
international law through the 20th century and into the 21st century connects to the 
historical and philosophical developments analyzed in this chapter.  A region that once 
had its own identity and normative framework for inter-nation relations became forcibly 
incorporated into the universalization of the Westphalian system and then the 
globalization of the post-Westphalian vision of the United States.  Asia merely became 
another part of a Western-centric political structure and mindset, which were clearly 
reflected in the rules of international law developed to facilitate the expansion of the 
power and ideas of the West. 
The story of the loss of an Asian perspective on international relations and 
international law is important in its own right but the story is not just of historical interest.  
Debate about whether the 21st century will be the “Asian century” reflects an 
understanding that the material power and influence of Asia in the next few decades may 
have a profound effect on international politics.  This understanding identifies a sense 
that Asia may be shedding the subordination it has endured for close to 200 years.  The 
transformation of Asia’s place and prominence in international politics invites 
considerations of what Asia will bring to the next phase of ideepolitik in international law.  
As Fidler has argued, Asia’s growing significance potentially makes it the next critical 
laboratory for global governance.74  How Asian countries respond to their emerging 
power and prominence and what they will contribute to the theory and practices of 
international law in the process are now important questions that deserve analysis.  In 
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their respective centuries, the European and American left their clear marks on 
international law.  What marks Asians may leave on international law in the 21st century 
is the question taken up by the subsequent chapters in this thesis. 
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Chapter 3. International Law as Civilization-Centric:  




 One of the features emerging from the historical experience of Asian countries 
with modern international law is how heavily this experience was marked by concepts of 
“civilized” and “uncivilized” nations.  As Chapter 2 noted, Western imperialism in Asia 
and other non-European regions included the use of a “standard of civilization” in 
making international law function outside its original European context.  This chapter 
explores this standard of civilization in more detail in order to probe how dramatically it 
affected the manner in which Asian countries were incorporated into the modern system 
and how this system operated, namely through the use of unequal treaties and the system 
of capitulations. 
 The chapter also looks at how a new standard of civilization may be influencing 
international law in the post-Cold War era.  This analysis further deepens the conceptual 
importance in thinking about civilizations, especially powerful ones, when thinking about 
how international law operates.  The new standard of civilization has features similar to 
and different from the old standard, and this chapter takes a look at both to provide an 
overview of how Western ideas continue to shape international law profoundly.  More 
specifically, the chapter considers the position of Asian countries with respect to the new 
standard of global civilization.  This new standard will be an important part of the context 
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in which the Asian perspective on international law and global governance is emerging 
and will be something against which the Asian perspective will be measured.  
 
3.2 The Standard of Civilization as the Main Engine for Justification of Western-
Centric International Law 
The concept of civilization, especially European civilization, played a significant 
role in the development of international law.  European civilization guided and directed 
how European powers conceived of and applied international law, especially in 
subordinating non-Western countries to the interests of European powers during the 
period of European imperialism.  The relationship between civilization and international 
law captures the effort to transplant the Enlightenment of 18th century Europe into the rest 
of the world.  The transplantation of European civilization through international law 
represents one of the most important features of international law’s history.  The 
association of international law with European ideas of civilization drove both 
international law and European civilization to gain universal scope.  As Cox noted, 
“[T]he civilizing process was conceived as a universal phenomenon characterizing the 
Enlightenment of eighteenth-century Europe, at one with universal reason and natural 
laws applicable in the physical sciences, economics, laws, and morality.  The finality of 
the process was civilization in singular.”1 
 The process through which European countries spread their conception of 
civilization through international law produced the original “clash of civilizations” 
because the spread of European ideas beyond Europe confronted many, diverse 
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 39 
civilizations and cultures.  In these civilizational encounters, European nations developed 
the “standard of civilization” to provide their ideas and power legitimacy through the 
system of international law.  Through the standard of civilization, the European powers 
judged what societies were worthy of being considered civilized and uncivilized.  
Through this process, non-European civilization and their concepts of social structure and 
behavior became targets for denigration and transformation.   
 The standard of civilization required civilizational diversity to operate in the 
manner it did.  The standard had little if any significance in the relationships among 
European countries.  European countries generally shared a common perspective on 
philosophy, religion, morality, political systems, and economics.2  These shared 
civilizational elements did not, of course, mean that European countries lived together in 
peace and harmony.  Inter-European relations required rules to regulate cooperation and 
conflict, and the process of making and applying these rules became the source for 
modern international law.  International law among European nations did not produce 
difficulties of a civilizational nature.  In fact, the law of nations was often referred to as 
the “Public Law of Europe,” a name that reveals the common civilizational foundations 
shared by European countries.  
The first sustained confrontations between civilizations occurred on a global scale 
from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries as European expansion into the non-European 
world accelerated and deepened.3  This period witnessed the transformation of the 
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Christian-European family of nations into a global society of civilized nations.4  With the 
expansion of the European powers, laws and practices generally accepted by European 
countries took an increasingly global and explicitly juridical character as the international 
system developed.5  To justify the spread of European ideas, the standard of civilization 
developed during the period of European imperialism.   
Initially, natural law doctrine, which was based on Christian notion of universality, 
was used to govern the relationship between European powers and non-European 
countries and other civilizations.6  Natural law doctrine, however, gave way to more 
scientific approaches to international law, as seen in the rise of positivism in international 
law.7  Under the influence of positivism, fundamental and basic concepts of international 
law, such as sovereignty of states, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the 
inviolability of diplomatic missions, emerged in the relations among European nations.  
Among these, the concept of state sovereignty became the most complex issue with 
regard to the relationship between civilized European countries and uncivilized non-
European countries.   
Under the standard of European civilization, European powers could not enter 
into any international legal relationship with uncivilized non-European countries because 
these countries did not enjoy sovereignty under international law.  Although the lack of 
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sovereignty of non-European countries conveniently gave European powers opportunities 
to conquer and exploit non-European countries, the lack of sovereignty of non-European 
countries brought about difficult questions for European powers.  The problems involved 
how to protect European nationals in non-European countries and how to guarantee non-
European countries’ compliance with international legal instruments without formal legal 
relations based on international law.8  European powers needed to create mechanisms to 
address these problems.  European devised the standard of civilization to govern relations 
with non-European countries because the standard provided a way to deal with non-
European countries under international law.    
Gong pointed out that the standard of civilization developed to solve practical and 
philosophical problems that arose as European influence expanded into non-European 
countries.9  First, to address the practical problem of protecting European life, liberty, and 
property in sometimes hostile non-European countries, the standard of civilization sought 
to guarantee European nationals certain basic rights, the observance of which, at least in 
relation to foreign nations, was expected from civilized states.  Second, in response to the 
philosophical problem of determining which countries deserved legal recognition, 
personality, and sovereignty under international law, the standard of civilization provided 
a doctrinal rational for limiting recognition in international law to those countries that 
European states, rightly or wrongly, regarded as being civilized.10  
To participate fully in international law, non-European countries had to transform 
their political, economic, and legal systems to meet the demands of European imperial 
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powers.  Fidler notes that European powers used the standard of civilization to mandate 
the reordering of non-European countries’ politics, laws, economics, and societies in the 
image of the West.11  Non-European countries had to become Europeanized states that (1) 
guaranteed basic rights, as understood in the West, for European nationals; (2) had an 
organized political bureaucracy with the capacity to run governmental functions and 
organize the country for self-defense in the model of European countries; (3) had a 
Western-style domestic system of law, with courts and written codes of law, that 
administered justice fairly within its territory; (4) had diplomatic resources and 
institutions to allow the state to engage in international relations; (5) abided by 
international law; and (6) conformed to the customs, norms, and mores accepted in 
Western societies.12  In brief, these requirements that non-European countries faced 
shifted the basis of recognition from the objective test of state existence to subjective 
tests based on concepts of civilization.13   
This mandate created by the standard of civilization contributed to the 
development of some non-European countries in the directions emphasized by the 
standard.  Societal developments in non-European countries related to the standard of 
civilization also directly served the interests of the European powers.  The reordering 
process of non-European governments, laws, economics, and societies protected 
European nationals in non-European countries and their economic activities and interests.  
According to the tenets of the standard of civilization, successful transformation meant 
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that non-European countries, such as Japan, could eventually be recognized as civilized 
countries and begin to have international legal personality under international law.14   
However, Japan’s successful adaptation to the European standard of civilization 
was an exceptional case in Asia prior to World War II.  The more common case, 
unfortunately, was the loss of the opportunity for non-European countries to participate in 
the system of international law without having to abandon their own civilizational 
heritages.  To make matters worse, the efforts of European powers to bring true 
civilization to the uncivilized non-European countries frequently involved brutal threats 
of military force, a lesson non-European countries did not forget.15   
Ironically, Japan, the most developed country in Asia from the viewpoint of the 
European standard of civilization, resorted to military aggression and threats of violence 
to establish its Dai To-A Kyoei Ken (大東亞共榮圈)’—literally “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.”  Japanese scholars generally understand the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere as a rejection of Western universalism through the assertion of a vision 
of Asian regionalism.  For other Asian countries subject to Japan’s military aggression, 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere represented the continuation of imperial 
domination, but this time with an Asian face.16  
In addition, European application of the standard of civilization intentionally 
deprived non-European countries of opportunities to make contributions to the substance 
and operation of an international law reflecting diverse civilizations.  The standard of 
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civilization merely strengthened and refined the Western-centric system of international 
law, a system that legitimized and sustained Western imperialism.  In sum, from the non-
Western perspective, the European standard of civilization represented little more than 
the stigma of being “uncivilized” as a matter of law and of power.  
 
3.3 Neglect of Non-Western Civilizations in the Course of Promoting Western 
Imperialism  
Fidler emphasizes that the standard of European civilization should be understood 
as the standard of Westphalian civilization because the concepts and mechanisms 
imposed on non-European countries were not just the domestic adoption of European 
civilization by non-European countries.  The standard of civilization also sought to bring 
non-Western societies into the Westphalian system of international politics, a system that 
originated and evolved within Europe from the 17th century.  Whether a state was 
sufficiently able to comply with binding commitments under international law and 
whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty, and property of 
Westerners were criteria for non-European countries to become a civilized country under 
international law.17  The standard of Westphalian civilization propelled non-European 
countries into the Westphalian system and its system of international law.  This section 




                                            
17 Fidler, Return of Standard, supra note 11, p. 144. 
 45 
3.3.1 Unequal Treaties  
The phenomenon of “unequal treaties” provides an example of how the standard 
of Westphalian civilization used international law against uncivilized nations.  Western 
imperial powers would force non-European nations to sign and implement one-sided 
treaties.  Compliance with these unequal treaties became a test in deciding whether the 
uncivilized nation was becoming more civilized, and thus able to honor treaty obligations 
under the international legal principle of pacta sunt servanda (i.e., treaty commitment 
shall be honored in good faith).  Thus, a treaty that signified a non-European nation’s lack 
of sovereignty and international legal personality could become the instrument for 
civilizational redemption and for equal status in the law of nations.  The entire dynamic 
established by an unequal treaty reflected a rejection of the non-European country’s 
interests, values, and aspirations arising from its own heritage and civilizational context.  
Without the standard of civilization to justify these agreements, the unequal 
treaties appear manifestly unjust in substance and process.18  Procedurally, unequal 
treaties often resulted from threats of or actual uses of force by imperial powers.  
Substantively, these treaties were grossly unfair in demanding far more from the non-
European country than the European power.  Generally, unequal treaties all established a 
system of extraterritorial jurisdiction known as capitulations (see more below) and fixed 
tariff duties at specified levels, both of which were non-reciprocal and benefited only the 
interests of the European country.  Unequal treaties also included most-favored-nation 
clauses, which gave a European country access to the best treatment any other imperial 
power received under any unequal treaty.  Unequal treaties also often contained 
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concession provisions that enabled foreign enterprises to receive benefits in mining, 
railways, and shipping.  In some cases, unequal treaties even granted the cession or lease 
of territory to foreign powers.19  The Treaty of Nanking provides a good example of the 
unfairness and unjustness of unequal treaties.  First, the Treaty of Nanking was concluded 
under a Western threat to bombard Nanking.  Second, China was forced to accept very 
unfavorable terms, including provisions governing low tariff rates and extraterritorial 
jurisdictions inside China for Western countries.20 
 
3.3.2 The System of Capitulations  
A closer look at the system of capitulations often imposed through unequal 
treaties proves revealing with respect to the depth of the rejection of non-European 
concepts of law, justice and government found in the standard of civilization.  In brief, 
the system of capitulations was a system of extraterritorial jurisdiction and power wielded 
by Western powers in the territories on non-Western countries.21  The basic function of 
the system of capitulations was to provide a Westernized foundation for facilitating 
economic interaction between civilized and uncivilized nations.  Capitulations allowed 
this economic interaction to penetrate non-Western societies more deeply, permitting a 
wider scope for Western intervention into the affairs of uncivilized nations.  Fidler 
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provides one description of how capitulations worked between the United States and 
Japan in the 19th century:   
 
Under the 1858 treaty between the United States and Japan, the two countries 
agreed to open American consular courts to Japanese creditors of Americans 
and open Japanese courts to American citizens with claims against Japanese 
nationals.  The different American and Japanese rules on breach of contract 
were not harmonized under capitulations, but Americans could not be subject 
to the compulsory jurisdiction of Japanese courts in connection with civil 
claims against them by Japanese nationals.  Japanese nationals wanting to 
pursue claims against Americans had to learn the rules and procedures 
required under the American law applied by the consular court.22 
 
Beyond the reach of civil and criminal law of non-Western countries, 
capitulations established extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Western country within the 
uncivilized state.23  The standard of civilization justified this extraterritorial jurisdiction 
because the merchants and business enterprises of European states could not be subject to 
the legal systems of uncivilized countries, even within the territory of the uncivilized 
nations.  Thus, the Western powers planted a bit of civilization in the uncivilized country 
until that country became civilized.  
As between unequal treaties and capitulations, capitulations had the sharper 
civilization edge because through capitulations Western countries rejected the application 
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of legal and judicial concepts alien to European civilization.  Unequal treaties reflected 
unequal power.  Unequal treaties containing the system of capitulations reflected the 
perceived inferiority of non-Western law and concepts of justice.  Becoming civilized by 
complying with unequal treaties meant, in the long run, changing legal and justices 
systems comprehensively in the image of the West.   
Capitulatory regimes began the process of introducing the basic rules and 
principles of Western legal systems to non-Western countries.  This introduction 
represents an early version of global legal harmonization.  However, such a 
harmonization process deprived non-Western countries of the opportunity to make their 
voices heard in formulating what Yasuaki calls an “intercivilizational” approach to 
international law.24  This history of unequal treaties and capitulations has made many 
non-Western countries suspicious about international law because unequal treaties and 
the capitulatory system were created and imposed under the name of international law.  
From the viewpoints of non-Western countries, international law was regarded as a 
weapon of a powerful and greedy Western civilization seeking to impose its interests and 
influence on non-Western countries.  Non-Western countries could not regard 
international law as a forum for facilitating the interactive and cooperative exchanges 
among different civilizations.  
 
3.3.3 The Aftermath of the Standard of Civilization 
As implemented through techniques such as unequal treaties and capitulations, the 
standard of civilization played a significant role in helping the system of international law 
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inflict on many non-Western societies feelings of humiliation, injustice, and inferiority.  
Part of the aftermath of the standard of civilization in international law is a lingering 
failure to embrace international law fully by those countries once labeled and treated as 
uncivilized.  This failure is historically understandable, but it has consequences for not 
only understanding the past but also shaping the future of international law.  The next 
section of this chapter explores the lingering legacy of the standard of civilization in 
today’s world and today’s attitudes towards international law.  This legacy keeps the 
relationship between international law and concepts of civilization alive and pertinent, 
even if the relationship no longer appears as prominently and provocatively as it once did.  
 
3.4 The Legacy of Western-Centric Civilization in the Age of Globalization: The 
Standard of Global Civilization 
3.4.1 Emergence of a New Standard of Civilization? 
The standard of civilization, which once prevailed in the period of colonialism, 
seems to have disappeared during and after the decolonization process.  During this 
process, non-Western countries made robust attempts to crowd out the legacy of the 
standard of civilization in international law.  Non-Western countries took an active part in 
suggesting new concepts of international law, such as permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources and the New International Economic Order.  The efforts of non-Western 
countries to accommodate their interests bore fruit in United Nations (UN) resolutions 
affirming the interests and perspectives of non-Western countries.25  Using their majority 
                                            
25 On permanent sovereignty over natural resources, see N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997). See also T. Elias, New 
Horizons in International Law 2nd rev. ed. (M. Ssekandi, rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publisers 
1992), pp. 185-200. On the New International Economic Order, see M. Bedjaoui, Towards a New 
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in the UN, developing countries challenged the rules and principles of international law 
designed to favor Western countries and took the initiative to re-shape new international 
law to reflect more appropriately the interests of Third World countries.26 
As a result of these and other developments, the standard of civilization in 
international law appears to have evaporated.  Unequal treaties and the system of 
capitulations have become relics of the past.  Under the fundamental rules and principles 
of contemporary international law, treaties cannot be created through coercion or that 
contain racial and ethnic prejudices.  Every state, regardless of its region, culture, and 
civilization, stands equal before international law as a member of international society.  
The standard of civilization in international law, which once justified the treatment of 
societies as uncivilized seems to have been abandoned.   
However, believing that the standard of civilization can only be found in the 
history books may be premature.  If we look closely at contemporary developments in 
international law and international relations, we can discern something like the old 
standard of civilization at work within the processes of globalization.  Through 
globalization, many of the same countries and peoples that endured the old standard of 
civilization now face a potentially new standard—the standard of global civilization.27   
                                                                                                                                  
International Economic Order (Holmes & Meier 1979). The New International Economic Order 
was advanced through a number of key UN General Assembly resolutions and declarations 
including the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res. 3281, 29 GAOR, 
Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030, p. 50 (1974), and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, UNGA Res. 3201, 6th Spec. Sess GAOR, Supp 1. U.N. Doc. 
A/9559 (1974). 
26 Analysis of The Third World countries’ various efforts to bring in fresh air to existing rules and 
principles of international law can be found in D. Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? 
TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 
29 (2003) [hereinafter Fidler, TWAIL], pp. 34-38. See also the analysis of these efforts in Chapter 
4 of this thesis. 
27 Fidler, Return of Standard, supra note 11, pp. 146-147. 
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Although different in many respects, Western imperialism and globalization share 
some common characteristics.  The extension of trade and economic intercourse is to 
Western imperialism what the dominance of neo-liberal economic policies is to 
emergence of globalization.28  Neo-liberal economic policies gradually became the global 
norm after the Cold War and accelerated the spread of capitalism.  Like unequal treaties 
and the capitulation system in the period of Western imperialism, virtually every type of 
socio-political policy of developing countries has come under hegemonic scrutiny from 
the West.   
From the perspective of many Third World countries, neo-liberal political and 
economic pressure to reform social, economic, and political structures in the image of the 
West appear as the resurrection of Western predatory imperialism.29  The use of 
international law to imbue globalization with neo-liberal political and economic policies 
and strategies has been undertaken by major international organizations, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).30  Amin argues, for example, that globalization can be understood as another stage 
of Western imperialism which has in common with its predecessors the goals of 
achieving control of expanding markets, the looting of the world’s natural resources, and 
                                            
28 On the neo-liberal economic policies, see Neo-Liberal Economic Policy: Critical Essays (P. 
Arestis & M. Sawyer, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2004); M. Prasad, The Politics of Free 
Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United 
States (Univ. of Chicago Press 2006). On the rise of neo-liberal globalization and the third way 
resistance to neo-liberal globalization, see R. Kiely, The Clash of Globalizations: Neo-Liberalism, 
the Third Way and Anti-Globalization (Brill 2005), pp. 48-125, 165-225, 255-291.   
29 Hardt and Negri argued that every state is placed under the dictatorship of informal empire of 
globalization. M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire (Harvard Univ. Press 2000), pp. xi-xii, xiv, 201-350. 
On the loss of the sovereign power of states under globalization and neo-liberal economic policies, 
see J. Rapley, Globalization and Inequality: Neoliberalism’s Downward Spiral (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 2004), pp. 75-106.  
30 Anghie, supra note 6, p. 245. 
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the super-exploitation of the labor reserves found in the Third World countries.31  More 
specifically, Chimni critically highlights:   
 
The threat of re-colonization is haunting the world.  The process of 
globalization has had deleterious effect on the welfare of third world peoples.  
International law is playing a crucial role in helping legitimize and sustain the 
unequal structures and processes that manifest themselves in the growing 
north-south divide … Indeed, international law is the principal language in 
which domination is coming to be expressed in the era of globalization.32   
 
The standard of global civilization suggests a potentially more radical and far-
reaching post-Westphalian vision than the old standard of Westphalian civilization.  Like 
the old standard, the new standard of global civilization pushes Third World countries to 
satisfy political, economic, and legal requirements in how those countries function.  
These requirements constitute the elements informing the standard of global civilization, 
such as strengthening free trade, establishing good governance and the rule of law, and 
protecting human rights.33  The most important requirements of the standard of global 
civilization can be summarized into two parts: good governance through democracy and 
                                            
31 S. Amin, Imperialism and Globalization, 53 Monthly Rev. 6 (2001), p. 9. 
32 B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto,” in The Third World 
and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization (A. Anghie, et al. eds., Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2003), p. 47. 
33 Fidler, Return of Standard, supra note 11, p. 147. See also, K. Jayasuria, Globalization, Law, 
and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergency of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 Ind. 
J. Global Legal Stud. 425 (1999); D. Shelton, Symposium: Globalization & The Erosion of 
Sovereignty in Honour of Professor Lichtenstein: Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 
25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 273 (2002). 
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human rights, and economic prosperity through market-based, globally oriented 
economic strategies. 
First, good governance has become a powerful norm globally applicable to all 
peoples and societies.  The radical changes triggered by globalization have brought about 
extensive debates about how the basic issues of governance within countries and among 
them—accountability, transparency, participation—may be resolved in the context of the 
global political economy.34  From the perspective of international law, good governance 
involves the establishment of democratic, open, accountable and transparent governments 
that respect and promote human rights and the rule of law.35  The emphasis on democratic 
governance as legitimate and good governance highlights a particular understanding of 
human rights.  After the Cold War, this perspective on human rights claims to provide an 
authoritative and universal understanding of human rights, as illustrated by the famous 
“End of History” thesis.36  This understanding of human rights represents foremost the 
Western ideas of individual liberty and representative, constitutional democracy. 
Second, many developments since the end of the Cold War highlight the triumph 
of Western ideas about the best way to achieve economic growth and prosperity.  These 
developments include the large-scale transitions of formerly socialist economies to 
                                            
34 Anghie, supra note 6, p. 247. 
35 Id., p. 248. On the relationship between human rights, democratic governance and good 
governance, see B. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford Univ. Press 
1999); Democratic Governance and International Law (G. Fox & B. Roth, eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2000); N. Tarling, Corruption and Good Governance in Asia (Routledge 2006). See also A. 
Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy, 16 Wis. Int’l L. J. 61 (1997); L. Reif, Building 
Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance 
and Human Rights Protection, 13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 (2000); T. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 46 (1992); C. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An 
International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West? 27 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 289 (1994-
1995); J. d’Aspremont, Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy, 38 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. 
& Pol. 877 (2006). 
36 Anghie, supra note 6, p. 255. 
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market-based economies, the expansion of the liberal international trading system 
through the establishment of the WTO, and the controversial application by international 
financial institutions of structural adjustment policies on developing countries.  These 
phenomena collectively represent structural and political forces that rival the old system 
of capitulations.   
Although globalization operates differently from imperialism, the new standard of 
global civilization exists as a way to determine the level of the political and economic 
development of human societies.  The criteria used to inform this determination largely, if 
not exclusively, emanate from a Western understanding of democracy, governance, 
economic developments, and human rights.  Moreover, this Western understanding 
proclaims its universality because it applies to all peoples and societies.  This view 
disregards social, economic, and political differences between Western developed 
countries and non-Western countries.  In addition, the Western view does not allow much 
tolerance or a margin of appreciation for the non-Western view on what qualities as 
acceptable for human and social development.37   
This situation is not conducive to non-Western perspectives on these governance 
and economic questions, and this climate echoes to same degree the reality under the old 
standard of civilization.  What fundamentally differs today, however, is that not all non-
Western regimes of the world are poor and without power vis-à-vis the West.  In this 
regard, the acknowledged rise of Asia to political and economic prominence provides a 
context not witnessed during the period of Western imperialism.  Considering Asia’s rise 
                                            
37 Analysis of the universalization of the Western democratic thesis can be found in J. Rawls, The 
Law of Peoples (Harvard Univ. Press 2001). On the critique on Rawls’s thesis, see C. Audard, 
“Cultural Imperialism and ‘Democratic Peace’,” in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? 
(R. Martin & D. Reidy, eds., Blackwell Publishing 2006), pp. 59-75.   
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with respect to the new standard of global civilization proves, therefore, to be an 
important and interesting analytical task.   
 
3.4.2 Asia and the Standard of Global Civilization 
  The economic success of many Asian countries has brought these countries 
material importance qualitatively different from the material significance of Asia to 
Western imperialists.  Yet, Asian economic progress is perhaps not sufficient for many of 
these countries to satisfy the new standard of global civilization, especially with respect 
to democracy, good governance, and human rights.  Lack of confidence in Asia’s 
economic and political progress appeared in reactions to the 1997 financial crisis in Asia.  
Western notions of good governance were frequently offered as the solution to preventing 
a similar crisis in the future, and here we can see the fingerprints of the standard of global 
civilization.  Anghie sensed these tensions and observed:  
 
The attack on these Asian system of governance, through the arguments 
relating to ‘democratic governance’ and ‘legitimate governance’ was seen, 
then as an attempt to undermine the conditions that had resulted in this Asian 
success, which challenged the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
decisively established the universal and enduring validity of the Western 
liberal-democratic system.38 
 
                                            
38 Anghie, supra note 6, pp. 255-256. 
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Similarly, when it comes to protecting and promoting human rights, more 
complex problems arise.  Specifically for Asian countries, the core problems concerning 
human rights improvements center on the debate concerning “Asian values.”39  Asian 
countries generally assert that human rights discourse tends to emphasize universal 
application of the Western understanding of human rights and marginalizes significant 
differences between Western and other understanding of human rights.40  Although 
human rights advocates emphasize the interdependence of two different kinds of human 
rights—civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights—the realization 
of human rights still heavily depends on the material capabilities of each country.  Some 
countries pay more attention to civil and political rights than economic, social, and 
cultural rights, while others take economic, social and cultural rights more seriously than 
civil and political rights. 
Under the influence of Western liberalism, particular understandings of human 
rights that prioritize civil and political rights become influential and authoritative globally.  
These understandings tend to emphasize the importance of democracy, and democracy 
becomes the pre-condition for enjoying other human rights in every country.  In this 
context, alternative understandings of human rights that emphasize social, economic, and 
cultural rights over civil and political rights face scrutiny within the dominant Western 
perspective on priorities in human rights protection.  The economic success Asia 
experienced did not immunize Asian countries from harsh judgments in the aftermath of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  These judgments provoked controversies familiar from 
                                            
39 Chapter 5 analyzes the “Asian values” debate in more detail. 
40 For the universal application of the Western understanding of human rights and a critique of the 
human rights understanding found in Asian values, see J. Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian 
Values: A Defense of ‘Western’ Universalism,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (J. 
Bauer & D. Bell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), pp. 60-87.  
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the debates about structural adjustment programs international financial institutions 
forced on transition economies and developing countries.  The attempt to reform 
economic structure in transition and developing countries through structural adjustment 
policies has been severely criticized by anti-globalization movements.41  Much of the 
criticism highlights that the reach of structural adjustment policies is not limited to 
matters of economic reformation.  Implementing structural adjustment policies requires 
changes in the social and political realms as well.  For example, deregulation, 
privatization, and trade liberalization advanced by structural adjustment policies cannot 
be achieved without modifying or revising laws relating to a vast area of government 
policy.  Strictly speaking, the request of the World Bank for countries to reform social, 
political and economic policies deviates from its competence.  The World Bank is 
prohibited by its Articles of Agreement from interfering in the political affairs of a 
recipient state.42  However, the scope of the impact of structural adjustment policies is 
justified to realize the multidimensional elements of achieving good governance.  Anghie 
argues that “[B]y asserting that economic development depends on good governance, on 
the political system of a country, the World Bank can justify formulating an entirely new 
set of initiatives that seeks explicitly to reform the political institutions of a recipient state, 
on the basis that such reform is necessary to achieve development, the central concern of 
the World Bank.”43  
                                            
41 Kiely, supra note 28, pp. 126-162. 
42 Section 10 of Article IV of the IBRD Articles of Agreement explicitly asserts that “the World 
Bank shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member.” See IBRD Articles of Agreement, 
Section 10 of Article IV of the IBRD Articles of Agreement available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049603~pa
gePK:43912~piPK:36602,00.html#I11 (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
43 Anghie, supra note 6 pp. 261-262. 
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In the eyes of critics, structural adjustment polices have created many problems, 
such as producing more poverty in some developing countries.44  For purposes of this 
chapter, the manner in which structural adjustment policies imposed a Westernized 
perspective on politics and economics on developing countries is a primary concern.  
Structural adjustment policies to a large degree encroach upon the sovereignty of 
developing countries, in the Westphalian sense of sovereignty.  The economic plans of 
Third World countries are restricted within narrow limits allowed by structural 
adjustment policies.  In addition, structural adjustment policies produce many problems, 
such as distortions of the labor market, increases in the gap between rich and poor, and 
suffering among the working class.  Chimni criticizes structural adjustment policies for 
their repressive and selective characteristics.  Under structural adjustment policies, the 
political struggles of the working class are regarded as movements that should be 
suppressed.45  Thus, only protection of liberal civil and political rights is allowed, and 
room for promoting economic, social, and cultural rights is reduced.  This selective 
approach to human rights contributes to distortions in priorities accorded to different 
kinds of human rights.   
By emphasizing neo-liberal economic reformation, structural adjustment policies 
do not pay attention to traditional aspects of economic structures of non-Western 
countries.  From the perspective of neo-liberal economic reformation, the traditional 
structures in Asian economies, such as support for life-time employment, and an 
emphasis on family-based business management, are the source of inefficiencies and 
                                            
44 M. Chossudovsky, Global Poverty in the Late 20th Century, 52 J. Int’l Aff. 293 (1998), pp. 293-
311. 
45 B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 1 (2004), pp. 22-23. 
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corruption and should, thus, be changed.  The proponents of neo-liberal economic 
reformation explicitly pointed out that the origins of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 
were found in traditional economic structures of Asian countries.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The standard of global civilization, which is represented by the post-Cold War 
emphasis on good governance and structural adjustment policies, is not as overtly harsh 
on non-Western countries as the old standard of Westphalian civilization.  The standard of 
global civilization does not resort to the racism that influenced unequal treaties and the 
system of capitulations to realize its objectives.  However, as noted earlier, substantial 
similarities exist between the old standard of Westphalian civilization and the new 
standard of global civilization.  These similarities appear in the common approach of 
selecting Western ideas of governance, economics, and law as the standards against 
which other countries and societies are measured.  The process through which countries 
are measured is different, with the old standard of civilization driven by imperialism and 
the new standard of global civilization propelled by globalization.  These different 
processes do not undermine the fact that transition and developing countries are measured 
globally by standards largely Western in origin.  As under the old standard of civilization, 
the new measurement process makes extensive use of international law.   
Although less violent and racist, the advent of the standard of global civilization 
does not necessarily mark the emergence of an inter-civilizational understanding of 
international law.  Through globalization, societies are, willing or not, being brought 
together increasingly as one civilization, but the standard for that civilization does not 
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necessarily reflect the diversity of civilizations that still inform government policies, 
social dynamics, and individual behavior today.  Whether moving towards an 
international law that reflects a civilizational dialogue as opposed to a Westernized 
monologue is feasible is explored in the remaining chapters of this thesis, with Asia as the 
case study. 
 61 
Chapter 4. Critical Theory and International Law:  
The Emergence and Importance of Third World Approaches  
to International Law (TWAIL) 
4.1 Introduction  
 The problem identified in Chapter 3 of a lack of impact on international law from 
non-Western countries and cultures has contributed to the development of an entire 
school or approach to studying international law called Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL).  This chapter focuses on TWAIL because this set of 
approaches constitutes the most important critical theoretical work focused on 
international law relevant to analyzing whether an Asian perspective on international law 
and global governance is emerging.  This thesis’ exploration of the possibilities of 
bringing on an “Eastphalian” approach to bear on international law must consider the 
conceptual critiques of past and present international law by TWAIL writers because 
these critiques focus on why Western ideas and interests have dominated the development 
of international law.  As this chapter argues later, the TWAIL approach is not without 
problems that limit its utility, particular its utility in plotting out strategies for the future 
operation of international law.  Nevertheless, the Asian-specific focus of this thesis must 
grapple with the most prominent theoretical arguments critiquing the historical and 






4.2 TWAIL: Challenging History, Changing Theory 
 TWAIL is an international law methodology and joins other approaches, such as 
positivism, policy-oriented jurisprudence, International Legal Process, Critical Legal 
Studies, international law and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law and 
economics.1  Mutua ascribes TWAIL as a “broad dialectic of opposition to international 
law” that resists the illegitimate, predatory, oppressive, and unjust regime of international 
law.2  Gathii notes that “[T]hird world positions exist in opposition to, and as a limit on, 
the triumphal universalism of the liberal/conservative consensus in international law.”3  
However, the critical attitude of TWAIL to the prevailing system of international law is 
not a new phenomenon in international legal analysis.  Fidler indicates that “[T]WAIL 
                                            
1 On different methodological approaches to international law, see The Methods of International 
Law (S. Ratner & A.M. Slaguhter, eds., The American Society of International Law 2004). 
2 M. Mutua, What is TWAIL? 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31 (2000), p. 31. For the various other 
arguments related to TWAIL and developing country perpectives, see T. Elias, New Horizons in 
International Law 2nd rev. ed. (M. Ssekandi, rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publisers 1992); R.P. 
Anand, “Attitude of the Asian-African States Towards Certain Problems of International Law,” in 
Third World Attitudes Towards International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai, 
eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987); R.P. Anand, Role of the “New” Asian-African Countries 
in the Present International Legal Order, 56 Am. J. Int’l L. 383 (1962); R.P. Anand, New States 
and International Law (Vikas Publications 1973) [hereinafter Anand, New States]; K. Aoki, Space 
Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third World” in International Law and Critical Race Theory, 
45 Vill. L. Rev. 913 (2000); T. Wang, “The Third World and International Law,” in The Structure 
and Process of International Law: Essay in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (R. 
Macdonald & M. Johnston, eds., Kluwer Law International 1983), pp. 953-976; C. Weeramantry 
& N. Berman, The Grotius Lecture Series, 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1515 (1999); J. Gathii, 
International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 184 (1998); K. Mickelson, Rhetoric and 
Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 Wis. J. Int’l L. 353 (1998); J. 
Ngugi, Making New Wine for Old Wineskins: Can the Reform of International Law Emancipate 
the Third World in the Age of Globalization? 8 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 73 (2002); W. 
Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of Equitable 
Distribution, 39 Colum. J. Int’l L. 302 (2001); O. Okafor, Newness, Imperialism, and 
International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective, 43 Osgoode Hall L. J. 171 
(2005); B. Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the 
Expansion of International Institutions, 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 529 (2000) [hereinafter Rajagopal, 
From Resistance to Renewal]; A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for 
Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 419 (2000); M. 
Sornarajah, The Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of Globalization, 5 Singapore 
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 284 (2001). 
3 J. Gathii, Rejoinder: Twailing International Law, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2066 (2000), p. 2067. 
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rejuvenates the opposition to aspects of international law expressed by Third World states 
and intellectuals during the process of decolonization and attempts to sharpen such 
opposition in the era of globalization.”4   
For the purpose of opposition to existing forms of international law, TWAIL 
embraces various arguments criticizing the Western domination of international law.  
TWAIL links with other international law methodologies, such as Critical Legal Studies,5 
feminist jurisprudence,6 Critical Race Theory,7 and Marxism8 that also criticize existing 
rules and principles of international law.  Although the diversity of ideas informing 
TWAIL gives rise to a question of the approach’s internal coherence,9 TWAIL has its own 
distinct qualities as an international legal methodology.  Although scholars working under 
the name of TWAIL do not necessarily share similar political, economic, or ideological 
beliefs,10 TWAIL scholars tend to align their arguments to demonstrate the vulnerability 
of Third World countries and peoples to the power politics perpetrated by the great 
powers.11   
                                            
4 Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future 
Direction of International Law, 2. Chinese J. Int’l L. 29 (2003) [hereinafter Fidler, TWAIL], p. 29. 
5 D. Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 335 
(2000). See also D. Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law, 12 Leiden J. Int’l L. 9 (1999). 
6 K. Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other 
Female, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1509 (1992). 
7 A. Anghie, What is TWAIL: Comment, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31 (2000), p. 39.  See also E. 
Iglesias, Out of the Shadow: Marking Intersections in and between Asian Pacific American 
Critical Legal Scholarship and Latina/o Critical Legal Theory, 40 Boston College L. Rev 372 
(1998); E. Roman, A Race Approach to International Law (RAIL): Is There a Need for Yet 
Another Critique of International Law? 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1534 (2000).   
8 C. Miéville, The Commodity-Form Theory of International Law: An Introduction, 17 Leiden. J. 
Int’l L. 271 (2004).  See also C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of 
International Law (Brill 2005). 
9 A. Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Anghie & Chimni, 
TWAIL Methodology], pp. 96-101. 
10 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 30. 
11 Anghie & Chimni, TWAIL Methodology, supra note 9, p. 78. 
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Okafor notes that “[T]WAIL scholars are solidly united by a shared ethical 
commitment to intellectual and practical struggle to expose, reform, or even retrench 
those features of the international legal system that helps create or maintain the generally 
unequal, unfair, or unjust global order”.12  The sensitivity of TWAIL to the effects of 
power politics flows from the traumatic experience of non-Western countries to 
colonialism and imperialism.  TWAIL scholars commonly emphasize that this historical 
perspective should be taken seriously to gain a correct understanding of the current 
features of, and debate about, the international system.  According to Okafor, TWAIL is 
concerned to expose the continuities and discontinuities in the historical development of 
international legal norms, structures, claims, or rules for the purpose of better 
understanding the ways in which they facilitate the serious advantages that Third World 
peoples suffer.13   
Moreover, TWAIL pays considerable attention to relations among the great 
powers and the ways in which international rules or institutions actually affect the 
distribution of power between states and peoples.14  Indicating that the interests of Third 
World countries and peoples have been sacrificed for the interests of Western powers, 
TWAIL stresses the equality of Third World countries and peoples.  TWAIL demands that 
international law and international relations should take seriously the position that Third 
World countries and peoples deserve no less dignity, no less security, and no less rights or 
benefits from international action than do citizens of Western countries seriously.15  
TWAIL is suspicious the notion of “universality” or “common humanity,” which Western 
                                            
12 Okafor, supra note 2, pp. 176-177 
13 Id., p. 178. 
14 Anghie & Chimni, TWAIL Methodology, supra note 9, p. 78. 
15 Okafor, supra note 2, p. 179. 
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perspectives on international law often claim.  From the TWAIL perspective, Western 
countries emphasis on the universality of international law is another guise that facilitates 
and justifies the marginalization and exploitation of Third World countries and peoples 
for the interests of Western countries.  
In the age of globalization, fearing the resurrection of Western domination over 
the world through neo-liberalism, TWAIL strongly suggests achieving solidarity among 
Third World countries to oppose the development of yet another unjust global order.16  
For this purpose, Mutua explains TWAIL’s three basic objectives:  
 
The first is to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international 
law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of 
international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to 
Europeans.  Second, it seeks to construct and present an alternative normative 
legal edifice for international governance.  Finally, TWAIL seeks through 
scholarship, policy, and politics to eradicate the conditions of 
underdevelopment in the Third World.17   
 
Associating the impact of globalization with Western hegemony, TWAIL scholars 
seek to foster and spread a new perspective on international law.  The efforts of TWAIL 
scholars to fight against the perceived Western hegemonic perspective on international 
law can be categorized in two parts.  First, TWAIL scholars seek to criticize the use of 
international law to solidify and perpetuate Western domination over the world.  Second, 
                                            
16 Mutua, supra note 2, p. 36. 
17 Id., p. 31. 
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TWAIL scholars seek to identify, promote, and establish the grounds for a post-
hegemonic global order which reflects the interests of Third World and its peoples.18 
For theses reasons, TWAIL is important to study for purpose of this thesis.  
TWAIL’s objectives echo issues analyzed in Chapter 3 associated with the impact of 
standard of civilization on international law.  TWAIL seeks to identify the injustices 
perpetrated through international law in the past, to prevent the resurrection of this past 
history, and to change international law so that it is not monopolized by Western concepts, 
power, and hegemony.  
As this chapter explores more below, the TWAIL approach to international law 
generates as many questions as insights.  TWAIL’s strength is an ability to identify unjust 
practices, policies, and principles in the past and present.  This strength makes TWAIL 
powerful in opposing inaccurate understandings of history and complacency about the 
status quo.  TWAIL is, however, less impressive where guidance about the future is 
required.  At times, TWAIL writings can seem so hostile towards the interests and 
behavior of Western countries that collaborative dealings with the West in the future seem 
hopeless.  TWAIL’s oppositional attitude also often makes TWAIL criticism appears 
reactive and “backwards looking” rather than proactive and prescriptive about realistic 
strategies for heightening the voice of the Third World in international law.  The fast-
moving nature of globalization highlights how TWAIL appears at times to be lagging 
behind the cutting edge of global politics and international law’s role in it.   
When TWAIL thinking does achieve forward-looking analysis, the results are 
often much less impressive than its oppositional critiques of existing problems.  This type 
                                            
18 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 31. 
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of prescriptive weakness is not peculiar to TWAIL, but the weaknesses weigh heavily on 
TWAIL because TWAIL writers believe they and others have a duty not only to right past 
wrongs but also to establish a new post-hegemonic international law and global order that 
reflects greater cultural and civilizational pluralism.  
 
4.3 The Third World’s Revolt Against the West: A Vision of Pluralism in 
International Law 
 Technically speaking, “TWAIL” refers to a deliberate movement among 
international legal scholars and activists that formally began in the 1990s.  Of course, 
critiques of international law from Third World perspective extend back at least to the 
period of decolonization.  These earlier Third World critiques of international law did not 
refer to TWAIL on any overarching name, but these critiques reflect the same objectives 
of the later TWAIL movement – to identify past and present injustices and to seek a more 
equitable system of international law that reflected Third World interests and values.  
 
4.3.1 Third World Critiques of International Law from the Period of Decolonization 
 According to Anghie and Chimni, Third World critiques during decolonization 
paid considerable attention to formulating strategies to fight against the dominant 
Western perspective on international law.  First, recalling the tragic experiences of Third 
World countries and peoples under Western colonialism and imperialism, Third World 
writers and thinkers highlighted how the colonial characteristics of international law 
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legitimized the West’s subjugation and oppression of Third World countries and 
peoples.19   
Second, these advocates attempted to rectify Western countries’ assumptions that 
pre-colonial Third World countries were strangers to norms and principles of 
international law.  Third World scholars analyzed historical records and revealed non-
Western countries’ using their own forms of “international law” within their non-Western 
“international relations” before the arrival of Western imperialism.20 
Third, Third World critics stressed that the contents of international law should be 
transformed to take into account the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the newly 
independent states.  For the purpose of transforming international law to reflect the 
interests of Third World states and peoples, advocates focused on the United Nations 
(UN), specifically producing UN General Assembly resolutions, to foster the changes 
necessary to make a more just world order.21  These uses of UN General Assembly 
resolutions brought about new debates on the sources of international law.22   
Fourth, given the fear of domination by the Western powers and the need to build 
up newly independent states, Third World proponents strongly relied on the fundamental 
principle of the Westphalian system – state sovereignty.  The emphasis on state 
                                            
19 Anghie & Chimni, TWAIL Methodology, supra note 9, p. 80. 
20 Id., pp. 80-81. 
21 Id., p. 81.  
22 On UN General Assembly resolution as a source of international law, see G. Arangio-Ruiz, The 
United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of International 
Law (Brill Academic Publishers 1979); V.S. Mani, Basic Principles of Modern International Law: 
A Study of the United Nations Debates on the Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (Lancers Books 1993); G. Kerwin, The Role 
of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law 
in United States Courts, 4 Duke. L. J. 876 (1983); M.D. Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions 
of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 Eur. J. Int’l 
L. 879 (2006).  
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sovereignty raised the importance of the principles of sovereign equality of states and 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states.23   
Fifth, Third World advocates stressed the importance of the economic 
development of Third World states.  They argued that political independence did not 
guarantee true liberation of Third World countries from the Western powers.  In addition, 
they kept a critical eye on the prevailing inequalities between the North and South.  These 
economic efforts bore fruit in the principles of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, changes to the international law on foreign direct investment, and the push for 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO).24 
 
4.3.2 Components of the “Revolt against the West”: Procedural and Substantive 
Initiatives by Third World Countries 
  Fidler observed that the efforts of Third World writers on international law 
connected to a larger political phenomenon of decolonization, what Hedley Bull called 
the “revolt against the West.”25  According to Fidler, the revolt against West sought the 
pluralization of the existing Westphalian civilization.26  Third World strategies to 
incorporate a more pluralistic vision in international law focused on procedural and 
substantial aspects of international law.  Procedurally, developing countries sought to 
change the hegemonic process through which the Western powers historically made and 
implemented international law.  Procedural reformation of international law was backed 
up by Third World countries’ growing quantitative presence in international organizations, 
                                            
23 Anghie & Chimni, TWAIL Methodology, supra note 9, p. 81. 
24 Id., p. 82. 
25 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 34. 
26 Id. 
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such as the UN.  The numerical majority enjoyed by Third World countries in 
international organizations prevented the great powers of the West from making 
international law in those organizations for the interests of Western powers and provided 
a means to promote the interests of Third World countries.27   
In addition to this procedural pluralization, Third World advocates attempted to 
undertake a paradigm shift in the substantive content of international law in a number of 
important areas.  The prevailing Western perspective on international law came under 
fierce Third World attacks.  Substantively, these attacks sought to generate more 
pluralism into the norms and principles of international law, which had always been 
designed by and for Western countries.  Third World efforts at pluralism of existing 
norms and principles of international law can be found in various areas of international 
law, such as the principle of self-determination, the prohibition of intervention in 
domestic affairs of other states, international law on foreign direct investment, 
international trade law, the law of the sea, and the establishment of the NIEO.28  
 
Principle of Self-Determination 
Although the principle of self-determination existed before the process of 
decolonization,29 the Third World emphasized the importance of the principle as a shield 
against social, economic, and political neo-colonial influences of Western powers.30  
                                            
27 Id., p. 38. 
28 Id., p. 39. 
29 Article 1(2) of the UN Charter (stating that a purpose of the United Nations was “[t]o develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of people”). See also A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995), pp. 11-33. 
30 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 39. Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
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Before Third World emphasis on the principle of self-determination, this principle was 
understood as the insistence that the government be responsible to the people.  Woodrow 
Wilson, former president of the United States argued that self-determination was the 
logical corollary of popular sovereignty.  He argued that the principle of self-
determination was synonymous with the principle that governments must be based on 
“the consent of the governed.”31  Emphasizing the autonomy of Third World countries to 
establish their governments in ways reflecting the interests of their peoples, the Third 
World had a powerful legal and moral weapon to block Western influence and create 
political, economic, legal, and cultural space for the states and peoples of the Third World 
to determine their own destinies, not destinies determined by colonial powers and 
civilizational prejudice.32  In addition, Third World countries played a significant role in 
elevating the principle of self-determination to the status jus cogens in international law.33  
The main focus within the principle of self-determination was changed by the Third 
World countries from the establishment of responsible governments reflecting interests of 
                                                                                                                                  
Rights (ICESCR) provides that “all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” See Art. 1(1) ICCPR and ICESCR. For analyses on the principle of self-
determination, see Modern Law of Self-Determination (C. Tomuschat, ed., Springer 1993); N. 
Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 Wis. Int’l L. J. 51 
(1988-1989); R. McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 Int’l & 
Comp. L. Q. 857 (1994); G. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the 
Post-Colonial Age, 32 Stan. J. Int’l L. 255 (1996); J. Summers, The Rhetoric and Practice of Self-
Determination: A Right of All Peoples or Political Institutions? 73 Nordic J. Int’l L. 325 (2004); P. 
Williams & R. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 347 (2004) 
31 Cassese, supra note 29, pp. 11, 19. 
32 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 39. 
33 Jus cogens rules, otherwise known as “peremptory rules,” are non-derogable rules of 
international law. They render void other, non-peremptory rules which conflict with them. See M. 
Byers, Conceptualizing the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 Nordic J. 
Int’l L. 211 (1997), p. 211. Supporters of the view that the principle of self-determination is part 
of jus cogens include: I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 4th ed. (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1991), p. 513; A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford Univ. Press 1986), 
p. 136.  
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the governed to protection of Third World countries’ sovereignty from the influences of 
Western powers.   
Third World countries’ arguments for self-determination were not sufficient to 
guarantee their social, economic and political independence from Western domination.  
Reinforcing and elevating the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of 
other states was also needed to promote the independence of Third world countries from 
the influence of the Western powers.34  Although the purposes of non-intervention and 
self-determination originated in European ideas about international law, Third World 
efforts to embrace, re-orient, and apply these principles to suit the needs of Third World 
states universalized and pluralized them for the benefit of Third World countries and 
peoples.35  Affected by the efforts of Third World countries, the scope of the principle of 
non-intervention was substantively expanded.  Third World countries’ efforts to expand 
the scope of the principle of non-intervention were well illustrated in UN General 
Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations.36  Third World countries efforts to 
emphasize the principle of non-intervention make this principle a powerful shield against 
the advocacy of humanitarian intervention, specifically unilateral intervention through the 
use of force.37   
                                            
34 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, pp. 39-40. On the principle of non-intervention, see Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect, 
[hereinafter Responsibility to Protect], paras. 2.7-2.15, available at 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
35 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 40. 
36 See UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited August 9, 2008). 
37 B.S. Chimni, “Towards A Third World Approach to Non-Intervention: Through the Labyrinth 
of Western Doctrine,” in Third World Attitudes Toward International Law: An Introduction (F. 
Snyder & S. Sathirathai, eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987), p. 73. 
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International Law on Foreign Direct Investment 
Third World efforts to change international law appeared in many specific areas, 
especially in areas that touched upon economic sovereignty and economic development.  
The efforts of Third World countries to change the international law on foreign 
investment are recognized as a good example of Third World countries’ attack on the 
Western domination of international law.38  From the Third World’s perspective, the 
international law on foreign investment allowed Western developed countries to 
subordinate the economic sovereignty of Third World countries to the interests of Western 
developed countries and corporations.  Third World countries rejected the customary 
international law on foreign direct investment that gave extensive protection to foreign 
investments of capital-exporting countries.  By giving extensive protection to capital-
exporting states, Third World countries argued that traditional international law on 
foreign direct investment undermined the effective exercise of their sovereignty in the 
economic realm.  For the purpose of exercising their economic sovereignty, Third World 
countries particularly attempted to change rules and principles concerning nationalization 
and expropriation.  Third World countries’ emphasis on “permanent sovereignty” over 
economic resources undermined traditional international law on foreign direct investment, 
which was designed for the economic interests of developed countries.  This attempt of 
Third World countries resulted in replacing and narrowing the scope of the Hull Doctrine 
of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for expropriation.39  Through the 
attempts of Third World countries to change the rules of international law on foreign 
                                            
38 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 41. On the international law on foreign investment, see M. 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment 2nd ed. (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
39 Filder, TWAIL, supra note 4, pp. 41-42. 
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direct investment, the host government, generally of Third World countries, had more 
latitude in assessing the appropriate level of compensation and determining the necessity 
of foreign direct investment for their own interests rather than those of capital-exporting 
countries.  By redirecting the focus of international law on foreign investment from the 
interests of capital-exporting countries to the interests of host countries, Third World 
countries succeeded in changing characteristics of international law on foreign direct 
investment.  
 
International Trade Law 
In addition to changing international law on foreign investment, Third World 
countries also worked to change international trade law, especially as embodied in the 
major body of such law found in the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
Originally, GATT did not pay much attention to the needs of developing countries 
because key GATT rules (e.g., the most favored-nation (MFN) principle) applied without 
regard to the economic conditions of contracting parties.  In other words, GATT rules 
have non-discriminatory characteristics because they applied equally to all contracting 
parties, which as sovereign states had equal rights and duties under international law.  
However, this legal formality of GATT confronted the reality that Third World countries 
did not have the same economic power and level of development compared with 
developed countries.  This formality of GATT was affected as more Third World 
countries became GATT contracting parties.   
In particular, Third World countries began to attack the formality of GATT and to 
suggest special and differential treatment for developing countries within GATT.  The 
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request for special and differential treatment meant creating an exception for the MFN 
principle, one of the core obligations of GATT.  The efforts to incorporate special and 
differential treatment into GATT bore fruit when the contracting parties added Part IV on 
“Trade and Development” to GATT in the mid-1960s, under which developed GATT 
countries agreed to permit special and differential treatment for trade in goods originating 
in developing countries.40  Third World countries’ efforts to make an exception for the 
MFN principle resulted in enacting a ten-year waiver of the MFN principle in 1971 to 
exempt Generalized Systems of Preference (GSP) efforts from the application of this 
principle, a waiver the GATT contracting parties made permanent in 1979 by adopting 
the Enabling Clause.  Supported by the Enabling Clause, which provides much greater 
leeway for developed countries to discriminate in favor of developing countries,41 Third 
World leaders succeeded in incorporating special and differential treatment into 
international trade law and achieved substantive pluralization of international law by 
allowing the rules to reflect levels of economic development rather than just reflecting 
the formal legal equality of states.42   
 
Law of the Sea 
Third World countries also launched initiatives to transform the substantive 
content of the law of the sea, an area of international law long dominated by Western 
maritime powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States.  In this area of 
                                            
40 Id., p. 43.  
41 B. Hoekman, C. Michalopoulos, and L. Winters, Special and Differential Treatment of 
Developing Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward After Cancún, 27 World Economy 481 
(2004), p. 490. 
42 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 44. See also R. Bahla, International Trade Law: Theory and 
Practice 2nd ed. (Lexis Publishing 2001), p. 1430. 
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international law, Third World countries supported two new concepts for the law of the 
sea – the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)43 and the common heritage of mankind 
(CHM).44  Through the EEZ and CHM, Third World countries brought pluralism to the 
content and the process of the law of the sea.45  The main impetus of Third World 
countries’ advocacy for the EEZ and CHM can be found in their desire to have access to 
the resources in EEZ and CHM and to prevent their monopolization by more powerful 
developed countries.46   
Prior to the emergence of the EEZ concept, living and non-living resources 
beyond the limits of the territorial sea were exploited extensively by Western developed 
countries because (1) the law of the sea held that these living and non-living resources 
fell under the principle of the freedom of the high seas, meaning that any nation was free 
to exploit the resources; and (2) Western countries generally had more resources and 
better technology to harvest or access such resources.  Thus, developing coastal states’ 
access to living and non-living resources beyond the limits of the territorial sea was 
affected by the way the law of the sea governed these resources.  However, after the 
emergence of the EEZ concept, and by declaring under this concept exclusive jurisdiction 
over economic resources out to 200 nautical miles from the coast, developing coastal 
                                            
43 See Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS], available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last visited Aug. 
12, 2008). On the concept of the EEZ, see R. Churchill & V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 3rd ed. 
(Manchester Univ. Press 1999), pp. 160-180. 
44 See Art. 136 of UNCLOS. On the concept of CHM, see P. Payoyo, Cries of the Sea-World 
Inequality, Sustainable Development and the Common Heritage of Humanity (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1997), pp. 157-459. 
45 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 44. 
46 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 43, pp. 160-161. 
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states gained control over resources in their EEZs and succeeded in gaining jurisdiction 
over activities of Western developed countries in their EEZs.47 
 
New International Economic Order 
 In many ways, Third World efforts to establish the NIEO captured the many facets 
of the movement to bring pluralism to the substantive rules and principles of international 
law.  Under the NIEO, Third World countries sought to transform the way in which 
international law regulated economic intercourses between states.  Fidler indicates that 
“[T]he various efforts on this issue converged in the NIEO, which laid out an alternative 
vision for economic relations between states that stressed strong principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention, national control over foreign investment, and the need to have 
economic policy recognized the development challenges faced by developing 
countries.”48  The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which is regarded as 
one of the key NIEO documents, embraces the efforts of Third World to change existing 
rules and principles of international law.49  The principle of self-determination is 
emphasized as the governing rule for economic and political relations among states.50  
Stressing every state’s right to choose its economic, political, social and cultural system 
based on the will of its people without outside interference, the Charter of Economic 
                                            
47 Id., p. 161. 
48 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 46. On the NIEO, see R.P. Anand, International Law and the 
Developing Countries: Confrontation or Cooperation? (Kluwer Law International 1987), pp. 
103-128; S.K. Agrawala, “The Emerging International Economic Order”, in Third World Attitudes 
Toward International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai, eds., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1987), pp. 379-388. 
49 See UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited Aug. 9, 2008). 
50 Id., Chapter 1.  
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Rights and Duties of States clearly indicates the importance of the principle of non-
intervention.51   
With regard to foreign direct investment, the Charter of Rights and Duties of 
States highlights the national jurisdiction of host countries for regulating foreign direct 
investment, including the issue concerning compensation.52  Emphasizing the necessity of 
extending, improving and enlarging the system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory tariff preferences to the developing countries, the Charter of Rights and 
Duties of States clearly supports special and different treatment for developing countries 
in international trade relations.53  With respect to law of the sea, the Charter of Rights and 
Duties of States describes the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, as the common 
heritage of mankind.54  
 
International Human Rights Law 
 With regard to human rights, Third World countries’ efforts to incorporate 
economic, social, and cultural rights into the realm of international human rights can be 
regarded as another attempt of Third World countries to achieve the pluralization of 
international law.  Under the Western liberal perspective on human rights, the importance 
of economic, social, and cultural rights was not stressed as much as civil and political 
rights.  The Western subordination of economic, social, and cultural rights reflected the 
problems associated with these rights, such as questions about their justiciability, the 
                                            
51 Id., Art. 1.  
52 Id., Art. 2. 
53 Id., Art. 18. 
54 Id., Art. 29. 
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vagueness of the substances of these rights, and the problems with creating international 
mechanisms to facilitate their implementation.   
The Western perspective human rights came under attack by Third World 
countries for its distorted emphasis on civil and political rights.  With supports of the 
countries from the Soviet bloc, Third World countries exerted influence to elevate the 
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights.55  Third World countries’ efforts to 
highlight the importance of economic, social, and cultural rights were asserted in 
international forums and these efforts included requests for extensive assistance from 
developed countries for enhancing the conditions of developing countries to fulfill 
economic, social, and cultural rights.  For instance, Third World countries stressed the 
imperative need for multilateral cooperation and assistance in implementing the socio-
economic development programmes of the non-aligned and other developing countries.56   
Informed by the perspective of cultural relativism, Third World countries also 
attacked the Western perspective on human rights based on liberalism by arguing that 
communitarian values should be taken more seriously.57  Third World countries criticized 
the perspective on the universality of human rights supported by Western countries, 
which disregards the substantial differences among countries across social, economic, 
political and philosophical dimensions.  This attempt of Third World countries to attack 
the Westernized spread of the universality of human rights is well demonstrated in the 
                                            
55 F. Jhabvala, “On Human Rights and the Socio-Economic Context,” in Third World Attitudes 
Towards International Law: An Introduction (F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai, eds., Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1987), pp. 293-306. 
56 See UN Doc. A/47/675 (1992), p. 47, para. 75, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/729/01/IMG/N9272901.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2008). 
57 P. Baehr, “The Universality of Human Rights,” in Human Rights: Chinese and Dutch 
Perspectives (P. Baehr, et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publisers 1994), p. 37. 
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Bangkok Declaration on human rights.  The preamble of the Bangkok Declaration which 
was the result of a regional conference in preparation of the World Conference held prior 
to a major world conference on human rights, states explicitly that states needed to stress 
“the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to avoid 
the application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and its 
politicization.”58  
In addition, Third World countries made a contribution to elevating the 
importance of the right to development in international human rights law.  Although 
neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights expressly contains the right to 
development, many of the principles and rights specified in those treaties relate to the 
right to development.59  Although Third World countries stressed the importance of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, in reality, they confronted great obstacles in 
fulfilling the tenets of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights owing to their low levels of economic development.  This reality encouraged 
developing countries to articulate the right to development, and the responsibilities of 
developed countries to provide assistance under the right.  Western developed countries 
were strongly opposed to this new principle of international human rights law on the 
ground that development was an economic objective and political aspiration; it did not 
belong within the realm of human rights law.   
                                            
58 See Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights (The Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights), UN Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, available 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2008). 
59 I. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 Am. U. 
Int’l L. Rev. 1425 (2000), p. 1430. 
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Despite the opposition of the Western developed countries, the UN General 
Assembly adopted in 1969 the Declaration on Social Progress and Development which 
listed the main conditions of social progress and development.60  The numerical majority 
enjoyed by Third World countries in the UN brought about the elaboration and 
development of the right to development through UN instruments.  At the heart of these 
efforts was the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) 
by the UN General Assembly in 1986.61  UNDRD is widely considered as a successful 
attempt to define the right to development.  Since the adoption of UNDRD, a series of 
follow-up activities have been undertaken.  These efforts finally bore fruit in the World 
Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993.62  At this conference, states 
reaffirmed that the right to development is a universal and inalienable human rights and 
an integral part of the corpus of fundamental human rights.63  
 
Summary on Pluralization Efforts by Third World Countries 
Through these and other efforts, Third World countries and legal advocates 
succeeded in forcing the international society to acknowledge that international law and 
international relations cannot function effectively without considering the preferences the 
                                            
60 See UNGA Res. 2542 (XXIV), Declaration on Social Progress and Development, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/256/76/IMG/NR025676.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited Aug. 8, 2008). 
61 See UN Doc.A/RES/41/128 (1986), The UN Declaration on the Right to Development, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2008). 
62 A. Rosas, “The Right to Development,” in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 
(A. Eide, et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), p. 249. 
63 See para. I/10 of UN. Doc.A/CONF.157/23 (1993), The Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action—The World Conference on Human Rights, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En (last visited Aug. 8, 
2008).  
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interests, values, and cultures of Third World countries.64  The impact of these Third 
World initiatives on international law during and immediately after the period of 
decolonization was substantial, but, as explored later in this chapter, whether this impact 
has proved lasting is a different question.  Indeed, this question is what has created 
difficulties for those doing TWAIL scholarship and advocacy during the post-Cold War 
period.65  
 
4.4 Withering Pluralism: Challenges of Globalization to TWAIL 
The TWAIL movement in the 1990s reflected concerns about the structure and 
dynamics of post-Cold War globalization from the perspective of Third World countries.  
Indeed, despite the proliferation of TWAIL analyses, some TWAIL scholars have a 
pessimistic view on the direction of TWAIL.66  This pessimism reflects a sense that 
Western dominance in international law again has the upper hand and is promoting the 
homogenization of the international society on the basis of Western neo-liberalism.  This 
homogenization directly threatens the heterogeneity favored by Third World pluralism in 
international law.  The impact of globalization helps obscure international law’s history 
and promotes a new version of Western dominance justified through the language of the 
“end of history.”  According to Fidler, the difficulties TWAIL confronts are driven by the 
intensified homogenization of Westphalian civilization through the increasing penetration 
of Western liberal, democratic philosophical perspectives.  These dynamics directly 
                                            
64 Anand, New States, supra note 2, p. 48-52. 
65 X. Chunying, “Can the Pluralistic World Have a Unified Concept of Human Rights?” in 
Human Rights: Chinese and Dutch Perspectives (P. Baehr, et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publisers 
1994), p. 50. 
66 A. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, 40 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1 (1999), p. 75. 
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challenges Third World and TWAIL interests in having international law embody 
procedural and substantive pluralism.67  
Even the prominent TWAIL scholar Chimni believes that TWAIL has neither the 
capacity to critique the emergent neo-liberal international law nor the ability to suggest an 
alternative perspective on international law.68  Moreover, the scale and speed of 
globalization, which resonates with the neo-liberal perspective increasingly affects the 
daily lives of peoples around the world, including Third World peoples.  In this context, 
the attempts of TWAIL to highlight the distinctiveness of perspectives from Third World 
countries and peoples rapidly lose their relevance because they cannot compete with the 
homogenization liberalism fosters through globalization.69  Under the impact of this 
homogenization, the very meaning of the term “Third World” has now been 
destabilized.70  This section explores the travails of TWAIL and Third World perspectives 
on international law in light of the post-Cold War emergence of globalization and the 
return of Western hegemonic influence in world affairs.  
 
4.4.1 Pluralization Lost? 
As noted earlier in this chapter, both Third World critiques of international law 
during decolonization and TWAIL aimed to increase the voice of the Third World in how 
international law is made, interpreted, and applied.  Although developing countries 
continue to outnumber developed states, the post-Cold War period has stimulated new 
                                            
67 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 48. 
68 B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto,” in The Third World 
and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization (A. Anghie, et al. eds., Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2003) [hereinafter Chimni, A Manifesto], p. 48. 
69 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 48. 
70 B. Rajagopal, Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and 
Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 Third World Q. 767 (2006), p. 767. 
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fears about the lack of effective Third World participation in international governance.  
This lack of participation reduces the likelihood that Third World countries can influence 
the procedural and substantive contexts of international law.  The grand strategy of 
bringing procedural and substantive pluralism to international law is in jeopardy in this 
era of globalization.  Evidence for this assertion can be found in what has happened to the 
results of the push during decolonization and after for more procedural and substantive 
pluralism in international law, a pluralism more aware and respectful of the interests, 
ideas, and cultures of non-Western peoples.  
During the period of Cold War, Third World countries used the principle of self-
determination and the principle of non-intervention as shields against the power of 
Western countries.  For the purpose of excluding the influence of former colonizers, these 
principles stressed the external characteristics of self-determination.  In other words, 
Third World countries used the principle of self-determination to focus on “external self-
determination,” or freedom from foreign rule or control.71  Similarly, Third World 
countries emphasized the principle of non-intervention to protect the supremacy of state 
sovereignty.  Given the history of colonialism and imperialism, the manner in which 
Third World countries stressed their sovereignty through the principles of self-
determination and non-intervention makes sense, but these positions proved ill-equipped 
to deal with the changes that occurred after the Cold War and as globalization accelerated.  
These two developments increasingly focused attention on what has happening inside 
states, and the use of iron-clad principles of external self-determination and non-
intervention no longer had the political traction they did during the Cold War.  
                                            
71 Cassese, supra note 29, p. 72. 
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For example, too much emphasis on state sovereignty only increased scrutiny of 
many problems inside developing countries.  Under the propaganda of decolonization, 
state building and respect for state sovereignty, authoritarian or dictatorial governments in 
Third World countries engaged in the often brutal repression of their peoples.  The desire 
of Third World peoples to enjoy good governance reflecting their cultural preferences 
was often ignored by governments that resorted to violence and authoritarianism.72  
Large-scale human rights violations by authoritarian or dictatorial governments of Third 
World countries could not be concealed or justified by incantations of the principle of 
self-determination and the principle of non-intervention.  
At the same time, new demands arose that called for the self-determination 
principle and non-intervention principle to reflect the realities produced by the end of the 
Cold War and the impact of globalization.  Specifically, the manner in which 
globalization penetrates domestic societies, the reinvigorated human rights movement, 
and the strength of demands for democratic governments all over the world challenged 
the very the foundation of the self-determination principle and non-intervention principle 
as articulated by the Third World decades before.  The principle of self-determination in 
the age of globalization now appears to have legitimacy only if it embraces internal self-
determination, which links directly to a human right to democratic governance.73  
Economically, similar developments meant that attitudes about economic development in 
the Third World included the acceptance of seeking radical internal governance changes 
in Third World countries, as evidenced by the development and use of structural 
                                            
72 Anghie & Chimni, TWAIL Methodology, supra note 9, p. 83. 
73 See Democratic Governance and International Law (G. Fox & B. Roth, eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2000).   
 86 
adjustment policies.74  The principle of non-intervention proved no obstacle to these 
types of efforts to stimulate economic development in Third World countries after the 
Cold War.  
Other post-Cold War developments also challenged the Third World versions of 
the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.  One such development 
involved the emerging preference for more international legal recognition of 
humanitarian intervention, perhaps most famously embodied in the new responsibility to 
protect doctrine.75  The increasing sense of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, and 
the promulgation of the concepts of a responsibility to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
states, opened many Third World governments to intense scrutiny and potential military, 
political, and economic interference from the Western great powers. In addition to the 
challenges to Third World versions of the principle of self determination and the principle 
of non-intervention, the pluralistic perspective on international law promoted by Third 
World countries and TWAIL in many areas of international law has rapidly withered.  
Globalization’s facilitation of Western-based homogenization in politics, governments, 
economics and law accelerates the loss of pluralization in many areas of international law.  
To return to initiatives pushed by the Third World, the EEZ, the CHM, and the NIEO, 
once regarded as revolutionary Third World achievements in bringing pluralism and 
diversity into international law, have lost their importance or disappeared entirely in the 
post-Cold War period.   
                                            
74 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 52. 
75 R. Janse, The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Interventions, 19 Leiden J. Int’l L. 669 (2006), pp. 
671-676. On the concept of responsibility to protect, see Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
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For example, despite the strong belief of Third World countries, the EEZ does not 
make a considerable impact on the fundamental redistribution of the ocean’s resources 
because many coastal developed countries benefited enormously by claiming EEZs.76  In 
addition, some African, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern countries came off badly because 
their EEZs are poor in resources.77  The CHM was the main reason why the entry into 
force of UNCLOS was delayed.  It took over a decade to enter into force because 
developed countries opposed the CHM concept, namely Part XI in UNCLOS.  A 
significant amendment to Part XI of UNCLOS occurred because of the opposition of 
developed countries to Part XI.  This amendment reflected the views of developed 
countries on how resources in the deep sea-bed area should be exploited.78  Fidler notes 
that “[O]n both the substantive rules on exploitation of deep sea-bed resources and the 
economic benefits deep sea-bed mining would generate for developing countries through 
international wealth redistribution, the Third World lost”.79 
The NIEO is also regarded as a failed endeavor of Third World countries to bring 
substantive pluralization to international law.  The main elements of the NIEO strategy, 
such as external self-determination, non-intervention, transformed rules on foreign direct 
investment, special and differential treatment in international trade law, and exploitation 
of resources of the deep sea-bed for the benefit of developing countries, turned out to be 
irrelevant for advancing the interests of Third World countries and peoples.80   
                                            
76 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 43, p. 177. 
77 Id. 
78 See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (last visited Aug. 
9, 2008). 
79 Fidler, TWAIL, supra note 4, p. 55. 
80 Id., pp. 55-56. 
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The Third World’s accomplishment of embracing special and differential 
treatment into international trade law has also lost much of its former luster.  Trade 
experts question whether special and differential treatment under GATT and other WTO 
agreements really provides developing countries with any sustained economic benefits.  
The move from GATT to the WTO has simply increased the pressure in developing 
countries to abide by the rules established by the major trading nations.  With many more 
obligations under the WTO, special and differential treatment for developing countries 
has a very different texture than when GATT was the main agreement.  Under the WTO, 
Chimni points out that “[E]quality rather than difference is the prescribed norm.  The 
prescription of uniform global standards in areas like intellectual property rights has 
meant that the Third World State has lost the authority to devise technology and health 
policies suited to its existential conditions.”81   
The efforts of Third World countries to highlight the different perspective on 
human rights based on cultural relativism provoked harsh criticism from Western 
countries and human rights advocates.  In the age of globalization, the universality of 
human rights remains a powerful idea that confronts pluralization strategies with 
difficulties.  With the support of the human rights movement, there is a growing argument 
that democratic government should be established in all countries in order to achieve the 
full realization of human rights, and this “right to democracy” privileges civil and 
political rights over economic, social, and cultural rights.   
As witnessed in Asian values debates explored in Chapter 5, Third World 
countries have not demonstrated themselves as unquestioned champions of economic, 
                                            
81 Chimni, A Manifesto, supra note 68, p. 59. 
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social, and cultural rights.  Although Third World countries claim to embrace economic, 
social, and cultural rights, these arguments are often made to justify oppression in terms 
civil and political rights.  Put differently, Third World countries not only subordinate civil 
and political rights but also sacrifice economic, social, and cultural rights for the sake of 
speedy and stable economic growth and development.  For the purpose of achieving such 
economic growth, Third World countries, including many Asian countries, often argue 
that democratic government are not universally required to fulfill economic, social, and 
cultural rights.  Authoritarian governments may achieve considerable economic growth 
and raise the standard of living of their peoples.  
However, this kind of economic development cannot make a contribution to 
enhancing the indivisible relationship between civil and political rights and economic, 
social, and cultural rights proclaimed in international human rights law.  In short, Third 
World countries’ emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political 
rights and communitarianism over liberalism based on the cultural relativism has lost 
some of its strengths as human rights perspective in the acceleration of human rights 
revolution stimulated by globalization.  
The changed environment for Third World countries also appears with respect to 
issues on which they have had some success.  As Fidler observed, developing states 
maintained sufficient solidarity to contribute to the demise of the proposed Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, the blocking of any linkage between WTO agreements and 
labor standards, and the preservation and expansion of safeguards on compulsory 
licensing under the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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Rights.82  In each of these instances, however, developing countries were defending the 
status quo against reform ideas pushed by the Western great powers.  The initiative was 
no longer in the hands of the Third World, as it once often was during the Cold War.  
 
4.4.2 TWAIL Troubles 
The many examples of the demise or decay of Third World attempts to pluralize 
the procedural and substantive nature of international law also connect with problems 
with TWAIL’s theoretical framework for opposing Western domination and the rise of the 
standard of global civilization discussed in Chapter 3.  TWAIL has an inherent weakness 
because its foundation is rooted in the basic structure of the Westphalian civilization 
forced on non-Western peoples during the age of imperialism.83  The more pluralistic 
world TWAIL seeks cannot come into being without social, political, and economic 
assistance from Western developed countries, which will impose conditions on such 
assistance that promote homogenization on Western terms.  This context is not conducive 
to building the more pluralistic world desired by TWAIL but is favorable to the process of 
deepening the level of homogenization achievable in Westphalian civilization.  Further, 
increasing the heterogeneity of the economic, political, social and cultural development 
of Third World countries weakens them in taking collective actions to challenge Western 
dominance.  It is almost impossible for Third World countries today to develop and 
maintain a single and unified global Third World perspective embracing the diversity of 
the cultures, politics, governance and legal systems, and economies of Third World 
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countries.84  Ironically, the traditional adherence of many Third World countries to a 
strong sense of state sovereignty hampers their collective ability to articulate common 
policies needed to address not only the resurgence of Western power but also the effects 
of globalization. 
The growth of global civil society is regarded as one of characteristic features of 
globalization and the emergence of forms of global governance.85  The growth of global 
civil society challenges the state-oriented perspective on international relations, including 
the state-oriented approach of TWAIL.  The Third World emphasis on state sovereignty 
has potential negative implications for Third World countries in the era of globalization.  
First, the prominence given to state sovereignty obscures the growing governance roles 
played by non-state actors domestically and globally.  State sovereignty exists in a very 
different environment in globalization than it did during the Cold War.  Second, the 
emphasis on state sovereignty prevents Third World countries from utilizing global civil 
society effectively to promote their interests and desires in international relations.  The 
realm of global civil society is, thus, effectively monopolized by Western interests and 
Western actors.  
This problem is reflected in a growing recognition of the need to use local and 
transnational social movements to reform the Third World and international law.86  This 
resistance-oriented perspective on international law seeks to use local and transnational 
social movements to criticize the imperial characteristics of the Western liberal 
                                            
84 Y. Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: the Asian Debate, 15 Australian Yearbook of Int’l L. 
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perspective on international law, by focusing, for example, on structural adjustment 
policies of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank.  This 
resistance-oriented perspective on international law relies on social movements of Third 
World peoples, sometimes in alliance with Western civil society groups, to criticize both 
the imperial attitude of Western countries and the impotence of Third World governments 
under the impact of globalization.  This approach does not rely on the old foundations of 
state sovereignty, external self-determination, and non-intervention.  In fact, Third World 
governments are often the target of these resistance-oriented transnational civil society 
efforts, often in the areas of human rights. 
The statist-approach that informs TWAIL turns out to be ineffective in addressing 
global problems, such as environmental degradation, extreme poverty and hunger, the 
spread of infectious diseases, and even effective responses to natural disasters.  These 
problems undoubtedly need global governance that requires the cooperation of states and 
non-states actors.  Many countries in the Third World are not only the epicenters of these 
problems but they also often do not have any capabilities to address these problems 
effectively.  Assistance from Western developed countries and global civil society groups 
becomes indispensable.  The imperative of such assistance increases the pressure on 
Third World countries to harmonize their policies according to the desires of the Western 
donor governments and civil society actors, which further marginalizes the possibility of 




4.5 TWAIL and an Asian Perspective on International Law and Global Governance: 
Moving Forwards, Looking Backwards 
From the viewpoint of Asian countries, the emergence of the standard of global 
civilization described in Chapter 3 might be considered another attempt to continue 
Western domination over Asian countries.  Owing to past experiences with Western 
colonialism and imperialism, Asian countries have a strong tendency to worry about the 
return of hegemony, specifically coming from Western countries.  Asian countries tend to 
be suspicious of new initiatives that originate in Western concepts and power, such as 
establishment of democratic government, radical economic reform, and human rights 
movements.  Asian suspicions reflect, in many ways, the skepticism and opposition 
reflected in Third World critiques of international law during decolonization and in 
TWAIL analyses.  
The emergence of the new standard of global civilization, and the role of Western 
powers in this emergence, should not, however, cause Asian countries to see in the 
challenge of globalization only the possibility of conflict and tension with the West 
concerning the use and development of international law.  The question for Asian 
countries is not how much to oppose the standard of global civilization but rather how 
much do Asian countries have to contribute to addressing global problems most countries 
face.  Given how Asia has developed, especially economically, the countries of this 
region occupy a unique place in global affairs.  As Fidler has argued, Asia represents an 
exciting and vital laboratory for 21st century global governance.87  
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In this context, an Asian perspective on international law and global governance 
must not only remember and criticize the Western imperialism of the past but also create 
a forward-looking alternative perspective on international law and global governance for 
this globalized age that draws on ideas and practices informed by the distinct cultural, 
political, and philosophical legacies of Asian countries.  Formulating such an alternative 
Asian perspective on international law is not an easy task, especially the challenge of 
offering Asian-informed approaches to global problems.  
 The foundations for such an Asian perspective can draw on Third World critiques 
from the period of decolonization and from insights developed by TWAIL, but the search 
for an Asian perspective cannot dwell too much on the past and its injustices.  Such a 
perspective cannot react to the standard of global civilization in an entirely hostile way 
because Asia encounters this standard from a completely different position than when 
Asian countries were forced to accept unequal treaties and the humiliation of the system 
of capitulations.  Unlike the Asian societies dominated by the European great powers, 
Asia today represents a microcosm of global realities because the Asian region contains 
the best of the First World and the worst of the Third World, and everything in between.  
As a microcosm for the age of globalization, Asian countries have an opportunity to craft 
an “Eastphalian” approach to compliment and supplement the Westphalian heritage of 
international law. What this Eastphalian approach may contain and how it might emerge, 
are addressed in the following two chapters. 
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PART II. FINDING THE EASTPHALIAN OUTLOOK:  
ELEMENTS OF AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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Chapter 5. The “Asian Values” Debate:  
Myths, Truths, and Their Implications for an 
Asian Perspective on International Law 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As analyzed in previous chapters, the philosophical, political, and cultural 
preferences of Western nations significantly affected the substance and process of 
international law.  In considering the potential contributions of Asian nations to 
international law in the 21st century, the debate over so-called “Asian values” becomes 
important to examine.  In general, proponents of Asian values seek to restore to 
prominence Asian philosophy, culture and civilization, which Western colonialism and 
imperialism denigrated and damaged.  The end of the Cold War and the acceleration of 
Western-oriented globalization stimulated the push back from advocates for Asian values. 
This push back involved an interesting mixture of traditional Asian hostility 
toward Western hegemony and growing pride in Asia’s emerging importance in 
international affairs.  Advocacy for Asian values became a way for Asians to stand 
against aspects of Western-oriented globalization and to advance agendas informed by 
Asian philosophy, culture and civilization.  Moreover, with Asia’s growing significance in 
global politics, Asian values offered a potential basis for new forms of global governance 
applicable beyond the Asian region, and thus perhaps constituted a challenge to Western 
normative dominance in international law and governance.1 
                                            
1 General works on the features of Asian values include W.T. de Bary, Asian Values and Human 
Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Harvard Univ. Press 1998); Human Rights and 
Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representation in Asia (M. Jacobsen & 
O. Bruun, eds., Routledge 2000). On the rise of the Asian region in global politics, see M. Berger, 
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This optimistic, forward looking perspective has, however, generated criticism 
and arguments that question the capability of Asian values to serve as a foundation for the 
management of global problems.  Critics pointed to governance failings in the Asian 
region, such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the long-time absence of regional 
human rights organizations and instruments, and the existence of authoritarian 
governmental regimes in Asian countries.  These pessimistic views on Asian values 
argued that Asian values would only play a relatively trivial role in blazing new paths for 
international law and global governance.2 
This chapter explores the implications of the debate about Asian values for 
international law and Asia’s future role in shaping this body of rules.  The optimistic and 
pessimistic sides of this debate about Asian values have been vigorously argued 
especially in the context of human rights.3  However, the heated debates about Asian 
values contain misconceptions and misunderstandings about Asian values on both sides.  
The Asian values debate too often reflects a crude dualism between West and East.  For 
instance, in the realm of human rights, this dualism often prevents those engaged in the 
debate from recognizing common ground between Asian and Western countries on 
human rights issues.4  Thus, to understand the implications of the Asian values debate for 
                                                                                                                                  
The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (Routledge, 2004).  
2 Specifically, a number of Western scholars challenged Asian values’ perspective on human 
rights See, e.g., J. Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of ‘Western’ 
Universalism,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (J. Bauer & D. Bell, eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), pp. 60-87. 
3 On the debates about Asian values, specifically related to human rights issues, see D. Bell, 
Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton Univ. Press 
2006), pp. 52-83; R. Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates 
about “Values in Asia,” 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2003); K. Engle, Culture and Human 
Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 291 (1999-2000). 
4 A. Sen, “Human Rights and Economic Achievement,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Rights (J. Bauer & D. Bell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), p. 97. 
 98 
the possibilities of an Eastphalian perspective on international law and global governance, 
a better grasp of Asian values and the controversies they have provoked is need.  
 
5.2 Emergence and Evolution of Asian Values and Their Implications for 
International Law and Global Governance 
5.2.1 Asian Values Emerge in International Relations 
The idea of Asian values derives its appeal because it offers an alternative to the 
dominance of Western ideas, which have driven the international mechanisms of human 
rights, economics, and politics.5  According to Tatsuo, the proclamation of Asian values 
expresses the desire of Asian peoples and countries to enhance their self-confidence and 
to challenge Western hegemony in international norm-making.6  Beyond highlighting 
injustices made by Western hegemony in international relations, Asian values require that 
Western countries should pay due respect and attention to Asian voices.7 
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, and Mahathir Mohammed, Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, launched the Asian values debate by strongly supporting China’s 
issuance of its White Paper on Human Rights in 1991.8  The Chinese government stated 
that, “Despite its international aspect, the issue of human rights falls by and large within 
the sovereignty of each state.”9  This White Paper treated rights to subsistence and 
                                            
5 I. Tatsuo, “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Rights (J. Bauer & D. Bell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), p. 29. 
6 Id. 
7 Id., p. 28. 
8 Lee Kuan Yew particularly emphasized the fundamental difference between Western concepts of 
society and government and East Asian concepts. See F. Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A 
Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73 Foreign Aff. 109 (1994), pp. 109-126.   
9 Human Rights in China (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, 1991), p. 11, contained in Y. Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, 23 Hong Kong L. 
J. 342 (1993), p. 345.  
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development as taking precedence over civil and political rights.10  The White Paper also 
stated that “the evolution of the situation in regard to human rights is circumscribed by 
the historical, social, economic and cultural conditions of various nations and involves a 
process of historical development.  Owing to tremendous differences in historical 
background, social system, cultural tradition and economic development, countries differ 
in their understanding and practice of human rights.”11   
The White Paper and support for it by prominent Asian leaders contributed to the 
promulgation of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, which is widely recognized as the 
manifesto of Asian values.  The Bangkok Declaration recognizes that “while human 
rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious 
backgrounds.”12  It also reiterates “the need to explore the possibilities of establishing 
regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia.”13  
As the content of the Bangkok Declaration indicates, Asian values concentrated 
on human rights and sovereignty issues, such as the priority of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, absolute sovereignty over domestic affairs, and the compatibility of Asian 
religions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam with democracy.  The scope of 
                                            
10 M. Wang, Chinese Opinion on Human Rights, 42 Orbis 361 (1998), p. 363.  
11 Human Rights in China (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, 1991), p. 2, contained in Y. Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 1 
Asia-Pac. J. Hum. Rts & L. 9 (2000), p. 12.  
12 Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, World 
Conference on Human Rights, A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/PC/59, 1993, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm#I (last visited June 4, 2008).  
13 Id. 
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Asian values was not, however, limited to political and human rights issues.14  Economic 
issues were intertwined with Asian values’ perspective on politics and human rights.  For 
rapid and stable achievement of economic growth, Asian values suggested that the nature 
of a government should be chosen foremost with consideration of the social, economic, 
and political conditions of Asian countries and peoples in mind, a choice that would not 
always lead quickly to democratic governments.  This notion raised the question whether 
Asian authoritarian regimes or Western democratic regimes were best suited for 
achieving continuous economic growth and political stability.15   
Viewed from the various angles of Asian values’ propositions on economic, social, 
and political issues, Asian values’ advocates were supporting an effort to project the 
superiority of Asian values as a basis for governance mechanisms: when needed, a 
relatively more authoritarian government was the best foundation for economic 
development and human rights promotion, which reflected Asian communitarian 
perspectives on social, economic, political, and cultural relations.16 
 
5.2.2 The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and Its Aftermath 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 created a challenge for the arguments claiming 
the superiority of Asian values over Western ideas as a basis for governance 
mechanisms.17  This crisis ignited a second round of debate on the importance of Asian 
values in the era of globalization.  The opponents of Asian values argued that features of 
Asian societies, such as authoritarian governments and the Asian style of business 
                                            
14 Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 2-3. 
15 Id. 
16 See Sen, supra note 4, pp. 90-93; Donnelly, supra note 2, pp. 72-76.  
17 For a brief introduction to the Asian financial crisis, see S. Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View 
from the IMF, 9 J. Int’l Financial Management & Accounting 167 (1998), pp. 168-170.   
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operations, were the main reasons for the Asian financial crisis. In addition, opponents of 
Asian values asserted that the crisis demonstrated the inability of Asian countries to 
achieve economic growth and stability without Western support and intervention.18 
For their part, the advocates of Asian values argued that certain features of the 
Asian economic system, such as restrictions on “Western-style” labor rights, deep 
reliance on social networks, and group-based business cooperation were indispensable to 
a speedy recovery from the Asian economic crisis and the revitalizing of Asian 
economies.19  Furthermore, advocates of Asian values indicated that Western-centric 
solutions to the Asian financial crisis, such as establishment of liberal market economic 
structures and the deregulation of business activities, actually proved irrelevant to 
responding to the crisis, if not actually very damaging to Asian societies.  In fact, 
structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank inflicted social, economic, and political problems on Asian countries, such as 
increasing the gap between rich and poor, destruction of family-based businesses, and 
rendering domestic industries very vulnerable to foreign capital investment.20  These 
problems not only increased the hostility of Asian countries and peoples toward the 
Western perspective on economic and political development but also fuelled the desire 
for an alternative perspective on political and economic development informed by the 
values of Asian countries and peoples.   
 
                                            
18 A. Chowdhury & I. Islam, The East Asian Crisis—A Political Economy Explanation, Visiting 
Researchers Series No. 1 (2001), pp. 14-18, available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/vrf12001.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
19 Bell, supra note 3, pp. 255-280. 
20 B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 1 (2004), pp. 22-23; M. Chossudovsky, Global Poverty in the Late 20th Century, 52 J. 
Int’l Aff. 293 (1998), pp. 293-311. 
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5.2.3 The Democracy and Human Rights Questions in the Debate on Asian Values 
The continued push for an Asian perspective on development again raised the 
question of what kind of government model, a democratic government or an authoritarian 
government, best supports the need for rapid economic growth in Asian countries.21  
Advocates for Asian values often consider a strong authoritarian government as the best 
choice for rapid economic growth, which, in turn, will provide the basis for the 
emergence of more democratic forms of governance.  In order to achieve the economic 
growth rates required for Asian development, active and broad intervention by a strong 
authoritarian government into private economic activities is needed for Asian countries 
and peoples.22  Generally, direct intervention by an authoritarian government into 
economic activities often triggers human rights concerns, specifically human rights issues 
concerning Western-inspired labor law and law on property rights.  Although the Asian 
values perspective recognizes the importance of human rights, it places more weight on 
rapid economic development rather than on protecting individual human rights.23  Thus, 
the Asian values perspective directly called into question the need for Western-style 
democracy and human rights principles with respect to promoting the political and 
economic development of Asian peoples. 
 
5.2.4 The Asian Values Debate Broadens Beyond Politicians’ Arguments 
As the debate about Asian values intensified in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, experts began to perceive the debate evolving in important ways.  
                                            
21 Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 45-50. 
22 Bell, supra note 3, p. 260. 
23 Id., pp. 260-266. 
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Although the rhetoric of politicians did not show much discernable difference after the 
crisis, Peerenboom argued that the two phases of the debate did exhibit different 
features.24  The most discernable difference appeared in the expansion of the debate from 
the propaganda of politicians to the more expansive engagement of academics and 
intellectuals.25  The Asian values controversy attracted the attention of scholars and 
thinkers in various fields, including political science, law, economics, human rights, and 
philosophy.  At the center of this expanding dialogue was the compatibility of Asian 
values with the hallmarks of Western modernity, such as capitalism, liberalism, 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights26—the very concepts informing the standard of 
global civilization identified in Chapter 3.   
Informing this interest in compatibility was the impact of globalization on 
international relations and its governance.  The Asian values debate highlighted the 
relationship between globalization and processes of political, economic, and social 
homogenization.  The concern raised by proponents of Asian values is that these 
homogenizing processes impose Western-defined modernity on non-Western countries 
and peoples.27  In this sense, Asian values connected with the rise of identity politics, 
multiculturalism, and neo-nationalism as response against the homogenizing features of 
globalization.28  In addition to the emergence of the Asian values movement, major global 
                                            
24 Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 4-5. 
25 M. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian 
Values, 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 109 (1998).  
26 Peerenboom, supra note 3, p. 5. 
27 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2005), pp. 245-272.  
28 On multiculturalism, see B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and 
Political Theory 2nd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan 2006); R. Niezen, A World Beyond Difference: 
Cultural Identity in the Age of Globalization (Blackwell Publishing 2004). For the importance of 
identity politics on international law, see T. Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the 
Age of Individualism (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).  
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identity-based turbulence appeared in the post-Cold War world in ethnic cleansing in the 
Balkans, tribal conflicts and genocide in Africa, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.29   
Asian values belong, therefore, to a phenomenon broader than the concerns of 
Asian countries and peoples, a phenomenon that put culture and cultural differences close 
to the heart of understanding how international relations operate, especially in the post-
Cold War world.  The tendency of Western approaches to ignore local characteristics and 
cultural differences turned out to be a source of global problems rather than a solution to 
them.30  Proponents of Asian values argued that these values provided a stronger 
foundation for global cooperation in an age of political, economic, and cultural 
differences than Western-led homogenization.  In essence, the Asian values perspective 
challenged the notion that core Western ideas, such as the market economy, democracy, 
the rule of law, and human rights, were superior bases for creating mechanisms for 
governing international relations in a world of deep cultural differences.  It then followed 
that Asian values perhaps offered a different model and approach to governance and 
globalization that would allow Western and other cultural viewpoints to establish a more 




                                            
29 Peerenboom, supra note 3, p. 65.  
30 R. Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Human Rights in the 
Asian Context, 9 Tuoro Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2001); S. Lawson, “Global Governance, Human Rights 
and the ‘Problem’ of Culture,” in Global Governance: Critical Perspectives (R. Wilkinson & S. 
Hughes, eds., Routledge 2004), pp. 75-89; J. O’Hagan, “Conflict, Convergence, or Coexistence? 
The Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order,” in Reframing the International: Law, 
Culture, Politics (R. Falk, et al. eds., Routledge 2002), pp. 198-200. 
31 Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 65-66. 
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5.2.5 Asian Values and Confucianism 
As part of the critique of Western-led globalization, advocates of Asian values 
argued that the teachings of Confucianism should be taken seriously in thinking of 
improved ways to manage global problems.32  This argument directly challenged the 
fundamental basis of post-Cold War Western globalization: liberalism.33  Pointing out the 
undesirable effects of Western liberalism, such as breaking the necessary solidarity 
between individuals and society, increasing the gap between rich and poor, and 
marginalizing the interests of minority groups,34  advocates of Asian values suggested 
that the communitarian perspective enshrined in Confucianism should be a philosophical 
basis for global governance mechanisms.35  Proponents of Asian values argued, for 
example, that the main reason for the speedy recovery of Asian countries to the 1997 
financial crisis could be found within the dynamics of “Confucian capitalism.”  The 
Confucian emphasis on a strong authoritarian government, education and self-cultivation, 
frugality and thrift, hard work and labor discipline, social networks and group-orientation, 
social civility, and the role of intellectuals provided the main engine for a speedy 
recovery and stable growth of Asian economies.36  
 
                                            
32 General works on the implications of Confucianism in the age of globalization can be found in 
Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (K. Shun & D. Wong, 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); Confucian Political Ethics (D. Bell, ed., Princeton Univ. 
Press 2008); Confucianism and Human Rights (W.T. de Bary & T. Weiming, eds., Columbia Univ. 
Press 1998) 
33 C. Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” in The East Asian 
Challenge for Human Rights (J. Bauer & D. Bell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), p. 126. 
34 H. Rosenmont, Jr., “Whose Democracy? Which Rights? A Confucian Critique of Modern 
Western Liberalism,” in Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and 
Community (K. Shun & D. Wong, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004), pp. 49-71. 
35 Id., p. 74.  See also Bell, supra note 3, pp. 72-76. 
36 Bell, supra note 3, pp. 259-271. 
 106 
5.2.6 Asian Values and International Law 
The emergence and evolution of the Asian values debate have great relevance for 
international law, even if the debate did not concentrate on international law as a direct 
topic of controversy.  As demonstrated in earlier chapters, international law reflects 
philosophical and cultural preferences and norms, typically those of the leading powers 
of whatever historical age.  The rise of Asian values reflected not only non-Western 
perceptions about society and its governance but also the emergence of Asia and Asian 
countries as increasingly more powerful and important actors in international relations.  
This mixture of power and ideas contains the potential to affect how states perceive 
international law as a governance mechanism and how states operate international law in 
addressing global problems.  
 
5.3 Values or Power? The Challenges of Asia and Critical Evaluation of Asian Values 
and Asian Power 
 Unfortunately, the Asian values debate often remains mired in a crude dualism 
between East and West, in which both sides of the controversy partake.37  Generally, 
opponents and advocates of Asian values are reluctant to find and share common ground.  
For instance, when it comes to human rights, opponents of Asian values often limit their 
focus to civil and political rights and the individualistic character of human rights, such 
as freedom of speech and the right to democratic government.  Conversely, advocates of 
Asian values emphasize the collective character of human rights and thus, stress the 
                                            
37 On the critique of crude dualism concerning Asian values, see E. Friedman, “Since There is No 
East and There is No West, How Could Either Be the Best?” in Human Rights and Asian Values: 
Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia (M. Jacobsen & O. Bruun, 
eds., Routledge 2003), pp. 21-30. 
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importance of economic, social and cultural rights more than civil and political rights.38  
These different emphases are not reconciled through the usual human rights mantra that 
both types of rights are interdependent and indivisible because preferences remain strong 
and deeply embedded in the two perspectives in this debate.  Similar fault lines appear on 
other issues, such as sovereignty and the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other 
states.39  
 
5.3.1 The Non-History of Pan-Asianism 
 In addition to Western skepticism about Asian values as a theoretical basis for 
international law and global governance, scrutiny of Asian values, on their own terms, 
reveals important problems and issues to consider.  First, throughout history, a shared 
conception of “Pan-Asianism” representing major Asian philosophies and cultures has 
never really existed, except as a way of masking the exercise of power.  Although Japan 
tried to justify its actions in the 1930s through the concept of the “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere,” this idea was merely propaganda to justify Japanese domination of 
other Asian countries.40  In terms of responses to Western imperialism, Asian countries 
never developed a strong sense of common Asianism in responding to their exploitation.  
The closest phenomenon was the “Bandung Spirit” that emerged from the Non-Aligned 
Movement’s opposition to the post-World War II continuation of colonialism.41  The 
                                            
38 Donnelly, supra note 2, pp. 74-78. 
39 Chapter 6 explores this fault line in the context of international law on the use of force by states. 
40 On the concept of Pan-Asianism, see Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, 
Regionalism and Borders (S. Saaler & J. Koschman, eds., Routledge 2007).  
41 Peaceful coexistence and neutrality are the main pillars of the Bandung Spirit. In addition, the 
coalition of African and Asian states against the imperialism and colonialism of Western powers 
was the main political mechanism implementing the Bandung Spirit. General works on Bandung 
Spirit include D. Wilson, China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part I), 30 China Q. 149 
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Bandung Spirit crystallized the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were 
declared in the Preamble of the Agreement between China and India on the Trade and 
Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India.42   
The ten principles of the Bandung Spirit asserted the equality of all races and 
nationalities in Principle 3.43  Principle 6 affirmed that the use of arrangements of 
collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers or any 
                                                                                                                                  
(1967), pp. 149-169; D. Wilson, China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part II), 31 China Q. 
96 (1967), pp. 96-127. Modern applications of the Bandung Spirit to anti-globalization 
movements in developing countries can be found in D. Khudori, Towards a Bandung Spirit-Based 
Civil Society Movement: Reflection from Yogyakarta Commemoration of Bandung Asian-African 
Conference, 7 Inter-Asia Cultural Stud. 121 (2006), pp. 121-138, available at 
http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/routledg/14649373/v7n1/s9.pdf?expires=121
5151749&id=44954446&titleid=743&accname=Indiana+University+Libraries&checksum=D828
1FF28FD12644EEF92A23522BB215 (last visited June 4, 2008). 
42 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. T. Wang, 
International Law in China 221 Recueil des Cours (1990-II) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991), 
p. 263. On the international instruments affirming the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
see I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force (Clarendon Press 1963), pp. 123-126. 
According to Zhaojie, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence possess a high degree of 
normative strength and flexibility because (1) they are the core principles of international law; (2) 
they are identical with the purposes expressed in the UN Charter and are compatible with other 
principles of international law; (3) they have stood the test of time since their initiation in the 
mid-1950s; and (4) they represent a new development in the fundamental principles of 
international law. See L. Zhaojie, Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the 
Chinese Perspective of the Contemporary International Legal Order, 5 Singapore J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 314 (2001), p. 320-321. 
43 The Ten Principles of the Bandung Spirit: (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) Respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all States; (3) Recognition of equality of all nations and of all States, big 
and small; (4) Abstention from interference or intervention in the internal affairs of other States; 
(5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with 
the Charter of the United Nations; (6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective 
defense to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers. Abstention from exerting 
pressure by any country on other countries; (7) Abstention from acts or threat of aggression or the 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any States; (8) Settlement 
of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or 
judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations; (9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; and (10) 
Respect for justice and international obligations. See the Ten Principles of Bandung, available at 
http://docenti.unimc.it/docenti/uoldelul-chelati-dirar/storia-dei-paesi-postcoloniali/i-dieci-punti-
della-conferenza-di-bandung (last visited June 5, 2008) 
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pressure by any countries should be avoided.44  The Bandung Spirit may be understood as 
a unified Asianism designed to stand against Western imperialism and colonialism.45  
However, linkage between the soaring rhetoric of the Bandung Spirit and each Asian 
country’s relationship with decolonization are very weak.  Similarly, critical analysis of 
Asian values should ask whether each Asian country’s experience of globalization 
actually reflects the rhetoric used to support and advance the idea of Asian values, 
however they are manifested.  
 
5.3.2 What is the “Asia” that Informs Asian Values? 
Advocacy for Asian values often skates over an obvious problem with this 
perspective and for identifying an Asian perspective on international law and global 
governance more broadly—the difficulty of identifying what “Asia” means and, thus, 
what values should be associated with that concept.  As Fidler argued, “[F]or some, Asia 
means East Asia, especially, China, Japan, Taiwan, and Korean peninsula.  Others talks of 
Asia more broadly, as encompassing East and Southeast Asia, stretching from Burma in 
the west to Japan in the east, and Russia in the north to Australia in the south.  A third 
perspective stretches Asia from India in the west to Japan in the east and everything in 
between.”46  The geographical ambiguity of “Asia” raises the question whether Asian 
countries actually share something that unifies them politically, economically, and 
culturally in ways that are seen, for example, in Europe and between Europe and the 
United States.  The influence of Confucianism certainly does not resonate as deeply in 
                                            
44 Id., Principle 6. 
45 On the Bandung Spirit, see Berger, supra note 1, pp. 49-55.  
46 D. Fidler, The Asian Century: Implications for International Law, 9 Singapore Yearbook of 
Int’l L. 19 (2005), p. 25.  
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India, which has it own ancient philosophical and cultural traditions, as it might in East 
Asia.47  
Beyond such geographical vagueness, Asian countries experience huge 
differences in levels of economic, political, and social development.48  According to 
advocates of Asian values, a strong authoritarian government, Asian-style capitalism, and 
emphasis on collective human rights, such as economic, social and cultural rights, are the 
main characteristics that make Asian approaches different from Western political, 
economic, and social perspectives.49  However, significant differences with regard to 
economic, political and social conditions among Asian countries suggest that Asian 
values do not operate consistently or effectively across Asia, which raises questions about 
why such variance exists.  Why has South Korea emerged as a developed economy with 
democratic institutions while North Korea and Myanmar have become pariahs in the 
international system?  Can Asian values provide any insights to such a question?   
Similarly, aspects of the Asian values critique of Western ideas can be applied to 
question the Asian values project itself.  For example, advocates of Asian values often 
criticize the Western homogenization agenda for ignoring important differences in Asian 
countries, including different levels of political, economic, and social development.  
Advocates of Asian values strongly argue that such differences should be taken seriously.  
However, the importance of respecting differences seems to be limited to the Asian 
values debate between West and East.50  The Chinese may embrace authoritarian political 
actions that South Koreans would not tolerate, and the government of Myanmar behaves 
                                            
47 Id., p. 27. 
48 Id., p. 34. 
49 Peerenboom, supra note 3, pp. 33-50. 
50 Donnelly, supra note 2, pp. 70-71, 74-76. 
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in ways that would be unacceptable in both China and South Korea.  Further, the 
proclaimed tolerance of Asian countries for differences might well prove empty in the 
event that a struggle for dominance and hegemony develop in the region between, for 
example, Japan, China, and India.51   
 
5.3.3 Human Rights Complexities with the Asian Values Perspective 
Other concerns about Asian values arise in the controversies over human rights.  
In general, advocates of Asian values emphasize economic, cultural, and social rights and 
tend to regard civil and political rights as a threat to economic development in Asian 
countries.52  Whether this emphasis on economic, cultural, and social rights represents 
simply a reaction to Western emphasis on civil and political rights or connects to 
something particularly “Asian” is open to question.  The significant levels of disparity 
among Asian countries concerning economic, cultural, and social rights, combined with 
the emphasis on strong notions of sovereignty and non-intervention, suggest that any 
Asian-specific concept of human rights is very limited in content and scope.  
The sheer difficulty of transforming Asian countries from exploited colonies to 
independent states may have played a larger role in the emphasis on economic, cultural, 
and social rights than “Asian values.”  Despite gaining political independence from 
former Western colonial powers, most if not all Asian countries faced very difficult socio-
economic problems, such as underdevelopment and extreme poverty.  These socio-
economic problems threatened the political stability of newly independent states in Asia.  
                                            
51 Fidler warns that tensions between China and Japan for obtaining hegemon status in the Asian 
region may threaten both that region and the whole world. Fidler, supra note 46, p. 27. 
52 Sen, supra note 4, p. 91. 
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Thus, achieving economic growth was a critical concern of Asian countries.  In this sense, 
many Asian countries employed strong state-driven economic policies for achieving 
economic growth and stability, even though their effects were often, at best, short-term.53  
For pursuit of this kind of economic development, lack of interest in civil and political 
rights could be justified as economically inefficient.  Thus, particular infringement of 
civil and political rights may be tolerated for the sake of rapid economic development.54  
Under this perspective, the subordination of civil and political rights to economic growth 
and political stability encouraged by Asian values is justified.55   
By their very nature, economic, social and cultural rights are largely dependent on 
the levels of social, economic and political development of states.  In general, state 
parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
undertake legally binding commitments to take steps to the maximum of their available 
resources to achieve progressively the full realization of the economic, social, and 
cultural rights contained in the ICESCR.56  Therefore, as advocates of Asian values assert, 
the economic growth of Asian countries will be a cornerstone for the full realization of 
the economic, social and cultural rights of Asian people.   
However, the emphasis on economic growth of the state itself should not be 
confused with the realization of economic, cultural, and social rights of individuals, as 
required by the ICESCR and other international human rights instruments.  Even though 
                                            
53 Bell, supra note 3, pp. 260-266. 
54 Donnelly, supra note 2, p. 73. 
55 Peerenboom, supra note 3, p. 37. 
56 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR notes that “[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” See Art. 2 of the 
ICESCR available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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aggregate economic growth of a state can be increased dramatically by strong state-
driven economic policies, the benefits from such economic growth may not be delivered 
to individuals equitably if there is no fair redistribution of wealth.  In addition, although 
many Asian countries have claimed that their economic policies were designed to 
enhance the conditions of economic, cultural, and social rights, empirical studies have 
shown to the contrary that many Asian governments sacrifice economic, social, and social 
rights under the name of rapid economic growth to the contrary.57  For instance, labor 
rights are often curtailed by governments because strong labor unions may play a 
powerful role in furthering their special interests over the perceived needs and interests of 
the country as a whole.   
The Asian values emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights often mirrors 
the Western fixation with civil and political rights.  Both perspectives stubbornly refuse 
to accept the human rights approach that both kinds of rights are crucial for individual 
dignity and social progress.58  Thus, full realization of economic, cultural, and social 
rights cannot be achieved without protecting civil and political rights, and vice versa.  In 
addition, the significance of civil and political rights cannot be determined by their 
statistical contribution to the rapidity of economic development.  Sen indicates that the 
case for democracy and civil rights cannot be based on their likely positive impact on 
economic growth, nor can the case for democracy and civil rights be demolished by their 
likely negative effect on economic growth.59   
                                            
57 Donnelly, supra note 2, p. 74. 
58 R. Müllerson, Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2000), pp. 253-254. 
59 Sen, supra note 4, p. 91. 
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Realization of civil and political rights contributes to the security of society, 
which is indispensable to economic growth and stability.  The desirable level of security 
largely hinges on the levels of social communication and discourse, which attempts to 
strikes a balance between competing interests.  Without civil and political rights, people 
cannot securely and robustly express their needs and demand appropriate public action.  
Sen argues that “[W]hether and how a government responds to needs and sufferings may 
well depend on how much pressure is put on it, and the exercise of political rights can 
make a real difference.”60  
In this sense, the Asian values approach to human rights seems defective in the 
same way Western preoccupation with civil and political rights is defective.  Further, 
despite the marginalization of civil and political rights in thinking about Asian values, 
there is little empirical evidence that civil and political rights conflict with economic 
growth.61   
 
5.3.4 Asian Values and Authoritarian Governments 
The favorable disposition of Asian values towards authoritarian governments also 
deserves critical scrutiny.  The basic justification for this position is that Asian countries 
needed strong governments because they faced many social, economic, and political 
problems after decolonization.  Some relatively authoritarian governments in Asian 
countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, and China, achieved impressive rates of 
economic growth.  However, other authoritarian governments have not proved successful 
                                            
60 Id., p. 92.  
61 Id. See also R. Barro, Getting It Right: Markets and Choices in a Free Society (MIT Press 
1996); P. Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution (Clarendon Press 1993).  
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at promoting economic growth.62  It is a false generalization that an authoritarian 
government is indispensable to the rapid economic development of Asian countries.  
When it comes to economic development, the type of government is not the sole factor in 
determining conditions for economic growth.63  There are various important factors that 
determine whether a country experiences economic growth.  For example, without export 
markets in other countries, a high level of literacy, and various incentives to encourage 
economic and entrepreneurial behavior, economic development is not possible.64  Sen 
argues that “[T]he temptation to see the positive role of authoritarianism seems to be 
based on taking the post hoc to be also propter hoc; it is not really founded on any 
systematic establishment of cause and effect relations.”65   
Furthermore, an authoritarian government may pay little attention to conditions 
for the realization of human rights, even economic, social, and cultural rights.  There is 
nothing inherent in the authoritarian form of government that ensures respect for any kind 
of human rights.  All too often, authoritarian governments wrap the personal interests of a 
handful of political leaders and elites in the rhetoric of serving the needs and rights of the 
people.  Under authoritarian governments, the people have little to no ability to influence 
the behavior of those who pursue “enlightened despotism.”  Donnelly points out that 
“[A]uthoritarian rule more often than not has been used as a masquerade for kleptocracies, 
bureaucratic incompetence, and worst of all, for unbridled nepotism and corruption.”66  In 
this context, an authoritarian government that readily sacrifices either civil and political 
                                            
62 Peerenboom, supra note 3, p. 47. 
63 A. Przeworski & F. Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 51 
(1993).  
64 Sen, supra note 4, p. 92. 
65 Id. 
66 Donnelly, supra note 2, p. 73. 
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rights or economic, social, and cultural rights to development cannot be regarded as a 
perfectly desirable form of government. 67 
 
5.3.5 Asian Values and Confucianism Revisited 
Problems also arise with the Asian values embrace of Confucianism as a 
philosophical basis for new global governance mechanisms.  While pointing out the 
failure of Western liberalism as a foundation for global governance, advocates of Asian 
values claim that the communitarian characteristics enshrined in Confucianism can 
inform response to the global challenges the international community faces in the 21st 
century.   
Comprehensive analysis of Confucianism is not needed to identify problems with 
how Confucianism is used by advocates of Asian values.  First, whether and how much 
Confucianism actually influences the behavior of Asian governments is hard to determine.  
Identifying Confucianism as an independent variable in state behavior within Asia is very 
difficult from a social science perspective, and much more difficult than demonstrating 
the effect of democracy and liberalism on the behavior of Western states.  Even though 
Asian peoples still preserve some Confucian traditions, such as complicated rules on 
rituals, Westernization on many levels has seriously encroached on Confucian traditions 
from the individual level to the society level.68  Since the collapse of the ancient 
Sinocentric system under the impact of Western imperialism, no Asian countries have 
paid any attention to Confucian protocols or ritual customs when they engage in relation 
                                            
67 Id., p. 72.  
68
 S.I. Jun, No (Logical) Place for Asian Values in East Asia’s Economic Development, 28 
Development and Soc. 191 (1999), pp. 193-194, available at 
http://sociology.snu.ac.kr/isdpr/publication/journal/28-2/2Sang-In%20Jun.pdf (last visited Aug. 
12, 2008). 
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with other countries, including Asian countries.  The template for such relations is 
Westphalian not Confucian.   
In terms of the impact of Confucianism on economic development, some 
Confucian factors which are relevant to economic development concerns are only 
selectively embraced.  Confucianism supports the role of an authoritarian government 
and its broad interventions for social welfare, education, and preservation of the group-
oriented social system.69  However, the darker side of Confucian thinking for economic 
development, such as the repression of human creativity and social diversity, moral 
disdain of commerce and industry, and the rigidity of social stratification, does not inform 
Asian economic development strategies.70   
The teachings of Confucianism seem to be emphasized by the advocates of Asian 
values mainly for highlighting the virtue of communitarianism and the failure of Western 
liberalism.71  The advocates for Asian values often manipulate Confucianism to justify 
the necessity of authoritarian regimes for protecting and promoting communitarian values 
in Asian countries.  In order to escape criticism for defending authoritarian governments, 
advocates of Asian values resort to Confucian perspectives on the strict hierarchical 
relationship between the governed and the governing.  According to Confucian teachings, 
people should obey the king as children should obey their father because, from a 
Confucian perspective, the state is an expanded, societal unit based on family 
                                            
69 Bell, supra note 3, pp. 266-271. 
70 Jun, supra note 68, p. 197. 
71 General works on the relationship between communitarianism and human rights include D. 
Wong, “Rights and Community in Confucianism,” in Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of 
Self, Autonomy, and Community (K. Shun & D. Wong, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004), pp. 
31-46; de Bary, supra note 1, pp. 58-89. 
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relationships.72  Thus, the communitarian perspective enshrined in Confucianism helps an 
authoritarian government make dictatorial social, economic, and political policies that 
may conflict with interests and needs of the people.  Further, the emphasis on 
communitarian values is not unique to Asian countries and peoples.  Western scholars 
have produced considerable studies on communitarian perspectives on human rights in 
Western countries, and Western governments pay much attention to communitarian 
values in trying to harmonize the various interests of individuals.73   
Whether in the West or the East, putting too much emphasis on communitarian 
values easily leads into the negation of the human rights of individuals.  To support their 
arguments on communitarian values, advocates of Asian values often resort to the 
Confucian perspective on human rights.  Under Confucianism, the discourse on human 
rights cannot be developed without reference to communitarian values.  Under the 
Confucian perspective on human rights, being human is not sufficient for individuals to 
be the subject of human rights.74  According to Confucianism, individuals as individuals 
cannot be regarded as the subject of human rights until they perform their societal roles 
and duties successfully as social beings.75  This duty-oriented or role-based human rights 
perspective is dangerous from a human rights perspective grounded in the inherent 
dignity of the individual as a human being.  Undoubtedly, responsible, socially oriented 
                                            
72 Under Confucianism, king, father and teacher should be respected by all individuals. See Y. Lee, 
Sam-Gang-Rok (The book on three general principles). See also B.H. Kim, Educational 
Implications of the Doctrine of King-Master-Father Trinity, 34 Gyoyuk Chulhak (Educational 
Philosophy) 61 (2008). 
73 Sen, supra note 4, p. 97. 
74 C. Ihara, “Are Individual Rights Necessary? A Confucian Perspective,” in Confucian Ethics: A 
Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (K. Shun & D. Wong, eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2004), pp. 23-24.  
75 J. Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,” in The East 
Asian Challenge for Human Rights (J. Bauer & D. Bell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999), p. 
216. 
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individuals are needed to maintain healthy societies.  However, the duties and roles 
assigned to individuals for maintaining a healthy society should not be the sole criteria 
that determine how governments treat individuals.  The raison d’être of human rights 
should be found in the effort to protect human dignity, which is independent of, and prior 
to, socially constructed duties and roles of individuals in society.76 
   
5.4 Conclusion: The Asian Values Debate, International Law, and the Future of 
Global Governance 
As analyzed in this chapter, the development and elaboration of the “Asian 
values” concept, and its connection with Asian cultural and philosophical traditions, such 
as Confucianism, presented a challenge to the existing dominant Western paradigms 
informing globalization, international law, and emerging forms of global governance.  
The breadth and bitterness of the debates over Asian values reveal the severity and 
seriousness of the challenge to the Westernized status quo.  From the perspective on 
international law, advocacy of Asian values had direct implications for basic principles of 
international law, such as sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
states, and for leading international legal regimes concerning international peace and 
security, economic development, and the protection of human rights.  Most broadly, these 
implications also touched upon how states and non-state actors might utilize international 
law in global governance mechanism across a spectrum of issues facing the international 
community. 
                                            
76 R. Ames, “Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative,” in Human Rights and the World’s 
Religions (L. Rounder, ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1994), p. 205. 
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Critical analysis of the Asian values perspective reveals numerous problems that 
raise questions about this perspective’s ability to provide a foundation for an Asian 
approach to international law and global governance.  Such questions do not eliminate the 
possibility of an Asian approach because similar concerns can be identified with respect 
to Western influences on international law.  What this chapter asserts, however, is that the 
incantation of “Asian values” is not sufficient to advance an Asian perspective on 
international law as it currently exists and as it may operate in the future.  Weaknesses 
with the Asian values idea do not diminish the growing importance of Asia in world 
politics, so the views of Asian nations will, in all likelihood, continue to be increasingly 
influential as the 21st century progress.  To have a broader, more global impact on 
international law, an Asian perspective will need to go beyond the insular and 
inconsistent use of the Asian values perspective.  An Asian perspective on international 
law will need to show how the Asian values debate reveals ways in which Asian 
approaches to governance questions provide a possible basis for thinking about global 
governance within and beyond Asia.  The next chapter examines whether Asian 
approaches to issues of international law and international and human security provide 
such a basis for Asia and beyond. 
 121 
Chapter 6. Eastphalia, International Law, and Security: 
Case Study on the Asian Perspective on the Use of Force,  
Humanitarian Intervention, and Human Security 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The proposition that an Asian perspective can or should influence the future 
direction of international law and global governance requires examining what this 
perspective has to tell us about issues on the cutting edge of international relations in the 
early 21st century.  This chapter examines whether an Eastphalian perspective exists with 
respect to international law and the pursuit of national, international, and human security. 
Without question, security issues remain at the forefront of the concerns of states, 
regional alliances of states, and multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations 
(UN).  As previous chapters have discussed, Asia’s growing importance in global affairs 
includes many areas, including security concerns (e.g., concerning North Korea, 
Myanmar, and the China-Taiwan problem); but this chapter pushes beyond analyzing 
security problems in Asia to explore whether Asian countries have a shared perspective 
that can influence the development of international law and global governance in the 
security arena.  Criticism of the West’s approach to global problems in light of Asia’s 
rise1 opens opportunities to explore what, if anything, Asian countries have to contribute 
to governing security threats and the use of force differently. 
In short, the challenge is to ascertain whether Asian ideas accompany Asia’s 
growing power and importance.  This task requires looking at whether and how Asian 
                                            
1 K. Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East  
(PublicAffairs 2008), pp. 175-176. 
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countries differ with respect to their positions concerning traditional topics of 
international law and security, such as legitimacy of the use of force by states (especially 
with respect to humanitarian intervention) and emerging ideas of global governance, such 
as the human security concept.  
 
6.2 The Existing International Legal System on the Use of Force and International 
Security  
6.2.1 International Law on the Use of Force and International Security: Brief 
Overview 
The most important provision of the UN Charter concerning regulation of the use 
of force is Article 2(4).2  Article 2(4) prohibits UN member states from threatening or 
using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.3  Although Article 2(4) 
specifically emphasizes territorial integrity and political independence, this emphasis 
does not restrict the all-embracing prohibition on use of force inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN.  Thus, the correct interpretation of Article 2(4) is that any use of 
inter-state force by UN member states for whatever reason is banned, unless explicitly 
allowed by the UN Charter.4   
The UN Charter contains four explicit exceptions to the prohibition found in 
Article 2(4), only the first two of which remain relevant today: (1) force used in self-
defense (Article 51); (2) force authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Chapter 
                                            
2 C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 2nd ed. (Oxford Univ. Press 2004), p. 29. 
3 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter notes that “[A]ll members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  
4 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 3rd ed. (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), pp. 87-88. 
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VII); (3) force undertaken by the five major powers before the UNSC is functional 
(Article 106); and (4) force undertaken against the “enemy” states of World War II 
(Article 107 of the UN Charter)5.  The UN Charter also implicitly recognizes, as an 
extension of the principle of sovereignty, that a state may invite another state to use force 
within its territory to deal with an internal armed conflict or rebellion.  
As the most important exception to the prohibition on the use of force, the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the Article 51 has to be 
understood in conjunction with Article 2(4).6  Gazzini notes that “[R]egardless of its 
admittedly too frequent violations, the very fact that states invariably invoke exceptions 
to the prohibition on the use of force—and especially self-defense—to justify the 
recourse to military measures confirm their legal conviction on the existence of such 
prohibition.”7  Self-defense is traditionally understood as the permissible military 
reaction by a state to an armed attack carried out by another state8 but the reactions of the 
UNSC, other international organizations (e.g., NATO), and individual states to the 
terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 indicate that states may 
legitimately invoke the right to use of force in self-defense when attacked by non-state 
actors.  The right of self-defense in Article 51 is an inherent right that states have, and the 
right includes not only the right to respond individually to an armed attack but also to 
participate in collective self-defense actions in alliance with another state that is the 
victim of an armed attack. 
                                            
5 A. Arend & R. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter 
Paradigm (Routledge 1993), p. 31. 
6 Dinstein, supra note 253, p. 175. 
7 T. Gazzini, The Changing Rule on the Use of Force in International Law (Manchester Univ. 
Press 2005), pp. 124-125. 
8 Id., p. 129. 
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The right of self-defense can arise under Article 51 only “if an armed attack 
occurs,” which means that the use of force in self-defense is legitimate only if an armed 
attack has taken place, is taking place, or is imminently about to occur.9  In addition, any 
use of force in self-defense must be proportional to the threat the state confronts.10  These 
rules in the UN Charter on the prohibition on the use of force and the scope of the right to 
use force in self-defense are widely considered to be the rules in customary international 
law as well.  
Article 51 also requires that any use of force in self-defense should be reported 
immediately to the UNSC, and that the state must cease using force once the UNSC has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.  However, 
according to Aust, this provision does not mean that the state must stop using force as 
soon as the UNSC adopts measures; the measures have to be shown to be effective in 
restoring peace and security to the attacked state.11  
The other exception to the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) involves 
the authority the UNSC has to authorize military action to address threats to international 
peace and security.  This authority forms part of the UN’s system of collective security.  
The collective security system permits the lawful use of force by the international 
community against threats to international peace and security.12  The authority to operate 
the collective security system is enshrined Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the power 
to authorize the use of force belongs exclusively to the UNSC.  In Article 24(1), UN 
member states “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
                                            
9 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 182. 
10 J. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2004), pp. 148-179. 
11 A. Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), p. 229. 
12 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 278. 
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maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties 
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”13   
The important provisions of the UN Charter concerning the collective security 
system are contained in Chapter VII.  Under Article 39, the UNSC shall determine the 
existence of any threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.  The 
UNSC’s determination is binding on member states, even if the UNSC subsequently 
proceeds to adopt a mere recommendation for action.14  In addition, the UNSC shall 
make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security in accordance with Articles 41 and 42.15  Article 41 
authorizes the UNSC to impose non-military sanctions on offending states.  If the UNSC 
deems such peaceful sanctions under Article 41 to be insufficient, it can order military 
actions in accordance with Article 42.16   
Besides granting the UNSC the authority to order military sanctions, Chapter VII 
also envisages a mechanism for the UNSC to use to impose these sanctions.  Chapter VII 
addresses two main issues concerning how the collective security system should 
practically operate: the availability of military forces and the means for the coordination 
of the use of these forces.17  Article 43 provides that all members of the UN should 
conclude special agreements with the UNSC through which they would make available to 
the UNSC certain contingents of their armed forces.18  For the purpose of coordinating 
                                            
13 See Article 24(1) of the UN Charter. 
14 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 280. 
15 See Article 39 of the UN Charter. 
16 See Articles 41 & 42 of the UN Charter. Arend & Beck, supra note 5, pp. 48-49. 
17 Arend & Beck, supra note 5, p. 49. 
18 See Article 43 of the UN Charter. 
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the use of these forces, Article 47 calls for the establishment of a Military Staff 
Committee.19  
  
6.2.2 Beyond the UN Charter: Claims for Broader Rights to Use of Force under 
International Law 
The UNSC’s authority to order military sanctions and the individual and 
collective right of self-defense are express exceptions to the prohibition on the use of 
force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  Much debate in this area of international law 
concerns, however whether international law supports the right to use force in contexts 
not explicitly captured by the UN Charter’s rules.  In short, there has been pressure on the 
UN Charter’s rule to include or recognize expansion of the legitimate bases on which 
states can rely in using force in their international relations.  This pressure tends to 
concentrate on effort to broaden the scope of the right to use force in self-defense (e.g., 
the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense) and to permit the use of force for purposes of 
addressing humanitarian suffering and grave and systematic abuses of fundamental 
human rights (e.g., the doctrine of humanitarian intervention).20  Less frequently and 
more controversially, arguments for an international legal right to use military force to 
promote or restore certain forms of governments, such as democracy, have been made.   
Debates about the scope of the right to use force in self-defense under the UN 
Charter have been present since the Charter’s adoption in 1945.  States that have used 
force in controversial contexts typically try to justify their actions by linking them to the 
right to use force in self-defense.  These justifications have stretched the scope of the 
                                            
19 See Article 47 of the UN Charter. 
20 M. Byers, War Law: International Law and Armed Conflict (Atlantic Books 2005), p. 85. 
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right of self-defense beyond what Article 51 of the UN Charter can reasonably bear, 
especially claims of a broad right of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense.  At the 
same time, the frequency of these arguments suggests that states have not been willing to 
accept a very narrow reading of Article 51.  A fundamental reason for the historic and 
contemporary exploration of a broader scope for the right of self-defense has been the 
failure of the UN collective security system to operate effectively and consistently.  In 
short, state practice has implicitly linked the elasticity of the right to use force in self-
defense with the efficacy of the UN collective security system, and that system’s failings 
have produced claims of broader rights to use force in self-defense. 
Calls for a robust right to use force for humanitarian intervention flow from the 
impact of the human rights revolution in international law.  Under the influence of this 
revolution, many international lawyers have argued that the use of force to prevent or 
stop massive violations of fundamental human rights is legitimate under international 
law.21  Although nothing in the UN Charter substantiates a unilateral right of a state to 
take military action against another state under the guise of securing the implementation 
of human rights, the advocates of humanitarian intervention stress the necessity of 
forcible humanitarian intervention to promote and encourage respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms under the purposes of the UN Charter.22   
Under this perspective, in order to employ force for the purpose of humanitarian 
intervention, states should satisfy the following criteria: (1) there must be a compelling 
and urgent situation of extreme humanitarian distress which demands immediate relief; 
(2) the state most directly involved must either not be willing or able to deal with it; (3) 
                                            
21 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 70. 
22 Id. 
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there is no alternative to the use of force because the UNSC is either unable or unwilling 
to authorize intervention; and (4) the action must be limited in scope and time to what is 
necessary to relieve the distress.23  The push for a doctrine of forcible humanitarian 
intervention also reveals skepticism that the UN’s collective security system can function 
properly in terms of protecting fundamental human rights from massive and systematic 
abuse.  This human rights-inspired skepticism about the UN’s collective security system 
requires the existence of an international legal right to use force not dependent on either 
the right to self-defense or the UNSC’s authorization of military action to restore 
international peace and security.  
If Article 2(4) is strictly interpreted, using force to undertake humanitarian 
intervention is prohibited.  In that situation, the only options left are the right to self-
defense, which in some situations of humanitarian crises is not applicable even in its 
broadest interpretation (e.g., NATO’s use of force to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo), 
or authorization by the UNSC, which is often not forthcoming because of vetoes (or 
threats of vetoes) from permanent UNSC members (e.g., Russia’s threatened veto of 
UNSC action to authorize intervention in Kosovo). However, according to Franck, 
neither the institutional history of the UN nor the record of state practice categorically 
precludes or endorses humanitarian intervention.  Rather, the history and practice witness 
a more nuanced reconciling of the pursuit of peace and justice through protection of 
human and humanitarian rights.24  Thus, despite serious controversies, advocating for the 
legality of forcible humanitarian intervention not only challenges traditional 
                                            
23 Aust, supra note 11, p. 230. 
24 T. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2002), pp. 138-139.  
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interpretation of Article 2(4), but also heightens the importance in international law of 
enhancing the fulfillment of fundamental human rights, which the UN Charter’s rule on 
the use of force and collective security system often cannot achieve.25  
 
6.2.3 Problems concerning International Law on the Use of Force and International 
Security 
 As the efforts to push international law beyond the rules on the use of force found 
in the UN Charter suggest, the international system has experienced, and continues to 
experience, serious controversies about the scope and substance of the international law 
on the use of force.  Although states and scholars generally agree that the prohibition on 
the use of force is a critical rule in international law, there are heated debates with respect 
to the scope of the prohibition on the use of force.26  The central question in this debate is 
whether the prohibition is interpreted broadly (thus eliminating more expansive readings 
of the right to self-defense and any doctrine of humanitarian intervention) or narrowly 
(thus opening possibilities for broader readings of the right of self-defense and the 
development of a right of humanitarian intervention).  Connected to the debate about the 
scope of Article 2(4)’s prohibition is the question of the effectiveness of the UN’s 
collective security system.  Does the ineffectiveness of this system mean that states can 
read Article 2(4) more narrowly than if the system actually worked?  
Other questions have proliferated in this context.  Does Article 2(4) prohibit a use 
of force that aims not to overthrow the government or seize the territory of another state 
                                            
25 Id., p. 139. 
26 Gazzini, supra note 7, p. 125. 
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but rather that attempts to uphold the purposes of the UN?27  In other words, is it possible 
to use force in the territory or another state in such a way that it does not affect the 
territorial integrity or political independence of that state or in any other way transgresses 
the purposes of the UN?28  Facing this problem, many U.S. scholars tend to argue that 
Article of 2(4) should be read narrowly to facilitate the use of force to uphold the 
principles and purposes of the UN.29  For instance, as part of its justifications for its 
invasion of Grenade in 1983, the United States suggested that Article 2(4) should 
interpreted with consideration of other values contained in the UN Charter, such as values 
as freedom, democracy, and peace.30   
 As noted above, attempts to limit the scope of the prohibition on the use of force 
directly relates to debates concerning the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  
Arguments are frequently made that forcible measures to protect the victims of violations 
of human rights can be undertaken without affecting the territorial integrity of the target 
state and challenging the target state’s political independence.31  According to Aust, a 
limited use of force for the sole purpose of relieving extreme human distress, to stop 
genocide or ethnic cleansing or other serious violations of international law, is not a 
violation of Article 2(4) because this use of force is necessary for realization of the 
promotion of human rights and addressing humanitarian problems, values which are 
contained in Article 1(3) of the UN Charter.32  He also argues that “[W]hen the upholding 
of the Purposes comes into acute conflict with the sovereignty of a state that is the very 
                                            
27 Gray, supra note 2, p. 29. 
28 Arend & Beck, supra note 5, p. 36. 
29 Gray, supra note 2, p. 30. 
30 Id., p. 31. 
31 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 90. 
32 Aust, supra note 11, p. 230. 
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obstacle to achieving them, respect for its territorial integrity or political independence 
has to give way to the overriding needs of humanity.”33 
Most scholars who favor humanitarian intervention tend to avoid the terminology 
of self-defense and insist that the forcible measure taken are legitimate, not by virtue of 
compatibility with Article 51 of the UN Charter, but as a result of being compatible with 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.34  This position, at the end of the day, interprets Article 
2(4) narrowly in order to allow states to use force more frequently, which ends up 
essentially at the same point as those that seek to expand the scope of the right to use 
force in self-defense.  Article 2(4) is, thus, subject to a two-pronged pincer movement to 
shrink its range of application. 
 However, many scholars question the legality of humanitarian intervention 
without legitimate authorization of the UNSC.  Concerning this question, Dinstein argues 
that “[N]o individual state (or group of states) is authorized to act unilaterally, in the 
domain of human rights or in any other sphere, as if it were the policeman of the 
world.”35  Under this perspective, although unauthorized humanitarian intervention may 
seek to protect human rights, it violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  In the Nicaragua 
case, the International Court of Justice rejected the argument that the United States could 
employ force against Nicaragua in order to ensure respect for human rights in that 
country.36  This perspective reads the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) more 
broadly and robustly than do the advocates for humanitarian intervention.  
                                            
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 90. 
36 See Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) [Merits] (1986), pp. 134-135, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket.files.70/6503.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) 
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 Undoubtedly, only the UNSC is empowered to authorize forcible military action 
against a state that is in breach of its international obligations to respect human rights 
under the law of the UN Charter.  This authority is, however, very hard to exercise 
because of inevitable disagreements among the five permanent members of the UNSC 
about whether intervention by force is appropriate.  Thus, that exception to Article 2(4) 
provided by Chapter VII of the UN Charter does not provide advocates of humanitarian 
intervention with a foundation for legitimizing the use of force to protect and respect 
fundamental human rights. 
Another problem with respect to humanitarian intervention can be found in its 
subjective and selective character.  Dinstein indicates that there can be contradictory 
subjective opinions as to whether a course of action is just, and there is too much room to 
abuse the law in the name of justice through a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.37  
Advocates of humanitarian intervention justify unilateral use of force by a state on two 
grounds: (1) just cause, and (2) the legitimacy of the governments taking action.  
However, there is a critical problem concerning the legitimacy of the state taking action.  
The criteria of legitimacy of the states seem to hinge on the existence of a democratic 
government.  Thus, from the perspective of humanitarian interventionists, a state is 
illegitimate if the government is not democratic, or if a democratic state is being 
challenged by non-democratic forces.  These situations allow fairly unrestrained 
unilateralism with respect to the use of force.38   
                                            
37 Dinstein, supra note 4, p. 70. 
38 V.S. Mani, Humanitarian Intervention Today 313 Recueil des Cours (2005) (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2006), p. 225. 
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Opponents of humanitarian intervention also point out that proponents emphasize 
human rights too much and tend to ignore collateral motives of intervening states.  
Hidden collateral motives of the intervening states influence the selection of the target 
state of humanitarian intervention.  Advocates of humanitarian intervention for 
establishing democratic government have a hard time resolving the subjective and 
selective problems of humanitarian interventions driven by hidden collateral motives of 
the intervening states.  For instance, why there is no plan for the United States and other 
democratic states to undertake humanitarian intervention against friendly and unfriendly 
regimes that systematically violate fundamental human rights?39  
 With respect to the use of force in self-defense, the notion of anticipatory self-
defense has been the source of much controversy among international lawyers.  Arend 
and Beck raise the question about the possible necessity of anticipatory self-defense: 
Does the reference to a state’s right to respond in self-defense “if an armed attack occurs” 
indicate that a would-be victim must actually wait for the other side to strike first before 
it can respond? Would the soon-to-be aggrieved state be unable to respond until the 
troops actually crossed the border or the bombs stated failing?40  Alexandrov indicates 
that “[T]he basis for the argument in favor of the legality of anticipatory self-defense is 
that states faced with a perceived danger of immediate attack cannot be expected to await 
the attack like ‘sitting duck’ but should be allowed to take the appropriate measures for 
their defense.”41  According to Gazzini, advocates of anticipatory self-defense argue that 
the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal indirectly admitted its lawfulness by 
                                            
39 Id., p. 228. 
40 Arend & Beck, supra note 5, p. 36. 
41 S. Alexandrov, Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International 1996), p. 149. 
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considering and rejecting on the factual evidence the claim that Germany had been forced 
to invade Norway in order to forestall an imminent Allied landing.42  In addition, there 
are cases, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the 1967 Israeli pre-emptive strike 
against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and the 1981 Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear 
reactor, where the legality of using force in anticipatory self-defense has been asserted.43  
However, many international lawyers deny the existence of a right of anticipatory 
self-defense.44  First, the notion of anticipatory self-defense is not expressly contained in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.  International lawyers also fear that anticipatory self-
defense will be open to abuses and subjective expansion of its parameters such that the 
prohibition on the use of force becomes nearly meaningless.  The Bush administration’s 
advocacy for the legality of a right to use force in pre-emptive self-defense has provided 
an example for critics of anticipatory self-defense to worry even more about the “slippery 
slope” this doctrine would produce.  
Second, states in their state practice are generally reluctant to invoke anticipatory 
self-defense as a justification.  Gray indicates that “[I]n practice states prefer to take a 
wide view of armed attack rather than openly claim anticipatory self-defense … States 
take care to try to secure the widest possible support; they do not invoke a doctrine that 
they know will be unacceptable to the vast majority of states.”45  This reluctance of states 
                                            
42 Gazzini, supra note 7, p. 149.  See Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal 
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to invoke anticipatory self-defense directly to justify their actions suggests that 
anticipatory self-defense is not widely accepted.46    
With regard to the collective security system in the UN, the right of the veto 
conferred on the permanent members of the UNSC has been the major obstacle to UNSC 
collective security actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.47  As noted earlier, the 
difficulties experienced with the UN collective security system during and after the Cold 
War directly affect how states perceive the scope and substance of the international legal 
rules on the use of force.  Even though post-Cold War use of the veto has not been as 
debilitating as during the Cold War, the right of the veto still plays a critical role in 
blocking possible actions by the UNSC.   
Moreover, the right of the veto of the permanent members of the UNSC may 
erode the original function of the UNSC by giving opportunities to other international 
organizations, such as NATO, to take the initiative in managing threats to international 
peace and security.  The existence of the veto power by the five permanent members is 
also directly related to concerns about the illegitimacy of the UNSC and arguments that 
the UNSC must be reformed and enlarged.48  Another aspect of the issue of legitimacy is 
lack of the transparency in how the UNSC makes important decisions.  The major powers 
conclude important decisions behind closed doors, which means how those decisions 
were reached is beyond public scrutiny.49  In this context, a state which is adversely 
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48 K. Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the 
Principle of Legality (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006), p. 4. 
49 D. Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under the Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice (Kluwer Law 
International 2001), p. 295. 
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affected by decisions of the UNSC will be suspicious about the decisions of the UNSC 
and their legality and legitimacy.    
 
6.3 The Asian Perspective on the Use of Force 
 Given the importance of the international law on the use of force in international 
relations, examining the potential impact on international law and global governance of 
the rise of Asia in this realm is important.  This section analyzes whether an Asian 
perspective on the use of force rules in international law exists, and, if so, what 
implications arise from this perspective.  As explored in detail below, the Asian 
perspective does not radically differ from the existing set of international legal rules on 
the use of force.  The importance of the Asian perspective is more apparent in how this 
perspective weighs in on the debates about the scope and substance of the prohibition on 
the use force, the right to use force in self-defense, and the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
6.3.1 The Confucian View on the Use of Force by States 
 The rules on the use of force by states examined in Section 6.2 have their origins 
in the Just War tradition of Western religious and philosophical thought.50  To elucidate 
                                            
50 General works concerning the Just War doctrine include S. Chesterman, Just War or Just 
Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford Univ. Press 2003); Just War 
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intervention, see Ethics and Foreign Intervention (D. Chatterjee & D. Scheid, eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2003); M. Finnermore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use 
of Force (Cornell Univ. Press 2003); Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas (J. Holzgrefe & R. Keohane, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003); J. Janzekovic, The 
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whether an Asian perspective on the use of force exists, an examination of Confucianism 
on the use of force by states proves valuable.  This analysis supplements the earlier 
references to Confucianism in this thesis sketching how Confucian thinking approaches 
the legitimacy of the use of force by states.  Although similarities appear between the 
existing rules of international law and the Confucian perspective, Confucianism contains 
an approach to the use of force relevant to the controversies in international law on the 
scope and substance of the right of self-defense and the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention.  As explored more in this chapter, the Confucian approach informs an Asian 
perspective on the use of force in international relations.  
Confucius argued that the goal for world order should be Ping (平). According to 
Confucius, Ping can be understood as peace, harmony, evenness, equality, fairness, 
justice and the like.  For the achievement of Ping, Confucius believed that states and their 
peoples needed a sense of peace and tranquility that transcended territorial borders.51  The 
optimal world order, which is directed by Tian-Xia (which refers to an ideal moral and 
political order admitting of no territorial boundaries), should be achieved according to the 
principles of right, virtues, and aims of Ping.  Thus, Confucius seemed to shut down any 
possibility of a good war between sovereign states.52  
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Conceptually, Confucianism does not recognize the inter-state system as a 
foundation for Ping.  Confucius was aware of inter-state systems in China during the 
periods of the Spring and Autumn (722-476 B.C.) and the Warring States (476-221 
B.C.).53  Confucius regarded the state-centric system as directed by greedy states and, 
thus, was an obstacle to achieving Ping, a harmonious order the artificial boundaries of 
states threaten.  Thus, wars undertaken to expand state territory and power were not 
legitimate under the philosophy of Confucius.     
Moreover, Confucius argued that leaders should govern the people by means of 
virtue and not by means of coercive political power.  Hence, if a ruler or king engages in 
aggression against other states, he cannot possibly be regarded as a sage leader because 
he does not govern by the rule of virtue.  Mencius also argued that the ideal ruler would 
win the people’s hearts and support by his benevolence without relying on the use of 
force.54  This approach would seem to rule out the use of force as an instrument for 
                                            
53 The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were the latest periods of the Zhou dynasty 
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 Mencius was an itinerant Chinese philosopher and sage, and one of the principal interpreters of 
Confucianism.  His thought is contained in The Mencius, which is one of The Four Books on 
Classical Confucianism (The Great Learning (大學), The Doctrine of the Mean (中庸), The 
Analects of Confucius (論語), and The Mencius (孟子)). Mencius’ interpretation of Confucianism 
has generally been regarded as the orthodox version by subsequent Chinese philosophers. The 
outstanding contribution of Mencius to Confucianism can be found in his view on human nature. 
Mencius believed in the innate goodness of the individual, believing that it was society’s 
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advancing any aspects of a country’s foreign and domestic policies.  Confucius argued 
that military aggression at home or abroad should not be connected with “the principle of 
benevolent government.”  In his book on the Spring and Autumn, Confucius condemned 
some 400 wars during a period of 240 years for their inhumane character because these 
wars were mainly driven by the desire of states to increase their territory and power.  So 
long as the goals of these wars are determined by the greed of states, from Confucius’ 
perspective, no justification could be made for any of these wars.55   
Considering Confucius argument on the use of force, all wars of aggression are 
bad, and pacifism would seem to be the only justifiable moral stance.56  But are 
Confucius really pacifists?  Although Confucius condemned the use of force to increase 
the state’s territory and power, limited uses of force by states could be justified for 
restoring Ping and Tian-Xia, which are severely damaged by wars of aggression.57  
Confucius and his disciples recognized two exceptional cases for justified resort to war: 
one is self-defense, and the other is the limited use of force against tyranny and 
oppression in other states.  Confucians would justify the use of force for self-defense, 
both individual and collective.58  For the purpose of removing possible human casualties 
driven by the use of force, Confucius emphasized establishment of national security and 
defense systems, such as strong border defenses to deter and defend against aggression.  
The main reason why Confucius justifies the use of force in self-defense can be found in 
                                                                                                                                  
influence that causes bad moral character. Mencius is often compared to Plato for their theories 
on human nature. Both have in common the affirmation of the innate moral goodness of all 
human beings. For more information about Mencius, see K. Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese 
Thought 1st ed. (Stanford Univ. Press 2000). 
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57 Id., p. 29.  
58 Chen, supra note 51, p. 39. 
 140 
his emphasis on the protection of people and the effort to maintain Ping and Tian-Xia.  
The justification for the limited use of force in self-defense is highlighted by Confucius 
specifically with regard to the survival of small countries.  If a small territory is ruled by 
a capable and virtuous ruler who seeks to promote peace and benevolence, and if that 
territory is attacked by an unjust would-be hegemon, then the ruler of that territory can 
justifiably mobilize the people for military action.59   
In the Book of Change, Confucius advised the rulers to build invincible forts to 
protect the country from foreign aggression.60  Mencius also had the same view on use of 
force in self-defense.  For instance, the ruler of Teng, a small state that was situated 
between two large and powerful neighbors, Chi and Chu, asked Mencius how to maintain 
national security and survival.  Mencius replied to this question: “I can only suggest one 
thing.  Dig deeper your moats, build higher your walls, and guard them with your people.  
In case of attack, be prepared to die in your defense, and have the people so that they will 
not leave you. This is a proper course.”61   
Confucius also approved the use of force in collective self-defense.  With the loss 
of control by the Chou King, who was regarded as a Tian-Zi in ancient China, small 
states could no longer depend on Chou’s power for the maintenance of order and they 
then had to defend themselves.  Facing the hegemonic ambition of Chu in the south and 
increasing barbarian invasions from the north, the survival of many Chinese states was at 
stake.  In order to solve these problems, Duke Hwan, the ruler of Chi, supported by his 
prime minister, Kwan Chung, summoned these states to establish an allied force.  Under 
                                            
59 Bell, supra note 52, p. 36. 
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Duke Hwan’s leadership, the allied states were successful in turning back and keeping the 
encroaching northern barbarians generally to the north of the Yellow River, thus 
perpetuating the existence of the states of Yen, Hing, Wei, and their own.  By means of a 
combined invasion undertaken as the use of force in collective self-defense, the allies 
were able to exact a covenant from the southern state of Chu.62   
Confucius also argued that use of force might be legitimate when there was 
tyranny in another country.  In the Confucian sense, a tyrant is a ruler who challenged the 
order of Ping and Tian-Xia.  The order of Ping and Tian-Xia is hugely dependent on the 
welfare of peoples in all states.  The welfare of people in ancient China was understood 
as securing the basic means of subsistence of the people by its ruler.  Under Confucius 
perspective, a ruler should be identical to a sage who governs the people by means of 
virtue and wins people’s hearts and support by his benevolence.  In addition, a ruler 
should strive for peace.  The main criteria for making a ruler a sage are determined by the 
capability of a ruler to increase the welfare conditions of his people.   
Thus, a ruler who oppresses his people and sacrifices the people’s welfare by 
driving them into war in order to increase his territory and power is regarded as a tyrant 
from the perspective of Confucius.63  The existence of a tyrant who maintains tyranny is 
understood as a direct threat to the ideal order of Ping and Tian-Xia.  Thus, although the 
use of force for expelling a tyrant from another country undoubtedly triggers human 
casualties, this sacrifice might be necessary for the restoration of Ping and Tian-Xia as 
higher goals for entire world.64  The character of the use of force for expelling a tyrant 
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from another country would be linked to the concept of “punitive expeditions” under the 
Confucian perspective.65  Although protection of human rights of people in another 
country was not part of the discourse on punitive expeditions under the Confucian 
perspective, the justification for the use of force in punitive expeditions hinged upon 
securing the material welfare of the people in another country directly endangered by its 
ruler.  The Confucian concept of a punitive expedition correlates in some respects to the 
modern idea of humanitarian intervention.   
 Mencius also justified the necessity of wars waged as punitive expeditions against 
tyrannical and oppressive rulers.  Mencius repeatedly argued that wars of punitive 
expeditions should not be employed for purposes other than re-establishing the conditions 
for that foreign society to pursue the ideals of Ping and Tian-Xia.  Mencius enumerated 
the conditions that must exist for a punitive expedition to constitute a just use of military 
force.  First, the people of the foreign country in question must be suffering under the 
oppression of tyrants.  The people’s suffering in this sense meant that the people of 
another country is not only deprived of their basic subsistence by their ruler but also is 
forced to be employed as militants for unjustified war, such as a war for expanding the 
ruler’s territory.  In considering the people’s suffering in Yen, Mencius asked the ruler of 
Chi to undertake a punitive expedition.  Mencius said that “[N]ow the Prince of Yen 
cruelly mistreated his own people and Your Majesty set out on a punitive expedition.  
Yen’s people thought you were saving them from ‘flood and fire’.”66   
Second, the country intervening with military force must take actions to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the people suffering under tyranny.  In other words, the people 
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must welcome the foreign military force.  Mencius described the example of a successful 
punitive expedition by indicating that “[W]hen the King Wu attacked Yin, he said, ‘Do 
not be afraid. I come to bring peace, I am not the enemy of the people.’  And the sound of 
the people making big bows was like the toppling of the mountain.”67  Mencius believed 
that the intervening power needed the support of the people to sustain the justness of the 
punitive expedition.  This task meant that the intervening military force must treat the 
people with respect and dignity.  Further, the welcome must be long lasting, not just 
immediate.  The welcome of the people in the target state can be explained by the 
willingness of people in the target state to follow the interim policies of the foreign 
intervening country.  According to Bell, the real challenge is to maintain the support for 
the invading forces after the initial enthusiasm because even punitive expeditions that 
were initially justified easily can go bad under the interests of foreign powers.68   
Third, Mencius required that the morality of the intervening rulers be superior to 
the tyrants they attacked.  Rulers that were tyrannical themselves could not wage punitive 
expeditions.  The morality test of intervening rulers should be made after the end of 
punitive expeditions. After expelling the ruler of Yen from Yen, the ruler of Chi not only 
behaved tyrannically to the Yen people but also annexed Yen to expand Chi’s territory.  
Such actions are not legitimate for intervening rulers.  Thus, the rulers of various states 
deliberated together about aiding Yen and delivering it from Chi’s abusive power.  Facing 
this unexpected situation, Mencius condemned the ruler of Chi for his lack of virtue, 
which is indispensable to maintaining the ideals of Ping and Tian-Xia.  Mencius argued 
that the annexation of Yen by Chi could only be justified on the ground that the people of 
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Yen would be pleased with Chi’s annexation.  In addition, Mencius demanded that the 
ruler of Chi immediately order that all captives be released, removal of precious of 
vessels stopped, and that Chi withdraw as soon as the new ruler was in place. Mencius 
strongly argued that the use of force for punitive expedition must not end up in greater 
misery through another tyrant imposed by the intervening forces.69  
Fourth, rulers participating in wars of punitive expeditions must have some moral 
claims to have the world’s support.  Mencius points to the example of a justified punitive 
expedition led by King Tang: “The Book of History says, ‘In his punitive expeditions 
Tang began with Ge.’  The whole world was in sympathy with his cause.  When he 
marched on the east, western tribes complained.  When he marched to the south, the 
northern tribes complained.  They said, ‘Why does he not come to us first?’”   
The main reason that rules for participating in punitive expeditions require that 
the intervening leader should win the world’s support can be found in the ideals of Ping 
and Tian-Xia.  Confucianism generally regarded the support of the world as a basic 
element constituting the ideals of Tian-Xia.  Under Confucianism, the will of people is 
the will of heaven.  Put differently, the holy orders from the heaven (Tian) that should not 
be violated in the whole world (Tian-Xia) are ultimately identical to the accumulation of 
peoples’ wishes.  Thus, winning the hearts and minds of people in the target state and the 
support of any other states means that a punitive expedition is legitimately approved by 
the whole world (Tian-Xia).  
In short, according to Mencius, the use of punitive expeditions is justified only if 
virtuous rulers use military force to punish tyrants with the support of the suffering 
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people and to restore peace and benevolence to that foreign society so that it can continue 
to strive for Tian-Xia and Ping. 70   
  
6.3.2 Confucianism and International Law on the Use of Force 
 Although Confucians had a clear view on the use of force by states, any attempt to 
relate this view directly to the modern international law on the use of force needs to be 
done with care and perspective.  Unlike the Western Just War tradition, Confucianism has 
no systematic code on the use of force, including detailed provisions on jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello.  Classical Confucians generally warned about the terrible results caused by 
war between states and tried to persuade the rulers of states not to wage war against other 
states for the sake of increasing their territories and powers.   
However, similarities and differences between Confucian thinking on the use of 
forces and rules of international law on the use of force exist and are worth exploring.  
Similarities can be found in the broad prohibition on the use of force by states, except the 
use of force for self-defense and in situations to relieve great suffering on the part of 
other people.  Differences between the Confucian perspective on the use of force and 
contemporary international law on the use of force are also present.     
Despite admitting the necessity of self-defense for maintaining Ping and Tian-Xia, 
Confucians rejected attempts to broaden the scope of self-defense.  Basically, Confucians 
regarded the use of force for self-defense as an unavoidable option for maintaining Ping 
and Tian-Xia within countries and for the entire world.  In other words, the use of force 
for self-defense is a necessary evil for rectifying injustice brought about by the attack of 
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one state against another state.  Under the Confucian perspective, the best way for a state 
to rule out the possibility of attack by another state should be sought in fortifying the 
national defense system.  Although Confucius admitted the necessity of the use of force 
for self-defense, Confucians took a negative view on the first strike of a state against 
another state, except for the purpose of punitive expeditions as discussed above, because 
this first strike undoubtedly leads to the escalation of violence between states and the 
deterioration in the welfare of the people, which would undermine prospects of pursuing 
Ping and Tian-Xia.  In this sense, Confucians took a negative view on what we today call 
anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense.  
With regard to contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention, there are 
some differences between the punitive expeditions discussed by Confucians and 
arguments about humanitarian intervention under modern international law.  First, 
unilateral punitive expeditions could occur in the Confucian perspective without the need 
for a state to clear any procedural hurdles (e.g., authorization by a collectivity of states).  
Under international law, humanitarian intervention without the authorization of the 
UNSC remains very controversial which heightens the importance of the UNSC as a 
procedural requirement for engaging in humanitarian intervention.  Of course, Confucius 
and Mencius developed their ideas long before institutions such as the UN were 
conceived.  The closest analogy in Confucian thinking is the need for the punitive 
expeditions to find favor with the wider world, but this favor was not something sought in 
advance or over which a small number of great powers had disproportionate say.  Thus, it 
was open to any state to satisfy the conditions for a legitimate punitive expedition.  
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Although Confucians did not require formal authorization for punitive expeditions 
from the wider community of states, Confucians required that states undertaking punitive 
expeditions should have informal, post hoc authorization in the form of the support of the 
world and the welcome of the people in the target state.  The Confucian perspective set 
very high thresholds for punitive expeditions to meet before they could be considered 
legitimate, and these thresholds echo the purpose of the criteria (e.g., necessity, 
proportionality, action limited to helping end the atrocities) proponents of humanitarian 
intervention apply to the right to use force to relieve great human suffering in other states.  
In the end, the Confucian perspective on the use of force by states shares key 
substantive similarities with the content of modern international law and the debates in 
international law about the right of self-defense and humanitarian intervention.  The 
differences more often than not relate to procedural or institutional issues (e.g., the role of 
the UNSC) than to substantive principles and concepts of legitimacy.  We can see in 
Confucian thinking the very spaces over which international lawyers argue about the 
meaning of the rules of international law on the use of force, and we can also see in the 
Confucian approach deep skepticism about expanding justifications for the use of force 
and high thresholds for determining the legitimacy of actions.  
 
6.3.3 The Confucian Perspective Applied to the First and Second Gulf Wars 
To help illuminate how the Confucian perspective relates to contemporary debates 
about the morality and legality of the use of force, this section applies the Confucian 
approach to the First and Second Gulf Wars.  The First Gulf War provides an example of 
the exercise of individual and collective self-defense against aggression, and the Second 
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Gulf War provides material to analyze the Confucian view on pre-emptive self-defense 
and humanitarian intervention.  
 
The First Gulf War: Individual and Collective Self-Defense 
As noted above, Confucianism recognized that the use of force in self-defense 
against aggression is legitimate.  When attacked by Iraq in August 1990, Kuwait had a 
right of self-defense, including the right to call on other countries to help it respond to 
Iraqi aggression and Iraq’s desire to annex Kuwait and have access to its oil resources.  
Other features of the First Gulf War also resonate with the Confucian approach to the use 
of force by states.  To begin, the use of force in self-defense certainly had the support of 
the Kuwaiti people, who were liberated from Iraqi occupation.  The United States and its 
allies also fought a limited conflict directed at expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait and did 
not attempt to occupy or annex Iraqi territory, overthrow the government of Iraq, or 
exploit Iraqi oil resources for selfish ends.  The military action allowed the Kuwaiti 
government to return, thus re-establishing peace and the prospects for benevolence in that 
country.  Finally, the use of force to defend Kuwaiti had characteristics of justified 
punitive expeditions to punish a ruler who blatantly violated the principle of Tian-Xia and 
Ping.  
The role of the UN in the First Gulf War proves more difficult from the Confucian 
perspective.  In the Confucian approach, the UN does not play the role of Tian-Zi, who, 
as an individual ruler, has the duty to realize Tian-Xia and Ping.  The UN’s authorization 
of the use of force in self-defense by Kuwait and its allies added, however, to the 
legitimacy of the use of force in the Confucian view because such authorization was a 
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sign of the peaceful and benevolence intent of the military action with respect to Kuwait 
and the wider Middle East. 71  The UNSC authorization also, in the Confucian perspective, 
acts as a surrogate for the support of the wider world that uses of force need to resonate 
with Ping and Tian-Xia. 
 
The Second Gulf War: Pre-Emptive Self-Defense and Humanitarian Intervention 
The Confucian perspective on the use of force in self-defense is consistent with 
the lack of controversy in contemporary international law about the legitimacy of using 
force in individual and collective self-defense against external aggression.  More 
problematical in international law are the issues of the scope of the right to use force in 
self-defense and whether there is a right to engage in humanitarian intervention.  Both 
these issues arose in the Second Gulf War, launched by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003.  Applying Confucianism’s views on the use of force by states to the Second 
Gulf War provide insights into the Confucian perspective on these burning contemporary 
questions in international law and international relations.  
 
The Second Gulf War and the Question of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense 
 From a Confucian perspective, the Second Gulf War cannot be considered a 
legitimate use of force in self-defense.  Among the U.S. justifications for its invasion of 
Iraq was that it acted under a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense, which represents an 
expansive reading of a right of anticipatory self-defense.72  The United States argued that 
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it had a right under international law to use force pre-emptively against a tyrannical 
regime that threatened U.S. security through its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 
and its support for terrorism.73  This assertion has proved very controversial under 
international law and by no means represents an accepted part of international legal 
doctrine on the right to use of force in self-defense.  In fact, the United States was the 
only country that participated in, or supported, the invasion that justified it on the basis of 
a right of pre-emptive self-defense. 
 The Confucian perspective supports the opponents of a broad right to anticipatory 
self-defense as articulated by the United States in connection with the invasion of Iraq.  
Confucians acknowledge the necessity of the use of force for self-defense, both 
individual and collective.  However, Confucius placed limits on what the use of force in 
self-defense justifies.  Confucians interpret the right to self-defense very narrowly as a 
justification for using military force.  Broadening the ability of using force in self-defense 
simply creates more opportunities for states to use force for purposes not related to 
protecting their territories from military attack.  In the case of the invasion of Iraq, the 
United States could not achieve its objective without occupying the country and effecting 
“regime change,” two objectives the Confucian perspective cannot accommodate with its 
narrow interpretation of the right to use force in self-defense. 
 More generally, Confucians frown on expansive notions of self-defense because 
such notions would simply tempt rulers to use military power in ways that more broadly 
threaten the pursuit of Tina-Xia and Ping.  Further, broad readings of the right to use 
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force in self-defense really only benefit strong powers with the military capabilities to 
wage war beyond their own territories.  Countries with weaker or smaller militaries have 
no effective ability to take advantage of an expanded concept of anticipatory self-defense.  
The presence of a right that is not really reciprocal in terms of rulers and states does not 
find favor in Confucian thinking. 
 
The Second Gulf War and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention 
 The Second Gulf War can also be interpreted as a humanitarian invasion, one that 
liberated the suffering people of Iraq from a tyrannical government.  In fact, after the 
United States failed to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it began to use 
justifications that appealed to the humanitarian nature of the invasion.  Justifying the 
invasion of Iraq as a humanitarian intervention is also controversial, and the Confucian 
perspective would add its weight to those who believe that the invasion cannot be 
considered a legitimate use of force for humanitarian purposes. 
 To begin, the Confucian perspective would not support the argument that Iraq 
qualified as a case in which foreign military intervention for humanitarian purposes was 
justified.  As with the right of self-defense, Confucianism has a narrow view of the 
grounds that justify humanitarian intervention.  According to Mencius, the most 
important obligation of a state is to feed its people.  In ancient China, the main threat to 
peace and security was the anger and violence of a starving people.  Hence the good ruler 
made securing the basic means of subsistence of the people the most significant goal that 
the state has to achieve.74 
                                            
74 Bell, supra note 52, p. 46. 
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 This proposition recalls the Confucian-influenced preference in Asia for 
emphasizing the material needs of the people over protecting civil and political rights and 
achieving democratic governments.  For all its problems, the Iraqi government was not 
systematically depriving the Iraqi people of basic subsistence needs.  From a Confucian 
perspective, the Iraqi government’s failure to accord the Iraqi people civil and political 
rights of the kind emphasized in the West was not a justification for military 
intervention.75  Under the Confucian approach, humanitarian intervention is justified in 
cases in which a foreign ruler or state deliberately denies its population the basic means 
of subsistence (e.g., intentional starvation) or in which a state has collapsed, exposing the 
population to widespread famine and starvation.76  For instance, if true, the North Korean 
government’s deliberate starvation of its people would trigger a Confucian sense that 
humanitarian intervention would be justified. 
  The second problem with viewing the Second Gulf War as a humanitarian 
intervention from the Confucian perspective involves the failure of the United States and 
its allies to improve significantly peace and benevolence in Iraq.  The problems that have 
afflicted Iraq after the initial successful invasion are well known and need not be detailed 
here,77 but the levels of violence and insecurity that developed in the wake of the invasion 
raise the concerns Confucianism has with humanitarian interventions.  According to 
Mencius, rulers engaging in military interventions in other states should liberate and win 
the hearts of the people in concrete ways.  Winning the hearts of the people in concrete 
ways can be found in the willingness of the people to follow and support the policies of 
                                            
75 Id., p. 47. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., Mahbubani, supra note 1, pp. 176-186. 
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intervening foreign states.  Thus, if there is significant resistance to the policies of 
intervening foreign states by people in the target state, the intervening foreign states 
cannot be regarded as winning the hearts of the people in concrete ways.  The failure of 
the U.S. military occupation of Iraq produced the violent insurgency that has plagued Iraq 
since the summer of 2003, and a Confucian perspective would fault the United States for 
not securing peace and benevolence for Iraqis.  This failure taints the legitimacy of the 
invasion and occupation as a humanitarian intervention.  
 Finally, the Confucian perspective would highlight that the dubious reasons for 
the invasion of Iraq and the tragic mishandling of the invasion’s aftermath raise questions 
about the morality of the rulers who launched the Second Gulf War.  According to 
Mencius, rulers that engage in punitive expeditions for humanitarian reasons must clearly 
have a superior moral basis for using force than the tyrants being attacked.  The lack of 
strong legal basis for the invasion, and the absence of direct UNSC authorization of the 
military action, focuses the spotlight more intensely on the reasons why the United States 
and its allies resorted to force against Iraq, and, as illustrated in this analysis, the reasons 
for the invasion differed according to the needs and problems of the invaders not the 
needs and problems of the Iraqi people.  Such a tarnished moral basis for the invasion 
matters in Confucian thinking about humanitarian intervention and leads to the Confucian 






The Second Gulf War and the Question of UN Security Council Authorization 
  Unlike the First Gulf War, the Second Gulf War came under attack for its 
illegitimacy because the UNSC had not expressly approved the military attack.78  
Countries participating in the invasion, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, 
argued that UNSC had authorized the military action because the authorization to use 
force against Iraq from the First Gulf War (Resolution 678) had never technically been 
terminated, and Iraq’s intransigence on weapons inspections (Resolutions 687 and 1441) 
constituted a material breach of the cease-fire (Resolution 687), which brought the 
authorization to use force back to life.  Even though the UNSC Resolution 1441 passed 
unanimously, Russia, China, and France issued a joint statement declaring that 
Resolution1441 did not authorize any “automaticity” in the use of force against Iraq, and 
that a further the UNSC resolution was needed to authorize the use of force.79  Moreover, 
                                            
78 Important UNSC Resolutions concerning Iraq situations are as follows: Resolutions 660, 661, 
678, 686, 687, 688, 797, 715, 986, 1284 and 1441. Among them, the UNSC Resolutions, 678, 687 
and 1441 have special meaning. Under UNSC Resolution 687, UN weapons inspectors were to 
search locations in Iraq for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as weapons that 
exceeded an effective distance of 150 kilometers. The UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) (S/RES/687, 
1991), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited June 23, 2008). UNSC Resolution 678 authorizes the use of all necessary means to 
enforce the UNSC Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to 
cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security. The UNSC Resolution 678 
(1990) (S/RES/678, 1990), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited June 23, 2008). UNSC Resolution 1441 offers Iraq “a final opportunity to comply 
with its disarmament obligations” that had been set out in several previous UNSC resolutions. 
The UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002) (S/RES/1441, 2002), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited June 23, 2008). 
79 Joint Statement from the People’s Republic of China, the Federation of Russia, and France 
(2002), available at http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/021108_cs_france_irak_2.htm 
(last visited June 23, 2008). 
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the United States and the United Kingdom came under fierce attack for failing to get 
explicit UNSC approval for military action against Iraq.80   
 Confucius did not require the prior authorization of the use of force by a higher 
entity to legitimize the use of force by states for restoring Ping and Tian-Xia.  Thus, the 
attempt to criticize the allied invasion forces for failing to get the authorization of the 
UNSC does not directly make sense under the Confucian perspective.  Confucians 
emphasized that the support of world is indispensable to determining legitimacy of 
punitive expeditions by foreign states, but it would not be accurate to equate this 
Confucian idea with UNSC authorization of a use of force, especially in light of the 
myriad concerns surrounding the legitimacy of the UNSC as the body mandated to 
maintain international peace and security.  
 
6.3.4 The Asian Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention 
 The Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention is not only informed by the 
Confucian philosophical position but also by Asian countries’ various experiences as 
victims of military intervention by foreign powers.  As noted earlier in this thesis, the 
historical experiences of Asian countries with imperial countries inform these countries’ 
strong embrace of the international legal principles of sovereignty and non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of other states.  The historical experiences of Asian countries with 
imperial powers and their manipulation of rules of international law (e.g., the standard of 
civilization) has encouraged Asian countries to adopt a strict attitude towards 
                                            
80 Iraq War Illegal, says Annan, BBC News, Sept. 16, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm (last visited June 23, 2008). See also M. 
O’Connell, UN Resolution 1441: Compelling Saddam, Restraining Bush (2002), available at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew73.php (last visited June 23, 2008). 
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interpretation of existing fundamental rules and principles of international law in order to 
prevent the great powers from using international law as an excuse for pursuing their 
selfish interests.  Thus, with regard to humanitarian intervention, Asian countries 
generally oppose reading international law as allowing countries to engage in 
humanitarian intervention without the direct authorization of the UNSC.81   
Many Asian countries, such as most of the members of ASEAN and China, have 
in principle and practice opposed any outside interference in their domestic affairs, 
especially their political or security affairs.  Drawing on the UN Charter, ASEAN 
countries have made non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs a cardinal principle 
of intraregional relations.82  Although they recognize the legitimacy of international 
community’s concerns over gross violation of human rights, Asian countries fear that a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention may be used as an excuse by great powers to 
intervene in the affairs of weak states for reasons unrelated to humanitarian impulses.  
For the purpose of preventing abusive humanitarian intervention, Asian countries assert 
that any humanitarian intervention against a state should be based on clear and objective 
criteria, undertaken without discrimination, and in a manner that fully respects the 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state concerned.83  For instance, 
former foreign minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia noted the increasing international focus 
on human security has triggered humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and 
                                            
81 Mani, supra note 38, p. 163. 
82 D. Anwar, “Human Security: An Intractable Problem in Asia,” in Asian Security Order: 
Instrumental and Normative Features (M. Alagappa, ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2003), p. 557. 
83 Id., p. 559. 
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Kosovo, but he warned that such interventions were dangerous and illegitimate without 
clear criteria accepted by the international community and approved by the UNSC.84    
There are at least three reasons that help explain Asian countries’ opposition to a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention in international law, especially a doctrine that 
permits unilateral humanitarian intervention without the authorization of the UNSC.  First, 
Asian countries have argued that the UN Charter provides no basis for recognizing the 
right to use force for humanitarian intervention in situations not involving self-defense or 
authorization by the UNSC.  Although the UN Charter recognizes the promotion of 
human rights as one of the UN’s purposes, this recognition does not trump the other 
purposes and principles of the UN, including respecting state sovereignty and the equality 
of sovereign states.  Mani indicates that sovereignty means a shield that allows countries 
to protect themselves from more powerful states and that permits countries the policy 
space to protect and develop their right of self-determination and political independence, 
their socio-economic systems, and their national identities and personalities.85  The strong 
embrace of the principles of sovereign and non-intervention not only reflect Asian 
acceptance of these key tenets of the traditional Westphalian international system but also 
Asian political and philosophical skepticism about humanitarian intervention as a positive 
force in world affairs.  In short, for Asian countries, humanitarian intervention is based on 
questionable political and moral grounds, often causes more harm to people than good, 
and threatens to undermine rules and principles that sustain inter-state relations.86   
                                            
84 Id.  
85 Mani, supra note 38, p. 216. 
86 On the arguments of non-interventionists generally, see F. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: 
An Inquiry into Law and Morality 2nd ed. (Transnational Publishers 1996), pp. 23-27. 
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 Second, Asian countries warn that the use of force for humanitarian intervention 
is dangerous because it both cloaks ulterior political motives and advances a particular 
moral perspective not necessarily shared by all countries.  The history of Asian countries 
with imperial powers makes them very skeptical of great power claims that certain 
actions are required to protect humanity and advance civilization.87  Typically, these 
humanitarian protestations obscure more base motives for wanting to take action, motives 
that have little if anything to do with humanitarian interests.  In terms of moral 
perspectives, Asian countries also tend to be skeptical that human rights arguments justify 
humanitarian intervention at the point of a gun.  Asian countries are not generally 
convinced that the “international community” has achieved sufficient integration of 
values to warrant a militarized enforcement mechanism for international human rights 
violations.  The reality of human rights in international system is that the acceptance and 
implementation of human rights varies greatly, which is not a strong platform on which to 
build a doctrine of allowing force to be used for humanitarian purposes.88   
In addition, Western countries often seem fixated on creating an effective right to 
intervene for humanitarian purposes after a tragedy has started to unfold rather than on 
accepting serious duties to provide economic and other forms of assistance to countries to 
ensure that such tragedies do not occur.  Advocacy for a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, thus, seems to many in Asia as cynically reactive as opposed to 
constructively proactive, which perhaps hides ulterior political motives in the desire to 
intervene.89  The answer to the crisis that gives rise to calls for a doctrine of humanitarian 
                                            
87 R. Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006), p. 268. 
88 Mani, supra note 38, p. 217. 
89 Id., pp. 227-228. 
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intervention is not military intervention but more constructive cooperation and assistance 
to support fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights, which might help re-orient 
perspectives on what policies are in fact more humanitarian in nature and effect. 
Third, according to Thakur, Asian countries take a negative view on humanitarian 
intervention because of its inconsistent application, which reflects double standards and 
the selective nature of Western powers’ interest in human rights protection.90  Asian 
countries warn that humanitarian intervention should not be used as the pretext for 
imposing external political preferences with regard to regimes and political and economic 
systems.  Thus, while acknowledging the need for humanitarian action in limited 
situations, such as genocide, Asian countries generally oppose any more robust doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention.  When it is necessary, Asian countries maintain that 
humanitarian intervention should be the option of last resort and should be temporary.  In 
addition, intervening forces must withdraw as soon as possible, and their actions while 
inside the target country must be guided by political impartiality and neutrality between 
the domestic political contenders as well as strict fidelity to international humanitarian 
law.91  
 In sum, the Asian perspective on the controversy about humanitarian intervention 
in international law shows consistency between philosophical and political influences.  
As analyzed earlier, the Confucian perspective recognizes the potential need for the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes, but Confucian thinking is skeptical about claims of 
military actions driven by humanitarian motivation and, as a result, set very high and 
difficult thresholds such intervention has to meet in order to be considered legitimate.  
                                            
90 Thakur, supra note 87, p. 269. 
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Similarly, the historical experiences of Asian countries with imperialism and great power 
politics have hardened them against calls for a robust doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention in international law.  In the narrow contexts where such intervention may be 
needed, Asian countries emphasize the need to satisfy demanding criteria before (e.g., 
UNSC authorization) and after (e.g., political impartiality and temporary presence) 
military action for humanitarian purposes. 
 The political and philosophical influences reflected in the Asian position do not 
constitute a radical departure from, or challenge to, the existing discourse on 
humanitarian intervention in international law.  Many experts in the West are also highly 
skeptical about calls for a stronger doctrine on humanitarian intervention, and existing 
rules of international law are widely interpreted consistently with the general Asian 
perspective.  In that sense, Eastphalia does not look that different from Westphalia.  The 
key variable in this context, then, is not the political and philosophical influences that 
shape the Asian perspective.  Rather, it is the power the Asian countries now possess in 
the international system.  This power means that their perspective has to be taken more 
seriously in the debates on cutting-edge issues, such as the scope and substance of the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  
 
6.3.5 Asia and Humanitarian Intervention: The Troubling Problem of Myanmar 
The consistency of the Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention from the 
political and philosophical angles does not mean that this perspective is without problems 
or critics, especially in an international system in which Asian countries have more 
material power.  Frustration in the West with Asian preferences for principles of near-
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absolute sovereignty and non-intervention partly arise because the Asian perspective does 
not appear to contain any positive ideas on how states should deal with atrocities and 
oppression taking place in other countries.  If a robust doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is not accepted, what other approaches or strategies do Asian countries 
suggest for addressing terrible problems of humanitarian abuses and disaster in the 
international system?  Does Eastphalia contain anything more than a warmed over 
version of 19th century Westphalian principles of absolute sovereignty and non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of states?  Do Asian countries, with their growing 
material and political importance in this era of globalization, have wider responsiblities 
for working to establish conditions necessary to allow Ping and Tian-Xia to be fostered 
not just in their own territories but in the global community?  
The contrast between Western and Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention 
are perhaps most stark in connection with Myanmar.  Generally speaking, Western 
countries have favored more interventionist policies for trying to address the nightmare 
the junta in Myanmar is creating for its people, and increasingly for the region.  Asian 
countries have generally opposed interventionist strategies and have been unwilling to 
engage the junta strongly to force it to change its policies.  This contrast was again 
present in the wake of the devastating cyclone that hit Myanmar in 2008.  Thus, the 
question of what to do about Myanmar provides a good case study of the challenges that 
the Asian perspective on humanitarian intervention poses for Asian countries in the early 
21st century.  
The controversies over humanitarian intervention in Myanmar after the cyclone 
raised significant questions about the approach Asian countries take to humanitarian 
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needs in the international community.92  The post-cyclone devastation in Myanmar, 
combined with the junta’s deliberate efforts not to allow foreign humanitarian assistance 
to reach desperate populations, created a humanitarian crisis that Confucianism might 
recognize as a candidate for outside intervention.  The cyclone massively threatened the 
ability of people in Myanmar to access basic survival goods (e.g., food, water, shelter), 
and the junta deliberately prevented foreign humanitarian assistance from reaching 
people facing death by disease and malnutrition.  Confucian conceptions of good 
governance would recognize nothing the junta did in the aftermath of the cyclone as 
satisfying the rulers’ duties to ensure the basic subsistence needs of their peoples.   
In addition, the humanitarian intervention needed to bring relief to the cyclone 
victims in Myanmar did not require the use of force against the junta.  The humanitarian 
intervention required was disaster relief, which does not raise the same questions that 
engaging in armed conflict for humanitarian purposes creates.  Thus, the political 
concerns for Asian countries about humanitarian intervention, and their concerns about 
great power machinations in such interventions, should have been less significant.  The 
dangers that Confucianism and Asia’s experiences with interventions traditionally 
identify were not, in post-cyclone Myanmar, an issue.  Further, worries about a lack of 
support from the people of Myanmar and the international community were also not a 
concern because wider and faster delivery of humanitarian aid would have been 
embraced within and beyond Myanmar as a peaceful and benevolent act.  Finally, Asian 
countries were well positioned materially and politically to engage Myanmar to persuade 
                                            
92 On the situation in Myanmar as it relates to humanitarian intervention, see M. Albright, The 
End of Intervention, New York Times, June 11, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/opinion/11albright.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2008); S. Y. 
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the junta to allow more foreign humanitarian assistance to reach the suffering people of 
Myanmar. 
Despite this conducive context, Asian countries generally stuck to their traditional 
opposition to intervention that would impinge on the sovereignty of a state.  The lack of 
the willingness of Asian countries to engage Myanmar more effectively, combined with 
the desire of some Western countries to use the UNSC to force Myanmar to accept 
humanitarian assistance, forced the problem of relieving the suffering in Myanmar to be 
overshadowed by maneuvering on both sides to prevent or establish, as the case may be, 
a precedent of UNSC authorized, non-violent humanitarian intervention to provide 
disaster relief.  China’s UN ambassador argued that the humanitarian situation in 
Myanmar was not an issue for the UNSC.93  He also asserted that current problem in 
Myanmar was a natural disaster, which should not be politicized.94  The Southeast Asian 
countries and India agreed with the position of China.95 
What was not clear from Asian positions taken in this incident was whether any 
Asian countries developed a positive agenda for engaging Myanmar in disaster relief and 
working to widen the distribution of foreign aid to suffering people.  The Asian 
perspective, at least as played out in the international media, was one that seemed fixated 
on defending sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention at all costs.  Undoubtedly, 
Asian countries offered Myanmar support and disaster relief supplies, but there is no 
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evidence of a concerted effort made by Asian countries to prod Myanmar to perform 
more effectively in responding to this disaster.  No Asian version of a “responsibility to 
protect” principle or duty was present in this episode.96  Neither the Confucian heritage of 
many Asian nations nor the historical experience of Asian countries with imperialism 
provides support for this passivity from countries in a region of growing global power 
and leadership.  Whether Asian countries want their response to the disaster in Myanmar 
to be the face of an Eastphalian contribution to international law and global governance is 
an important question for Asian countries to consider.  
 
6.4. Human Security with an Asian Face? The Asian Approach to the Emerging 
Concept of Human Security 
6.4.1 The Concept of Human Security 
Traditional notions of security, shaped largely by structure and dynamics of the 
Cold War, were concerned mainly with a state’s ability to counter external military threats 
from rival states.  After the end of the Cold War and the impact of a new phase of 
globalization, the traditional perspective on security, with its focus on the survival of 
states, has been challenged by the rise of new types of security threats, such as the 
dangers of environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population 
movements, and infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS.97  These new security threats 
                                            
96 The attempt to strike balance between state sovereignty and international responsibility to 
relieve human suffering is made through the principle of the responsibility to protect. See Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to 
Protect, [hereinafter Responsibility to Protect], available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-
Report.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). 
97 The Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2003 (UN 2003) [hereinafter 
Human Security Now], available at http://www.humansecurity-
chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf (last visited June 25, 2008), p. 5. 
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pose dangers not only to the security of the state (e.g., national security) but also to the 
security of individuals and communities (e.g., human security).  Behind the perceived rise 
of these new security threats is the idea that the security of individuals cannot be 
protected by the military capabilities of states because these capabilities do not provide 
defenses against transnational dangers accelerated by globalization.  In these 
circumstances, the security conditions of individual human beings are more vulnerable to 
newly emerging security threats, creating the need to think about security policy in very 
different ways. 
 
Overview of the Human Security Concept 
The idea of human security was most famously introduced in the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Report of 1994.98  According to the UNDP Report: 
 
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security 
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in 
foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. 
Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives.99 
 
The UNDP asserted that human security has two main elements: protection from 
(1) threats, such as hunger, disease, and repression; and (2) sudden and harmful 
                                            
98 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of 
Human Security, 1994 (1994) [hereinafter UNDP Report 1994], available at 
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disruptions in the patterns of daily life.100  The UNDP also asserted that globalization 
creates the need to think about security in human rather than state-centric terms: “In the 
globalizing world of shrinking time, shrinking space and disappearing borders, people are 
confronting new threats to human security—sudden and harmful disruption in the pattern 
of daily life.”101  According to the UNDP, there are seven specific elements that comprise 
human security: (1) economic security; (2) food security; (3) health security; (4) 
environmental security; (5) personal security; (6) community security; and (7) political 
security.102 
Human security seeks to reorient the pursuit of security by placing individual 
human beings at the center of security concerns.103  Tigerstrom indicates that the human-
centered focus of the concept of human security demands explicit attention to the needs 
and interests of individuals, and gives analytical and moral priority to individuals’ needs 
and interest over those of states.104  She also points out that the core of the human-
centered approach in human security is the normative priority of people’s security, 
especially in relation to states’ security.105  According to Fidler, the theoretical foundation 
of human security is rooted in the theory of social constructivism.106  Fidler notes that 
“[S]ocial constructivists generally focus on the ideational move away from the narrow, 
realist concept of national security toward more expansive notion of security, such as 
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human security, a shift that illustrates the power of ideas to shape how humans socially 
construct their relations globally.”107 
There are three different understandings about how best to understand and 
promote human security.108  The first understanding is a rights-based approach to human 
security, which focuses on the rule of law and treaty-based solutions to human security.  
This approach seeks to strengthen normative legal frameworks at both international and 
regional levels while also deepening and strengthening human rights law and legal and 
judicial systems at the national level.109  The second understanding is centered primarily 
on a humanitarian conception of human security where the “safety of people” is the 
paramount objective behind international relations.  This approach sees war as one of the 
principal threats to human security and identifies a need to go beyond the provision of 
emergency and humanitarian relief in war-torn societies and conflict settings by 
addressing the underlying causes of conflict and violence.110  The third understanding is 
the “sustainable human development” approach that takes a comprehensive view of what 
is required to produce human security.  This approach is associated with the UNDP’s 
multi-faceted definition of human security described above.111   
Under each of these approaches, human security broadens the scope of threats that 
should be considered security priorities.  Under human security, a security can be 
construed as any menace to “the quality of life of individuals.”112  Thus, human security 
regards the problems of hunger, poverty, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, 
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infectious diseases, and even natural disasters, such as tsunamis, as the most urgent 
security threats to daily life of individuals.113  Human security highlights the 
interdependence of these various security concerns.  For instance, if one group or 
individual is threatened, many other communities are also likely at risk.  Violations of 
human rights in a state cannot be contained in that one state alone.  This perspective 
reveals an intrinsic aspect of human security: to a certain extent, all human kind is 
inextricably connected.114 
 
Challenging Dominant Concepts of Security 
Human security represents a challenge to the traditional notion of security, which 
has been dominated by a realpolitik security perspective, by placing individual human 
beings at the center of security concerns.  Theoretically, realpolitik security flows from 
the theory of realism, which emphasizes four features of international relations: (1) 
statism; (2) anarchy; (3) survival of states; and (4) the self-help system.115  Statism means 
that the state is the pre-eminent actor and all other actors in international politics are of 
lesser significance.116  In terms of anarchy, anarchy does not imply chaos in international 
politics.  Anarchy means that no higher authority directs states’ behavior.117  Because 
states are the only pre-eminent actors in international politics, the primary objective of all 
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states is their own survival.118  The survival of states is held to be a precondition for 
attaining all other goals.  Because anarchy means that no higher authority exists to 
prevent and counter the use or threat of force, state security can only be realized through 
self-help.119  In this context, states cannot guarantee their own absolute security under the 
anarchical structure of international politics.  Therefore, realism focuses on the 
importance of states increasing their material capabilities, especially military power, in 
order to reduce their insecurity.120   
Under realism, state competition for material power brings about the security 
dilemma from which none can escape.121  The security dilemma occurs when two or more 
states each feel insecure vis-à-vis other states that they do not trust.  Under anarchy and 
the self-help system, no states feel secure, and no states trust other states not to take 
aggressive actions.  Thus, states make considerable efforts to strengthen their security 
needs through increasing their military forces.  This effort by one state increases 
insecurity for other states, and this security dilemma easily leads to tensions, conflict, and 
war.122  Although this dilemma can be mitigated (e.g., through balance of power 
alliances), it cannot be surmounted, as long as states possess ultimate military and 
material power in a political context characterized by anarchy.  Consequently, states have 
no choice but to pursue power as an overriding imperative.123  
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In this context, the military and material power that a state has play a crucial role 
in the perspective of realpolitik security.  In addition, because the balance of power is the 
central mechanism for international order under realism, states often ally with other states 
in order to preserve the balance of power among competing states.124  Because military 
and material capabilities of states have paramount importance in realpolitik security, this 
approach takes seriously neither non-military nor non-material capabilities of states, such 
as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic government.125  In this context, non-
military or non-material capabilities or attributes of states only matter in realpolitik 
security to the extent that these capabilities directly affect military or material capabilities 
of states.   
However, under the impact of globalization, material capabilities, especially 
military capabilities, do not necessarily enhance the security of states.  In other words, no 
matter how much states fortify military capabilities and reinforce alliances with other 
states for the protection of their security, their efforts may be ineffective against new 
threats driven by globalization.126  These globalized threats directly make realpolitk 
security obsolete as a perspective on security issues.  In addition, realpolitik security has 
little conceptually or practically to offer in terms of policies for addressing the new 
transnational security concerns fueled by globalization.  In this sense, the attempt of 
human security to place the protection of individual human beings before that of state 
directly challenges just about everything found in realpolitk security. 
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Globalization + Human Rights = Human Security 
The rise of human security as a concept in international relations and international 
law has been fueled by the convergence of the latest phase of globalization and the 
strengthening of the global human rights movement.  First, the loss of power by states 
and intergovernmental organizations caused by the turbulence of globalization creates or 
exacerbates potential new threats to individual lives.  Many individuals are exposed to 
various threats that have become increasingly transnationalized, such as corruption, 
repression, discrimination, extreme poverty and communicable and non-communicable 
diseases that cannot be addressed effectively within the traditional structure and dynamics 
of the Westphalian state system, especially its myopic perspective on what constitutes a 
security threat.127  Thus, there is an urgent necessity to reconsider globalized security 
concerns that directly affect the daily life of individuals.   
Second, the human rights movement has made a critical contribution to the 
emergence of the idea of human security.  The concept of human rights contains a 
fundamental belief in the indivisibility of security and human rights.128  This belief well 
suits the insecurities individuals face in a world of globalized problems.  Under the 
indivisibility of security and human rights, there can be no security for individuals if their 
right to life is endangered.  Similarly, security is also absent when individuals are denied 
the right to subsistence, such as through the denial of food, clothing, and housing.  If 
security is defined as protection from harm, then the infringement of fundamental rights 
creates insecurity.129  In this context, the expanding activities of NGOs, such as Amnesty 
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International, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, reflect this linkage between security and human rights.  In sum, the indivisibility 
of security and human rights, stimulated by the human rights movement, can be 
considered an essential factor contributing to the rise of human security.  
 
Concerns and Controversies about the Concept of Human Security 
Although human security represents a powerful perspective in the age of 
globalization, there are debates about the definition, applicability, and relevance of 
human security in international relations today.130  The most powerful critique of human 
security is that it is an overly broad and obscure concept of security.131  The lack of a 
precise scope and definition of human security makes the tenets of human security appear 
meaningless.  There is no apparent objective analytical criterion that determines whether 
a problem is or is not a human security issue.  Moreover, even scholars who claim that 
human security has relevance do not suggest that the human security approach embodies 
a unified approach to security.132  Paris notes, for example, that “[T]he existing definition 
of human security tends to be extraordinary expansive and vague, encompassing 
everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides 
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policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and 
academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.”133   
Human security comes under sharp critique because of its skepticism about states 
and the role of state-centric international organizations in security concerns.  Although 
human security’s emphasis on the importance of non-state actors may be relevant given 
globalization’s impacts and the growing power of human rights thinking, it has a 
somewhat skeptical view of the potential for cooperation among states and 
intergovernmental organizations.  However, states and intergovernmental organizations 
still play an essential role in managing global security, however defined, because states 
still remain enormous material power.134  In fact, the elaboration and development of 
human security policies need multidimensional cooperation among states and 
intergovernmental organizations.  For instance, official development assistance from 
developed countries to developing countries plays a huge role in reducing extreme 
poverty.135  Non-state actors, no matter how wealthy, simply do not have the scale of 
material resources that states can marshal to achieve their domestic and international 
interests.  Moreover, considering the efforts of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 
economic growth and poverty reduction, the UN Secretary-General has advocated close 
and more productive cooperation between the UN and the WTO.136 
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Despite the controversies surrounding the concept of human security, the concept 
has arrived as an important aspect of the dialogue in contemporary international relations 
and international law, and global governance.  Problems and skepticism typically stalk 
ideas on the cutting edge of global politics, and human security is no different in having 
its fair share of detractors and opponents.  The idea of human security is, without 
question, one of the leading normative ideas confronting policy makers in the 21st century, 
which makes understanding how this concept relates to the potential emergence of an 
Eastphalian perspective on international law and global governance worth exploring.  
 
6.4.2 Human Security and the Asian Perspective 
 The rise of the concept of human security in international relations and 
international law and the rise of Asia in world affairs have happened simultaneously 
within the past 20 years.  Thinking about human security from the perspective of Asian 
countries is, thus, more than an academic exercise because whether and how Asian 
nations accept this concept will have significant impact on the trajectory of this 
normative re-framing of the security debate in national and global governance.  The 
question this section explores is whether the aspects of the Asian perspective explored in 
this thesis offer prospects for Asian countries to become leaders in the development and 
refinement of the human security concept.  In short, the human security debate offers an 
opportunity to peer into what an Eastphalian worldview for the early 21st century might 
contain. 
 The premise of the analysis in this section is not that, at present, Asian countries 
have a unitary perspective on human security and its implications for international law 
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and global governance.  Not surprisingly, Asian countries have been participating in the 
arguments about what human security means.  Differences among Asian countries can be 
seen through viewing attitudes towards human security’s close relationship with two 
kinds of freedom: freedom from fear and freedom from want.  Connecting the goal of 
freedom from want with human security, the former UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Kofi 
Annan, emphasized that men and women should be free from want, so that threats such 
as extreme poverty and infectious diseases are lifted from their lives.137  With respect to 
freedom from fear, the UNSG notes that “[T]he threats to peace and security in the 21st 
century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, 
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.  They also include poverty, deadly infectious 
disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic 
consequences.”138  In terms of freedom from fear, the UNSG stresses that all men and 
women should be free from fear, so that their lives and livelihood are not ripped apart by 
violence, war and other forces destructive of individual and social safety and security.139 
 The freedom from fear and freedom from want lenses circulate in Asian debates 
about human security.  Anwar notes that “[A]lthough the two dimensions of human 
security—freedom from needs and freedom from fear—have been emphasized equally in 
official documents, it is no secret that for most NGOs and observers in Asia the main 
focus of interest is freedom from fear.  Although overcoming poverty is important, there 
has been very little debate about the subject at either the national and regional level.”140  
Contrary to Anwar’s observation, some Asian states have criticized linking human 
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security too closely with freedom from fear.  For instance, while acknowledging two 
elements of human security, Japan criticizes those who focus solely on freedom from fear.  
One Japanese official notes that “[H]uman security is a much broader concept.  We 
believe that freedom from want is no less critical than freedom from fear.  So long as its 
objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is 
necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human 
life in conflict situations.”141 
 More important analytically than such differences over where the emphasis in 
human security ought to be placed is whether the Asian perspective on international 
relations is conducive or receptive to either the freedom from fear or freedom from want 
aspects of the human security concept.  As explored in the last section, the human 
security concept involves a radical challenge to traditional ways of thinking about 
security.  Human security changes the focus of the security debate away from the state 
and towards the individual.  Almost by definition, human security looks past sovereignty 
to peer inside the state and assess how the state secures freedom from fear and freedom 
from want.  The human security concept is heavily influenced by human rights principles, 
so the substantive content of human security has a universal quality across nations and 
cultures. 
 Finally, the human security project seems interested in holding states accountable 
for how they secure freedom from fear and want for their citizens.  In short, pursuing 
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human security involves the need to intervene into the domestic affairs of states to assess, 
admonish, or assist efforts to increase each individual’s freedom from fear and want.  
When human security is gravely endangered within a state, human security policies 
embrace the right for other countries to intervene, perhaps even by military force, under 
the principle of the responsibility to protect.  The responsibility to protect expressly 
indicates that the foundation of this principle lies in obligations inherent in the concept of 
sovereignty.142  Furthermore, the responsibility to protect principle asserts that, where a 
population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the 
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.143 
 In all these respects, the human security concept is quintessentially post-
Westphalian because it challenges the traditional notion of sovereignty, tests sovereignty 
against a universal standard of treatment of humans, and advocates for intervention into 
the domestic affairs of states that do not work toward providing their peoples freedom 
from fear and freedoms from want.  
 The elements of the Asian perspective analyzed in this thesis do not, overall, 
combine in a manner receptive to the prevailing content of the human security concept.  
Philosophically, the Confucian perspective contains features that resonate with the human 
security idea, particularly the emphasis Confucius and Mencius placed on the ruler’s duty 
to secure his people’s physical safety (e.g., freedom from fear) and basic material needs 
(e.g., freedom from want).  Confucianism even contained the idea that one state could 
intervene with military force in another state whose rulers failed to secure such basic 
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levels of individual security and subsistence.  We can, thus, find in Confucian thought 
features that resemble, if only in a rudimentary way, human security’s universal scope, its 
concern with holding leaders accountable, and its integration of mechanisms to intervene 
when human security is threatened. 
 The elements of Confucian thinking that may resonate with human security 
concept are, however, overwhelmed by aspects of the Asian perspective that contradict or 
oppose the substantive content and policy implications of human security.  To begin, the 
“Asian values” debate examined in Chapter 5 indicates that many in Asia reject value 
universality as a premise for international law and global governance.  This attitude 
extends back to Asian participation in efforts of developing countries during the Cold 
War to stress the importance of peaceful co-existence (e.g., China’s Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit144), an approach based on respecting the 
differences that exist among states.  However problematical, advocacy for “Asian values” 
reveals a skepticism about and opposition to viewing the values of the West as the 
template for governance in other societies with different civilizational and political 
histories.  Approaching human security should, therefore, be a more conservative 
undertaking that respects different traditions and conceptions of the good society. 
 Two other elements of the Asian perspective augment this more conservative take 
on human security.  First, the skepticism about universal values connects directly back to 
the political experience of Asian peoples being the victims of Western imperial power and 
prejudice.  The Asian perspective stands as a warning of the dangers of pretending that 
power and principle are not two sides of the same coin in international affairs.  Second, 
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the Asian perspective focused heightened attention on economic, social, and cultural 
rights, which, by their very nature and design in international law, are relative to a 
country’s level of political, economic, and social development.  In short, beyond perhaps 
some minimal core content, economic, social, and cultural rights lack clear universally 
applicable meaning, unlike most Western-backed civil and political rights. 
 The Asian perspective also proves difficult for advancing the project of human 
security because Asian countries’ tendency to support strongly the principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.  As noted above, 
the concept of human security looks past sovereignty and has little patience with states 
arguing that sovereignty prevents outsiders from assessing their behavior within their 
own territories.  The still robust emphasis of Asian countries on the principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention blunt this critical aspect of human security because the 
emphasis values sovereignty more than transnational efforts to develop better human 
security in all countries.  In this respect, Asian countries tend to be consistent because 
they oppose outside interference in their own affairs and they refrain from criticizing and 
intervening in each other’s domestic affairs.  This consistency stands as an obstacle to the 
need within the human security project for mechanisms to probe the performance of 
states and intervene when states fail to protect and promote freedom from fear and 
freedom from want.  
 Measured against the quintessentially post-Westphalian concept of human security, 
the Eastphalian approach looks rather Westphalian in comparison because of its 
continued emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention into the domestic affairs of 
states.  The Asian perspective raises, however, questions about the post-Westphalian 
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conception on human security.  The most important of these questions is whether the 
prevailing concept of human security, and its corollary the principle of the responsibility 
to protect, constitutes in fact the best approach for states and the international community 
to achieve freedom from fear and freedom from want.  From the Asian perspective, the 
concept of human security looks like another “one size fits all” solution advocated by 
Western countries and human rights advocates that ignores the progress Asia as a region 
has made in advancing freedom from fear and freedom from want. 
 For example, the United Nations reported that Asia’s economic growth 
dramatically reduced extreme poverty and hunger, which is the first goal of the 
Millennium Development Goals.145  Progress on reducing extreme poverty and hunger 
qualifies as progress on increasing freedom from want within the region.  Despite 
tensions and differences, Asian countries have also avoided becoming engaged in inter-
state wars as the region has grown in economic and political significance.  The absence of 
such wars strengthens freedom from fear within the region.  These achievements in Asia 
are, of course, linked to global phenomena, such as the foundation for global trade 
provided by the WTO, and to active Asian participation in the workings of international 
and regional governance, such as the United Nations and ASEAN.  Nevertheless, 
avoiding large-scale wars, significantly increasing economic growth, and reducing 
extreme poverty and hunger are noteworthy human security achievements within the 
Asian region.  
 In short, the dissonance between the prevailing concept of human security and 
elements of the Asian perspective on international relations should not imply that Asian 
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countries have made no gains in improving human security.  These gains have been made, 
however, by following a different approach than the one found in the human security 
project associated with the continued attempt to universalize Western liberalism.  The 
gains made in Asia do not mean that human security problems are few and far between in 
Asian countries.  As noted earlier in this thesis, Asia today contains the best of the First 
World and the worst of the Third World, which makes the region such a fascinating 
potential laboratory for global governance on human security. 
 The Eastphalian recipe for dealing with human security problems is, however, 
more conservative and Westphalian than the prevailing concept of human security pushed 
in the West.  More specifically, at the macro-political level, this recipe involves robust 
national engagement with the global economic and financial system as means of 
increasing national and regional economic and material wealth and strenuous efforts to 
avoid inter-state war and conflict.  These strategies require no radical revisions of 
existing bodies of international law on the use of force and international economic 
cooperation.  In terms of how each country internally manages its economic and political 
affairs, the Eastphalian approach stresses the need for each government to understand and 
faithfully honor the duty it owes to provide security and subsistence for its people, and, in 
the Eastphalian context, this duty is informed more by the importance of economic, social, 
and cultural rights than Western practices.  
 However specifically any individual government fulfills its duty is not a basis for 
foreign interference and intervention into its domestic affairs.  The Eastphalian approach 
is tolerant of differences in governmental regimes, economic systems, and cultural 
traditions.  Changes to such regimes, systems, and traditions will occur, particularly in a 
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context of intensifying globalization, but the changes should be as indigenous as possible 
and flow from within the country rather than being imposed from without.  Both the 
philosophical heritage and historical political experiences of Asian countries tend to 
equate foreign intolerance of differences with the arrogant ambition of superior power.  
Thus, the Eastphalian perspective can embrace human security as an objective but differ 
from Western champions of this idea in how state and societies should pursue this 
objective.  
 
6.5 The China Factor: China’s Rise, Asian Concepts on Security, and the Future of 
International Law 
A final issue to consider in this chapter’s analysis of the Asian perspective on 
security and its implications for international law is the rise of China as a great power.  
Historically, China played a major role in shaping international relations in Asia, and 
Western imperialism interrupted Chinese influence by destroying the old Sinocentric 
system.  Japan, rather than China, was the first Asian great power to emerge after the 
Sinocentric system collapsed, but Japan’s day in the sun as the dominant Asian economic 
and military power produced tragedy for the region in the 1930s and during the World 
War II.  China’s recent rise to the status of a new great power is a development of great 
magnitude for not only Asia but also the entire international system.  For better or worse, 
China’s power will permeate almost everything about Asia and the Asian perspective on 
international law and global governance.  The China factor will be particularly important 
in the realm of regional, global, and human security. 
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Although the rise of Chinese power has so far been peaceful, China’s great power 
status has the potential to create security problems and conflicts in the Asian region.  
Foremost as a possible source of war in Asia is the tense situation between China and 
Taiwan, a situation that implicates the security interests of the United States and other 
regional powers, including Japan and South Korea.  The growing visibility of Chinese 
nationalism also raises security concerns in Japan because of the history of tense relations 
between the two countries flowing from Japanese aggression against China and other 
Asian countries in the 1930s and 1940s.  The restoration of Japanese power after World 
War II remained confined largely to the economic sphere because of the security umbrella 
provided by the United States.  But China’s rise as a great power contains a potential 
military component not feared in Japan’s post-World War II resurrection.  
Even given these worries in the traditional realms of national and international 
security, the rise of China is unlikely to create serious challenges to the prevailing system 
of international legal rules applicable to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Apart from the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, countries in the 
region do not seriously fear military attack by China, which suggests China is not likely 
to challenge the existing content of the international legal rules on the use of force 
discussed earlier in this chapter, and certainly not in ways the United States attempted in 
advocating for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense as a justification for its invasion 
of Iraq.  China’s power and influence in Asia largely meant that it, rather than the United 
States, determined the diplomatic approach the six-country talks took in dealing with the 
security problem North Korea’s nuclear weapons program presented. China’s presence on 
the UNSC, and its skepticism about the use of force for humanitarian interventions, will 
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likely mean that the UNSC does not become active in mandating humanitarian 
interventions and advancing the principle of the responsibility to protect. China’s 
opposition to UNSC mandates against Myanmar illustrates the likely Chinese approach to 
the UNSC’s role in addressing threats to international peace and security.  
The China factor in the security area is likely to be more interesting and 
controversial beyond the traditional realms of security addressed by the international 
legal rules on the use of force in the UN Charter. China’s power and interests are now 
truly global, and how China approaches its relations with other countries will be the most 
visible projection of an Eastphalian attitude towards international relations in the first part 
of the 21st century. The best example of the potential significance of China’s out-of-Asia 
impact on the nature of inter-state relations, international law, and global governance 
comes from China’s extensive involvement in diplomatic and economic activities in 
Africa.146  
Unlike the Western approach taken with African countries after the end of the 
Cold War, which sought to change radically the nature of African political and economic 
governance along Western models (e.g., in the form of structural adjustment policies and 
demands for democratic reforms), China is engaging African countries diplomatically and 
economically without making demands for serious macro-political and macro-economic 
changes in African governance. This approach applies to Chinese relations with such 
notorious governments as those in control of the Sudan and Zimbabwe. Although 
radically different from the Western post-Cold War approach to Africa, the Chinese 
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approach is quintessentially Asian in engaging with other countries diplomatically and 
economically without directly intervening in the domestic affairs of other states.  
 As criticism of China’s deepening involvement in Africa from human rights 
groups and democracy advocates suggests, the Chinese approach to Africa significantly 
narrows the room international human rights law can play in shaping Chinese-African 
relations and negates the possibility that expansion notions of human security will 
influence diplomatic and economic initiatives between China and African countries. 
Instead, the Chinese approach heightens the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention in international law without having such an emphasis prevent China from 
massively extending its influence and activities in Africa’s development. 
 As the growing controversy and concern about China’s involvement in Africa 
illustrates, the Chinese approach presents Western countries and their more 
interventionist proclivities with a serious challenge.  Although experts with a realpolitik 
perspective will see in China’s behavior the classic signs of a great power seeking to 
augment its material power at the expense of rival states, realpolitik analysis gives no 
credence to rules of international law in any context. Those concerned with the future 
direction of international law, and its role in global governance, may well be 
uncomfortable with the nature of China’s engagement of Africa because it does not 
reflect international legal principles other than very strong principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention.  Some of the most cutting edge areas of post-Cold War international law, 
such as advocacy for human rights, the promotion of democracy, and justifications for 
forcible humanitarian intervention, have in theory and practice sought to cut back the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention found in classical international law. 
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An understanding of the Asian perspective on international relations and 
international law, as this thesis has tried to provide, suggests that the nature of China’s 
approach to Africa should not be as surprising as it seems to many critics to be. This 
observation is not intended to express support or agreement with China’s behavior in its 
relations with Africa countries; rather, it is meant to underscore that China may be 
exporting aspects of the Eastphalian approach as it becomes a global power. China’s 
expanding international interests and presence may, therefore, become the global face of 
the Eastphalian strategy towards international relations in the first part of the 21st century. 
This global face, backed by Chinese power, may set itself against robust continuation of 
the post-Cold War trends in international law, which challenged traditional notions of 
sovereignty, demanded more accountability from governments, fostered the sovereignty-
penetrating processes of globalization, and sought to empower directly individuals and 
communities within states and across nations. Whether the globalization of the 
Eastphalian approach through Chinese power contributes to the same kind of security and 




This chapter has analyzed the Asian perspective on the international law 
addressing security issues, particularly the international legal rules relevant to the use of 
force, humanitarian intervention, and the concept of human security. This analysis 
revealed that the Asian perspective resonated well with traditional interpretations of the 
broad prohibition of the use of force by states and a narrow reading of the right to use 
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force in self-defense. The Asian perspective weighs in against using humanitarian 
intervention as a justification for the use of force by states, at least in the absence of 
authorization from the UNSC. In these regards, the Asian perspective does not represent a 
radical challenge to existing understandings of international law in these areas because 
many Western experts and governments hold similar views. Perhaps more important in 
this context is the rise of Asia’s political and economic importance, which gives the views 
of Asian countries more traction in international politics. Especially noteworthy in this 
sense is China’s emergence as a recognized and more assertive great power in the 
international system. 
 The Asian perspective on security matters in international relations also is 
important for the relevance and content of the concept of human security, which has 
emerged in the post-Cold War context as a leading normative development with deep 
implications for international law and global governance. As this chapter demonstrated, 
the Asian approach to international relations and the prevailing manner of explaining the 
human security concept do not share much, if any, common ground. In short, the Asian 
perspective offers little for advocates of human security to embrace. This fundamental 
divergence is not about the governance importance of working towards freedom from 
fear and freedom from want; rather, the divergence appears in how states should go about 
engaging each other in the pursuit of these objectives. Asian countries can claim that their 
approach can lead to gains in human security, as illustrated by the absence of inter-state 
wars among Asian countries and the significant reductions in extreme poverty and hunger 
Asian countries have made through economic growth.  All the attention on the rise of 
Asia must mean that Asian countries have more to offer human security than empty 
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incantations about the absolute nature of the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention. 
 The Asian perspective on security explored in this chapter will be significantly 
influenced by China’s emergence as a great power in global affairs. China’s increasing 
global interests, involvement, and initiatives may well be the mechanisms through which 
the Eastphalian approach to international law and relations becomes globalized. China’s 
great power status will, if nothing else, create an alternative approach to the more 
interventionist Western perspective refined after the end of the Cold War. The nature of 
this competition between the Eastphalian and the post-Westphalian perspectives is not yet 
clear, and predicting the future is always a dangerous game. The last chapter of this thesis 
will, however, probe the prospects for the globalizing Eastphalian perspective in the hope 
of casting some dim light toward the uncertain future. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Eastphalia Rising? 
Asia, International Law, and Global Governance 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapters of this thesis explored whether and how the rise of Asia’s 
importance strategically, politically, and economically may affect international law and 
global governance as the 21st century progresses. These chapters attempted to push 
beyond the superficial conclusion that Asia’s increased prominence would be a factor in 
shaping the future of international law and global governance. Political power is, of 
course, relevant to how states, international organizations, and non-state actors will 
operate international legal and global governance mechanisms in the future. This thesis 
has probed whether the manner in which Asian countries engage in international relations 
may reflect more than material power and help shape global affairs in ways that project 
ideas and approaches different from the dominant post-Westphalian trends seen since the 
end of the Cold War.  
 This line of enquiry has proved daunting and difficult, often raising more 
questions than answers. The notion that an “Asian perspective” can be culled from the 
diversity of the Asian region still may strike some as fanciful, but the idea and the attempt 
to analyze it has proved useful in highlighting features of Asian thinking and practice that 
may not otherwise have been considered in on-going debates about the future trajectories 
of international law and global governance. Part of the deeper hypothesis with this 
analysis is that ideas and historical traditions shape international law in addition to the 
disequilibrium of power that exists in any international system.  
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Part of the historical story of international law involves the “clash of civilizations” 
that took place when West met East, especially during the march of Western imperialism 
into Asia in the 19th century. The Asian attitude to international relations and international 
law has long been colored by the subordination of Asian culture and civilization to 
Western power and practices. The search for an Eastphalian approach to global affairs 
undertaken in this thesis was not a search for, or prediction of, another clash of 
civilizations. The contours of an Eastphalian approach have proven more subtle and, thus, 
more difficult to tease out clearly. This lingering ambiguity offers a target for criticism, 
but criticism would reflect stimulation of dialogue and debate about developments that 
are controversial but potentially of profound significance.  
This concluding chapter reviews the major arguments of the thesis, explores the 
strengths and weaknesses of the discernable features of an Eastphalian approach, and 
offers some thoughts on the problems the Eastphalian perspective may present to efforts 
in international law and global governance to advance important normative agendas in 
world affairs.  
 
7.2 Pillars of the Eastphalian Approach to International Relations 
  This thesis built its search for an Asian perspective on three analytical pillars—
philosophy, politics, and power. In terms of philosophy, the thesis explored various 
aspects of Confucian thinking that have had wide impact and influence in many Asian 
countries, particularly those in East Asia.1 This approach is consistent with analyses of 
international law and global governance that draw on Western philosophical traditions, 
                                            
1 See Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6, which contain analysis of various aspects of Confucian thinking. 
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especially the tradition of political liberalism in the post-Cold War period. The Confucian 
heritage does not encompass all philosophical traditions in Asia, but, for purposes of this 
thesis, it represents a tradition that has had wide impact and relevance, especially for 
China and other East Asian countries at the forefront of Asia’s rise to prominence in the 
early 21st century.  
 The political pillar of the Eastphalian approach represents the political 
perspectives Asian countries developed during their unfortunate experiences as targets of 
Western imperialism. These experiences continue to make Asian countries uncomfortable 
with Western-led initiatives to penetrate the sovereignty of Asian states in order to 
implement political, economic, and governance reforms.2 This political perspective is 
palpable when one compares the emphasis on sovereignty seen in Asian intra-regional 
organizations, such as ASEAN, with the more aggressive approach to sovereignty taken 
by the project of economic and political integration found in the European Union.  The 
distinctiveness of the Asian approach remains vibrant, as illustrated by a fairly uniform 
Asian resistance to forcing Myanmar to accept humanitarian assistance in the wake of the 
devastating cyclone in 2008. Eastphalian sensibilities about sovereignty and non-
intervention are also be on display with respect to China’s approach to its political and 
economic engagement with countries and regions outside Asia, such as Africa.3 
 The final pillar of the Asian perspective is power—Asia’s growing power and 
importance in the international system. But for Asia’s rise in political significance in 
world affairs, the philosophical heritage and historical political experiences of Asian 
                                            
2 See Chapters 3, 4, and 5, which contain analysis on the impact of Western imperialism on Asian 
perspectives on international politics. 
3 See discussion of China’s approach to political and economic engagement with Africa in 
Chapter 6. 
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countries would not matter as much in thinking about the future of global politics, 
international law, and global governance. In short, Asia matters today in ways that it did 
not matter in earlier historical periods, and a key element of this difference is the 
emergence of Asian countries as more substantial political and economic actors in their 
own rights in international affairs. Topping the power aspect of the Asian perspective is 
the development of China into a great power with global interests and global reach.4   
 The claim in this thesis is not that these pillars of the Asian perspective merge 
seamlessly and harmoniously into a unified attitude towards all issues percolating in 
international relations. Rather, the thesis demonstrates that understanding these three 
influences on Asian countries helps bring into focus some features of Asian attitudes 
towards international politics. These attitudes have potentially significant implications for 
the future of international law and global governance, as discussed more below. In the 
past, these features existed but without much impact on the trajectory of world politics 
because the Asian region was more an object of action by outside powers than a region 
that could influence international affairs independently. Asian countries can no longer 
simply influence world affairs by re-playing the trauma of the victim of imperialism and 
choosing sides in larger geo-political power struggles. Asian countries have emerged 
sufficiently from that sordid past and are now confronted with the task of looking 




                                            
4 See Chapter 6 for analysis of the importance of China’s emergence as a great power. 
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7.3 Potential Eastphalian Impact on International Law and Global Governance 
 Throughout this thesis, the features of an Eastphalian approach to international 
relations have contrasted starkly with much of the content and thrust of international law 
and global governance in the post-Cold War period. In short, we do not have much of a 
meeting of the minds between the post-Westphalian trajectory witnessed in international 
law and global governance over the past two decades and the Eastphalian emphasis on 
strong principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. 
The post-Westphalian trajectory, particularly in the areas of human rights, humanitarian 
intervention, and human security, limits and pressures the classical Westphalian principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention. As a result, the post-Westphalian approach creates 
more space for international law, both as a normative guide to political action and reform 
and as source of devising practical governance regimes to meet new challenges the 
globalized world faces.  
 The Eastphalian embrace of robust principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
has the opposite effect because it defends and extends the governance space that these 
principles can occupy in the relations between states. The thesis has explored the 
implications of the Eastphalian perspective for the international legal rules on human 
rights5 and the use of force,6 and these implications do not track where post-Westphalian 
moves in international law would take global governance. For example, the Eastphalian 
approach is not likely to support initiatives in international law to strengthen the 
international justiciability and enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights and to 
grant countries the legal right to intervene with military force under the principle of the 
                                            
5 See Chapter 5. 
6 See Chapter 6. 
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responsibility to protect. In terms of substance, the Eastphalian approach would reduce 
the influence of ideology in international law, a phenomenon stimulated by the American 
approach to international law and international relations during and after the Cold War. In 
terms of process, the Eastphalian perspective would subject changes in international law 
to more deliberate, state-centric processes and reduce the ability of non-state actors, such 
as NGOs, to influence the development of international law.  
As a result, global governance activities would be more conservative by 
respecting differences among states and societies and by being more state-centered in 
how governance arrangements were negotiated and implemented. The Eastphalian 
approach to global governance would prefer ad hoc, informal, and political solutions to 
shared collective action problems to more legalized and binding strategies often 
emphasized in post-Westphalian international legal discourse. The Eastphalian 
perspective recognizes the need for collective action among states, but its preference for 
the political over the legal would curtail more direct, expansive, and innovative uses of 
international law in global governance mechanisms.  
 
7.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Eastphalian Perspective 
 As delineated in this thesis, the Eastphalian perspective offers a different vision of 
the future of international law and global governance, and the vision is sufficiently 
different to spark controversy and opposition because it challenges the continuation of the 
post-Westphalian future for international law and global governance. In this context, 
probing the strengths and weaknesses of the Eastphalian approach proves worthwhile. In 
terms of possible strengths of the Eastphalian perspective, it is important to note that this 
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perspective does not radically challenge fundamental elements of the international system 
and basic principles of international law that support this system. In other words, 
Eastphalia is not a revolutionary mindset.  
 For example, Asian countries support traditional interpretations and applications 
of the international law on the use of force found in the UN Charter. At a time when 
Western governments (e.g., U.S. advocacy for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense) 
and non-state actors (e.g., NGO support for the principle of the responsibility to protect) 
often push for expanding the legitimate bases for using force in international relations, 
the Eastphalian outlook is less radical and threatening to international order. Similarly, 
Asian countries acknowledge the existence and importance of economic, social, and 
cultural human rights, as many Western countries do, and they connect these rights to 
their cultural understandings of the importance of communitarian duty and responsibility. 
The Eastphalian approach to economic, social, and cultural rights is fairly mainstream. 
The frustration of human rights advocates with the mainstream approach to economic, 
social, and cultural rights is not a frustration specific to an Eastphalian worldview.  
Recognition of the importance of raising standards of living through economic 
growth contributes to significant Asian participation in and commitment to international 
legal regimes encouraging trade and foreign direct investment. Asian countries are, 
therefore, willing and able participants in the governance regimes that attempt to stabilize 
and expand world economic activity, which most political leaders and economic experts 
believe is critical for preserving order and stability in international relations. Combined 
with its opposition to tinkering with the international law on the use of force, the Asian 
embrace of global economic interdependence gives the Eastphalian perspective on 
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international relations excellent credentials for supporting order, stability, prosperity, and 
peace among nations.  
Presented in its most positive light, the Eastphalian perspective urges leaders to 
manage cooperatively the systemic, structural aspects of international relations—
preventing war and promoting prosperity among states and peoples. How countries 
internally manage the political problems and possibilities that arise in a stable and orderly 
international system is more a matter of each state’s autonomy, and respecting that 
autonomy reduces inter-state frictions and heightens the duty of the nation’s leaders to 
secure the domestic safety and subsistence of their people.  
Presented in a more negative light, critics of Eastphalia would argue that its return 
to strong principles of sovereignty and non-intervention represents little more than an 
excuse for the continuation of undemocratic regimes and corrupt politics and for 
shielding illegitimate behavior from external scrutiny. Put more colorfully, Eastphalia 
looks like the worst bits of the old Westphalian system dressed in Asian clothing. There is 
nothing particularly Asian about acknowledging that war is bad and economic wealth is 
good. International law and global governance have moved normatively beyond these 
obvious objectives because achieving these objectives in a sustainable way requires 
digging into how states organize themselves internally and how they function as 
governance units in an increasingly interdependent world.  The Eastphalian perspective 
rejects the need for, and legitimacy of, this process of scrutinizing governance at all 
levels against dynamic principles of international law.  
In this respect, the Eastphalian approach is entirely backwards looking and has no 
positive, future-oriented agenda beyond chanting the virtues of sovereignty and respect 
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for political and cultural differences. Without such an agenda, Eastphalia has nothing 
normatively novel or constructive to contribute to efforts to improve human dignity in a 
world in which globalization is increasing inequalities and deepening inequities. 
Repeatedly genuflecting before the altar of sovereignty is neither new nor specifically 
Asian because many states in every region have engaged in this ritual, usually with 
adverse consequences for international and human security.  
The Asian interest in this ritual is supposedly to protect something “Asian” from 
further depredation at the hands of outside powers in the West. Eastphalia is empty in not 
articulating what the Asian “something” is and demonstrating that those outside Asia 
should accord it respect and space in the competition of ideas globalization fosters.  
 
7.5 Asia as a Laboratory for Human Security: Global Governance Looks East 
 In reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the Eastphalian perspective on 
international relations, this perspective seems poised at a historic transition point—it has 
arrived sufficiently to be taken into account, but has not yet clearly signaled where it will 
be going. Sufficient features of an Asian approach are discernable, particularly in light of 
Asia’s growing prominence and the increasing attention the region receives. This 
approach, and its proximate causes (philosophy, political experience, and power), cannot, 
with prudence, be dismissed as irrelevant merely because it does not mirror the post-
Westphalian vision of the future of international law and global governance. This vision 
does not universally hold sway in the West either, so it should not hold pride of place in 
assessing the Eastphalian worldview.  
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 Recognizing basic features of the Eastphalian perspective is, however, also not 
sufficient to give this perspective lasting importance in international relations. The real 
test for Eastphalia is whether it can inform the responses Asian countries and other 
nations develop for improving human security. Whether Asian countries desire it or not, 
the rest of the world will be watching how Asian governments approach the plethora of 
human security challenges remaining in the region. The recognition of the progress Asia 
has made in reducing extreme poverty and hunger demonstrates that the global 
governance spotlight will shine on Asia. Asia’s political prominence means that how 
Asian countries respond to this attention will have global significance.  
 In this context, Asian countries will have to supplement the basic outlines of the 
Eastphalian perspective sketched in this thesis with more specific blueprints for 
effectively tackling human security challenges, including environmental degradation, 
transnational organized crime, terrorism, and the spread of infectious diseases. In keeping 
with the Eastphalian approach, these governance blueprints may not be influenced or 
connected with principles of international law. Any lack of international legal texture to 
policy approaches to human security threats will only become politically salient if the 
approaches taken manifestly fail to improve human security. Successful management of 
human security problems underneath the emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention 
will go a long way toward making Eastphalia a more credible global template for political 
and governance action.  
 In this light, the Eastphalian perspective may prove more valuable as an influence 
on global governance than on international law. The nature of the Eastphalian outlook 
means that Asian countries will develop various policy responses to similar human 
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security challenges, which will make Asia something of a global laboratory for 
governance of human security threats. Asian political and economic development has 
proceeded sufficiently to warrant seeing Asia in this light, whereas viewing Africa in the 
same light would be unhelpful and unfair. Eastphalia could advance if Asian countries 
can move beyond defensively proclaiming “Asian values” to move towards proactively 
creating “Asian solutions.”7  
 As analyzed in this thesis, the Eastphalian perspective does not contain sufficient 
features to provide strong hints about what Asian solutions to human security threats 
might be. More research and analysis would be necessary to flesh out whether the 
outlines of such solutions are emerging across the range of human security problems Asia 
faces. Such exploration would likely produce areas in which Asian solutions are found 
wanting, and Asian governmental responses to such findings that simply parrot the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention will not be impressive. Eastphalia should 
not be the expedient haven of Westphalian concepts long ago discredited as rather 
unhelpful in improving the human condition. At the end of the day, in the era of 21st 
century globalization, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention will not provide 
                                            
7 Recognition of the need for Asian solutions, and their importance beyond Asia, is revealed in 
this announcement of a forthcoming January 2009 conference in Singapore: “Asia’s growing 
economic and geopolitical importance has led to increased interest in its social protection and 
social welfare programs. How do these diverse countries deal with aging, disability, drug and 
alcohol abuse, housing, income supports and welfare, health care coverage, old-age pensions, 
single mothers, social services, unemployment, and the working poor? How can we encourage 
cross-national exchanges among researchers, academics, practitioners, and government officials? 
The Lee Kuan Yew school of Public Policy and the University of Maryland School of Public 
Policy in association with the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management will hold a 
conference to explore these and other topics in Singapore, January 7 through January 9. The 
conference will highlight scholarly—but policy-oriented—papers on these and similar 
topics. . . .The conference will close with a panel on ‘Implications Beyond Asia’” Asian Social 
Protection in Comparative Perspective, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National 
University of Singapore, January 7-9, 2009. 
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much political cover. What Asian countries do with the policy space the principles of 
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